¶ 127. (dissenting) . Each taxpayer should pay the taxes that he or she owes under the tax laws — no more, no less. The majority opinion rewrites the plain language of the *651governing law and creates a new exemption in the tax laws that the legislature did not see fit to enact.
¶ 128. The majority opinion states that its decision "has great import to the average taxpayer in this state."1 I agree. The fiscal implications of the new tax exemption created by the majority opinion are substantial: According to the Legislative Fiscal Bureau's January 30, 2007, revenue and expenditure projections, the state's projected loss in revenue as a result of the erroneous decision in the present case will exceed $277.6 million prior to the end of the 2007-09 biennium and $28.3 million annually thereafter.2 Wisconsin taxpayers will pick up the tab left by those who have escaped taxation as a result of the majority opinion.
¶ 129. A court should not effectively override an enacted tax statute by imposing the court's views of economic policy or of the wisdom of a tax law. With this principle in mind, I examine the text of the applicable statute and administrative rule.
¶ 130. The legal question presented, and the facts, are really rather simple when stripped to their essence.
¶ 131. Here's a snapshot of the law: Wisconsin taxes the sale, lease or rental of tangible personal property.3 " 'Tangible personal property'... in-*652eludes ... computer programs except custom computer programs." Wis. Stat. § 77.51(20) (2003-04).4
¶ 132. A custom computer program is defined by the Department of Revenue's rule, Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e), (k), and (m), which everyone agrees governs the instant case. According to the administrative rule, the words "custom computer program" mean "utility and application software which accommodate the special processing needs of the customer."5 The administrative rule also provides that custom programs do not include "prewritten programs" (sometimes also called "canned programs"),6 which are "programs prepared, held or existing for general use normally for more than one customer ... ,"7 A program is either a (taxable) prewritten program or a (tax-exempt) custom program; it cannot be both.8
*653¶ 133. Here's a snapshot of the facts: In 1995 SAP leased its R/3 System to Menasha Corporation. The R/3 System consists of some 70 software modules, each providing a rudimentary business and accounting software system for a customer's business. The R/3 System is not designed specifically for any customer. R/3 is a product that SAP leases in unmodified form to many customers. In other words, the R/3 System is a platform that an individual business uses for creating its own customized business and accounting software. SAP's customers must undertake their own modification of the R/3 platform to customize it for their own business needs.
¶ 134. By 1998 SAP had leased this same software to more than 20,000 customers across the world.9 In 1997 Business Week noted that "SAP's R/3 runs the back offices of half of the world's 500 top companies— scheduling the manufacture of washing machines at General Electric Co. and shipping soda pop on time at Coca-Cola Co."10
¶ 135. The leasing arrangement between SAP and its customer (here Menasha Corporation) is separate and distinct from any arrangements the customer thereafter makes with any entity for modifying the R/3 System to meet the customer's particular software needs.
¶ 136. The lease of the R/3 software by SAP to Menasha Corporation for $5.3 million (which did not oblige SAP to provide customization services) is the *654basis for the tax in the present case. Relevant to the instant case, the Department of Revenue is not imposing a tax on expenditures of more than $16 million that Menasha Corporation made over the next seven years to customize the R/3 System.
¶ 137. In sum, the R/3 System was not written solely for Menasha Corporation or upon its request. SAP had developed the R/3 System before meeting up with Menasha Corporation and has leased the same R/3 System to thousands of customers.
¶ 138. The majority opinion agrees that "the R/3 System exists and can be sold to everyone in the same form."11
¶ 139. Here's the legal question of statutory interpretation presented: Is the R/3 System of 70 modules leased by SAP to Menasha Corporation in 1995 a taxable "computer program" or a tax-exempt "custom computer program" as these words are defined in the administrative rule?
¶ 140. Here's a snapshot of the majority opinion's answer to the legal question: The majority opinion hides behind the decision of the Tax Appeals Commission. It cannot hide. It bears full responsibility for the result.
¶ 141. Interpretation of a statute or a rule is a question of law determined by this court independently of other courts or administrative agencies. In interpreting a statute or an agency rule, a court may, but need not, accord an agency's interpretation of a statute deference or weight. The court reserves its authority to interpret the law. Indeed, it is the court's responsibility to decide questions of law and to determine whether deference is due and what level of deference is due to an *655agency interpretation and application of a statute.12 By granting deference or weight to an agency interpretation, the court does not, and should not, abdicate its authority and responsibility to decide questions of law.13
¶ 142. Furthermore, deference or weight is due to an administrative agency only when the agency's interpretation is consistent with the language, meaning, and purpose of the statute or rule and is reasonable.14 The court itself must always interpret the statute to determine the reasonableness of the agency determination.15
¶ 143. In the present case, the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation of the statute and rule governing computer software and custom computer software is inconsistent with the language, the meaning, and the purpose of the statute and administrative rule and is not reasonable. The Tax Appeals Commission's determination therefore cannot be entitled to any deference or weight as this court determines the question of law presented.
*656¶ 144. Nevertheless, the majority opinion hides behind the Tax Appeals Commission by spending many pages uselessly, confusingly, and often erroneously discussing whether the Department of Revenue's interpretation of its own rule or the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation of the Department's rule should be given some kind of weight as the court determines the question of statutory interpretation presented.16 All of this *657discussion in the majority opinion is beside the point, given that the Commission's interpretation is, in any case, unreasonable and should be given no deference at all.
¶ 145. The majority opinion does not take seriously its duty to render its own interpretation of the administrative rule and to scrutinize the reasonableness of the Commission's interpretation. Although con*658ceding numerous imperfections in the Tax Appeals Commission's Ruling and Order,17 the majority opinion does its best to paper over, or to ignore, the Commission's obvious failures to remain faithful to the clear text of Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(1). The majority opinion abandons its responsibility as the ultimate authority to decide issues of law, perfunctorily and unpersuasively concluding that the decision of the Tax Appeals Commission is consistent with the administrative rule and is reasonable.
¶ 146. Here's a snapshot of the Tax Appeals Commission's erroneous reasoning (upon which the majority opinion erroneously rests): The Tax Appeals Commission makes two critical errors in interpreting and applying Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(1).
¶ 147. First, and most importantly, the-Tax Appeals Commission utterly disregards the administrative rule's definition of nontaxable "custom programs" as "utility and application software which accommodate the special processing needs of the customer." Nowhere in its opinion does the Tax Appeals Commission apply the rule's definition to the facts of the present case. The Commission's opinion effectively repeals the administrative rule's clear language setting forth this definition.
¶ 148. The R/3 System that SAP leased to Mena-sha clearly does not fit within the rule's definition of "custom programs." Everyone agrees that the R/3 System *659that Menasha Corporation acquired from SAP did not "accommodate the special processing needs of' Menasha. Everyone agrees that the R/3 System is leased in unmodified form to many customers and that the R/3 System does not meet the special processing needs of any particular customer. The Tax Appeals Commission and the majority opinion could not possibly have reached a contrary conclusion if they had honored the text of the administrative rule defining "custom programs."
¶ 149. Second, the Tax Appeals Commission misconstrues the administrative rule's definition of taxable "prewritten programs," adding words and ideas to the plain language of the rule that cannot be found in the rule's text. Prewritten programs are defined in relevant part as "programs. . . existing for general use." The Commission erroneously converts the words "existing for general use" in the administrative rule to read "ready for use off the shelf without any modification."
¶ 150. The essence of the Tax Appeals Commission's decision is that because Menasha Corporation had to customize the R/3 System after the Corporation acquired it, the R/3 System is a custom computer program, not a prewritten program existing for general use. According to the Tax Appeals Commission, the distinction between custom computer programs and prewritten programs hinges on the amount of effort necessary to get the software operational for a particular customer's needs. The Commission concludes that the R/3 System does not "exist for general use," because it is, in the Commission's view, "useful only after a significant investment of resources in planning, testing, training, enhancement, and maintenance ... ."18
*660¶ 151. The plain language of the administrative rule does not support the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation. The administrative rule does not define a prewritten program as one that requires no additional investment from the customer after its acquisition. The rule requires only that a prewritten program is "prepared, held or existing for general use," not that the program is ready for use right off the shelf without any modification. The phrase "for general use" does not include any mention of the amount of time necessary to get the program up and running for the individual customer.
¶ 152. Nor does the fact that the R/3 System is not ready for use off the shelf without any modification mean that the program is not of use or useful in the unmodified state in which SAP leases the program to its customers. Of course the unmodified R/3 System is used and is useful. The R/3 System is used and useful as, in the Tax Appeals Commission's own words, "a rudimentary business and accounting computer software system[.]"19 SAP's customers use this rudimentary business and accounting computer software system to advance their abilities to build the business and accounting programs that will meet their own particular needs. SAP's customers do not, as the Commission implies, pay millions of dollars to acquire something that has no use.
¶ 153. When the administrative rule's definition of "prewritten program" is applied as written, not as rewritten by the Tax Appeals Commission and the majority opinion, the R/3 System that SAP leased to Menasha clearly fits within the definition of "prewritten program." The R/3 System is an existing program that Menasha Corporation acquired in unmodified form, not *661a program that SAP created or modified at Menasha Corporation's request. The R/3 is suitable for general use; it is used by many customers other than Menasha Corporation. The program thus is a prewritten program "existing for general use normally for more than one customer."
¶ 154. In sum, the Tax Appeals Commission ignores the administrative rule's definition of "custom programs" and rewrites the rule's definition of "prewrit-ten programs." The majority opinion seriously errs in adopting the Commission's interpretation as its own, when the Commission's interpretation is so plainly inconsistent with the rule's language, meaning, and purpose.
¶ 155. This court should, in my opinion, follow the excellent memorandum decision of Judge Steven Ebert of the Dane County Circuit Court, which reversed the deeply flawed decision of the Tax Appeals Commission.
¶ 156. I shall first set forth the undisputed facts, then the applicable administrative rule, and finally I shall apply the statute and rule to these undisputed facts in greater detail than presented in the snapshots above.
I — I
¶ 157. SAP leased its R/3 software to Menasha Corporation for a license fee of approximately $5.3 million.20 SAP's lease of its R/3 software to Menasha Corporation was routine in nature and similar to the *662circumstances of its R/3 sales to its other customers.21
¶ 158. The R/3 System is a software product that SAP leases in unmodified form to many customers.22 *663SAP's leases of R/3 System software are sales of "off-the-shelf' standardized software; the program is written before the sale and is sold to a wide variety of customers.23 SAP does not modify the existing software modules before shipment to customers.24 SAP and Menasha Corporation's agreement made no provision for customization of the R/3 System software by SAP25 The customer must implement the R/3 System on its own or hire SAP consultants or SAP approved independent consultants.26 SAP keeps the lease agreement separate from any agreement relating to consulting and maintenance services.27
¶ 159. In other words, the R/3 System is not designed specifically for any customer. SAP itself agreed in a Wisconsin Department of Revenue audit that R/3 is subject to Wisconsin sales tax as "off-the-shelf1 standardized software written before the time of the sale and intended to be sold to a wide variety of customers.28 *664According to the Tax Appeals Commission, SAP admitted that the R/3 System is prewritten and paid the Department of Revenue more than $1.9 million in tax and interest for sales to Wisconsin customers; SAP further agreed to collect sales and use taxes thereafter.29
¶ 160. The R/3 System is an example of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software, that is, "generalized, integrated software that [can] be customized for virtually any large business."30 The R/3 System contains a basic business and accounting system that did not meet Menasha Corporation's (or any entity's) particular needs for a business and accounting software system.31 SAP markets the R/3 System not as software that is customized to the needs of SAP's customers but rather as software that is customiza&Ze to the customer's needs.
¶ 161. Like SAP's other customers, Menasha Corporation acquired the R/3 System from SAP to customize it to meet Menasha Corporation's needs.32 After licensing the R/3 System from SAI] Menasha Corporation expended a large sum of money over seven years to customize the software to fit its business needs. All told, Menasha Corporation paid approximately $16,275,000 in consulting fees for the purpose of customizing the R/3 software: $13 million to ICS Deloitte (an SAP "logo partner" that Menasha Corporation elected to hire); $2.5 million to SAP; and $775,000 to consultants asso-*665dated with neither ICS Deloitte nor SAE33 SAP was one of at least five different groups of personnel involved in the implementation team that modified R/3 to meet Menasha Corporation's needs.
¶ 162. The Department of Revenue imposed $265,093 in sales or use taxes on the $5.3 million that Menasha Corporation paid to SAP for the lease of the R/3 software 34 It is this tax that is at issue in the present case.35 Menasha Corporation's refund claim *666pertains solely to the $265,093 in sales or use tax payments arising from Menasha Corporation and SAP's $5.3 million transaction for the acquisition of SAP's R/3 software. The present case has nothing to do with the nontaxable $16,275,000 in consulting fees that Mena-sha Corporation paid in various transactions over the course of seven years for the purpose of customizing the R/3 software.
¶ 163. Those are the undisputed facts. I turn to the law and its application to the undisputed facts.
I — ( I — 1
¶ 164. The Department of Revenue promulgated Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71 under its rule making authority.36 Section 11.71, entitled "Computer industry," restates (among other matters) Wis. Stat. § 77.51(20) to provide that the receipts of the retail lease of "computer programs, except custom programs," are taxable37 and defines terms relevant to taxation of the computer industry. Like the Tax Appeals Commission and the majority opinion, I look to the administrative rule to answer the legal question posed in the present case.
*667¶ 165. Section 11.71(l)(e), (k) and (m) of the Wisconsin Administrative Code (Tax) defines the words "custom program" as used in § Tax 11.71 (and thus Wis. Stat. § 77.51(20)) as follows:
(e) "Custom programs" mean utility and application software which accommodate the special processing needs of the customer. The determination of whether a program is a custom program shall be based upon all the facts and circumstances, including the following:
1. The extent to which the vendor or independent consultant engages in significant presale consultation and analysis of the user's requirements and system.
2. Whether the program is loaded into the customer's computer by the vendor and the extent to which the installed program must be tested against the program's specifications.
3. The extent to which the use of the software requires substantial training of the customer's personnel and substantial written documentation.
4. The extent to which the enhancement and maintenance support by the vendor is needed for continued usefulness.
5. There is a rebuttable presumption that any program with a cost of $10,000 or less is not a custom program.
6. Custom programs do not include basic operational programs or prewritten programs.
7. If an existing program is selected for modification, there must be a significant modification of that program by the vendor so that it may be used in the customer's specific hardware and software environment.
*668(k) "Prewritten programs", often referred to as "canned programs", means programs prepared, held or existing for general use normally for more than one customer, including programs developed for in-house use or custom program use which are subsequently held or offered for sale or lease.
(m)... For purposes of this section a program is either a prewritten or custom program.38
¶ 166. When I apply the administrative rule to the undisputed facts, it is clear that the R/3 System is excluded from being a custom computer program under the very first sentence of the rule.
¶ 167. The first sentence of Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e) defines the term "custom programs" to "mean utility and application software which accommodate the special processing needs of the customer." The Tax Appeals Commission recognizes that the administrative rule's first sentence defines the term "custom programs.” Quoting directly from the rule's first sentence, the Commission states that "[sjection TAX 11.71(l)(e)(intro) defines custom programs 'as utility and application software which accommodate the special processing needs of the customer.' "39 The Tax Appeals Commission is obviously correct that the ad*669ministrative rule's first sentence defines "custom programs." The first sentence begins, " 'Custom programs' mean . . . (emphasis added). The verb "mean" denotes definition.40
¶ 168. Although claiming to defer as a general matter to the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation of the administrative rule, the concurrence apparently does not defer to the Commission's conclusion that the rule's first sentence defines "custom programs."41 The concurrence also does not explain what the rule's first sentence means, or what function it serves, if it does not define "custom programs."
¶ 169. Everyone agrees that the R/3 System that Menasha Corporation acquired from SAP did not "accommodate the special processing needs of' Menasha Corporation.42 Software that is leased in unmodified form to many customers and that does not provide *670adequate processing for any particular customer obviously does not accommodate the customer's special processing needs. Indeed Menasha Corporation had to expend more than $16 million over seven years to fit the R/3 System to Menasha's special processing needs.
¶ 170. The Tax Appeals Commission completely disregards the administrative rule's first sentence defining "custom programs." In its opinion, the Commission neither acknowledges nor explains its failure to apply the definition set forth in the rule. It appears that the Commission's error was inadvertent, not the result of a conscious determination that the administrative rule's definition of "custom programs" somehow is not controlling in the instant case. The Commission just seems to have forgotten that the definition is there.
¶ 171. The majority, however, certainly is aware that the definition is there. The Department of Revenue argues to this court that the rule's first sentence defining "custom programs" must be applied in deciding the instant case.
¶ 172. The Department of Revenue, for example, states in a brief to this court (using the words of the rule's first sentence) that the outcome in the present case depends upon "whether the software sold under the sales transaction with the seller accommodates the special processing needs of the customer . . . ."43 In the same brief, the Department further argues that "[a]s purchased by Menasha under its software sales contract with SAR R/3 was not 'custom' because it did not 'accommodate the special processing needs of the cus*671tomer' as required by subsection (e) of DOR's rule."44 Again the Department relies on the first sentence.
¶ 173. During oral argument to this court, the Department of Revenue again stated its position that the court must apply the administrative rule's first sentence defining "custom programs" in determining whether the R/3 System is a "custom" program for purposes of the rule. Counsel for the Department of Revenue made the following statement to this court:
[T]he rule says that "custom software" is software that accommodates the specific processing needs of the customer. The R/3 modules ... as purchased by Mena-sha are not "custom software" within that definition because as purchased the modules did not accommodate the specific processing needs of Menasha. Mena-sha hired ICS so to customize the software so that it would accommodate Menasha's specific processing needs. ...
When asked where in the rule counsel found this definition of "custom software," counsel referred the court to the first sentence of the rule.
¶ 174. Although the majority is aware that Wis. Admin. Code § 11.71(1)(e) defines the term "custom programs" in its first sentence, and although the majority is also aware that the Department of Revenue relies upon the definition set forth in the first sentence, the majority opinion does not apply the rule's definition of "custom programs"; does not explain why it does not apply the rule's definition of "custom programs"; and does not acknowledge the Department's argument that the rule's definition of "custom programs" should be applied.
*672¶ 175. Instead of applying the definition as written, the majority opinion relies exclusively upon the rule's second sentence, which states that the determination of whether a program is "custom" shall be based on all the facts and circumstances. The majority opinion decides the present case simply by "weighing" the relevant facts and circumstances, as if Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e) did not define "custom programs" but instead merely set forth some sort of amorphous balancing test with no bottom line. The majority opinion concludes that the facts and circumstances "weigh in favor" of holding that the R/3 System that SAP leased to Menasha Corporation is a custom program. The majority opinion nowhere determines whether the facts and circumstances show that the R/3 System fits within the rule's definition stating that " '[c]ustom programs' mean utility and application software which accommodate the special processing needs of the customer."
¶ 176. The Tax Appeals Commission and the majority opinion clearly err in disregarding the administrative rule's first sentence defining "custom programs" and in relying exclusively on the rule's second sentence stating that the determination whether a program is custom shall be based on all the facts and circumstances. The rule's second sentence supports rather than displaces the definition set forth in the first sentence, instructing the court what factors to consider when determining whether a program accommodates the special processing needs of the customer.
¶ 177. For example, when a vendor enters into a transaction to sell a standardized software package but also agrees to modify the software for the customer (thus giving the software elements of both a prewritten program and a custom program), the software initially *673meets the administrative rule's definition of a custom program. Then the factors set forth in the rule's second sentence must be examined to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the program is a tax-free "custom" program accommodating the special processing needs of the customer. The second sentence, however, does not come into play when the program obviously is excluded from the definition of a custom program under the first sentence.
¶ 178. The rule's first sentence defining "custom programs" clearly provides the rule's bottom line. Put another way, although the application of the rule need not end with the first sentence in every case, it does begin with it. The dissent examines and applies both the first and second sentences of the rule. The majority opinion erroneously attends only to the second sentence and entirely ignores the first in deciding the instant case.
¶ 179. I could end the dissent right here. The plain language of the first sentence of Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e) leaves no doubt that the present case must be resolved in favor of the Department of Revenue. I shall, however, proceed to the administrative rule's second sentence and to the list of seven factors enumerated within the rule's text. The rule's second sentence and enumerated factors reinforce the rule's first sentence defining "custom programs."
¶ 180. The sixth enumerated factor, Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e)6., shows that the R/3 system cannot be a custom computer program. The sixth factor states that "[cjustom programs do not include basic operational programs or prewritten programs." No one argues that the R/3 System is a basic operational program. Rather the dispute is whether it is a prewrit-ten program. Prewritten programs are defined in Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(k) as "programs prepared, *674held or existing for general use normally for more than one customer."45 Furthermore, § Tax 11.71(l)(m) states that a prewritten program for purposes of § 11.71 is either a prewritten or custom program.
¶ 181. The language of Wis. Admin. Code § 11.71(l)(e)6. and (m) make clear that if the R/3 System is a "prewritten program," it cannot qualify as a custom computer program. The Tax Appeals Commission understood that the rule's sixth factor has this meaning, stating that factor six "is as much a veto as a factor"46 and that "[t]his case hinges on whether the R/3 System is a prewritten program."47 The Commission's proper interpretation of the plain language of § Tax 11.71(l)(e)6. as a veto is further supported by Wis. Admin. Code Tax § 11.71(l)(m), which provides that for purposes of § Tax 11.71, "a program is either a prewritten program or a custom program," not both.
¶ 182. Although conceding that the R/3 System is "existing rather than created"48 and is leased in identical form to a large number of customers, the Tax Appeals Commission and the majority opinion shockingly conclude, contrary to the very words of the rule, that the R/3 System does not exist for general use by more than one customer.
*675¶ 183. The Tax Appeals Commission reaches this conclusion in disobedience of the plain language of the administrative rule, explaining that the only "use" of the R/3 System was its use after extensive post-sale modification had customized the software to Menasha Corporation's particular business needs. As the majority opinion states, the Tax Appeals Commission reasons that the R/3 System does not exist for general use because the software is "useless until modified."49
¶ 184. According to the Tax Appeals Commission, "[t]he distinction between custom and prewritten programs hinges on the amount of effort necessary to get the software operational for a particular customer's needs."50
¶ 185. Put another way, the Tax Appeals Commission concludes that SAP's sophisticated business customers pay millions of dollars to acquire software that has no use and is useless in the form purchased. Nonsense! Menasha Corporation paid $5 million for software that it knew had a use and that it knew would be useful to it: Menasha used, and paid a lot of money to use, the R/3 System as a rudimentary business and accounting software system that advanced Menasha Corporation's ability to build its own business and accounting software system that met Menasha's Corporation's particular needs.
¶ 186. The Tax Appeals Commission's decision rests on converting the words "existing for general use" in the administrative rule's definition of prewritten *676program to the words "ready for use off-the-shelf' without any modification51 It is unreasonable to interpret the words "existing for general use" as "ready for use off-the-shelf' without any modification. Reasonably construed, the words "existing for general use" mean just what they say: that the program exists (as opposed to a program that must be created at the customer's order) and is suitable for general use (as opposed to the special use of one customer). The text of the administrative rule says nothing about whether a program is "ready for use off-the-shelf' without any modification.
¶ 187. The R/3 System that SAP leased to Mena-sha clearly falls within the administrative rule's definition of prewritten program. Because factor six (and (l)(m)) act as a "veto," rendering prewritten programs and custom programs mutually exclusive, the R/3 System cannot be a custom program under Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e).
¶ 188. The Tax Appeals Commission concluded that although "SAP admitted that the R/3 software is prewritten and subject to the sales and use tax," and although SAP "backed up" this admission by paying taxes on past sales of the R/3 software and agreeing to collect sales and use taxes on future sales, SAP's admission and actions have "no value" in the instant case and are not "probative."52 The Tax Appeals Commission's position that SAP's admission and actions have no value and are not probative is not reasonable. How can the seller's agreement that its own software is taxable as "prewritten" software be without any probative value?
*677¶ 189. In sum, the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation and application of the administrative rule's sixth factor is unconvincing for several reasons.
¶ 190. First, nothing in the words of the administrative rule supports the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e)6. changing the words "general use" to read "ready for use off-the-shelf' without any modification. The words "ready for use off-the-shelf' without any modification are conspicuously absent from the text of Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(k). The administrative rule's text does not require that the "use" of a prewritten program must be use of the program off the shelf and without modification.
¶ 191. Second, the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation of "prewritten program" in Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(k) as ready for use off the shelf without any modification is not only contrary to the words of the rule but also contravenes the history of the administrative rule.53 The history behind the rule shows that the majority opinion rewrites the text of *678Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(k) to include the very language that the Department of Revenue expressly refused to put in the rule at the time of the rule's promulgation.
¶ 192. The computer industry apparently lobbied the Department during the promulgation of Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71 to define "prewritten programs" as programs that are ready for use off the shelf. When the Department was preparing the definition of "prewritten programs" in Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(k), an attorney representing the computer industry (the very same attorney, as it happens, who represented Menasha Corporation before the Tax Appeals Commission in the present case) lobbied the Department to define "prewrit-ten programs" as programs intended for general use "and mass distribution as prepackaged ready-to-use programs" (emphasis added).54
¶ 193. The Department expressly denied the attorney's request, stating that it would stick with "the prewritten program definition we originally used."
¶ 194. The Department's refusal to define "pre-written programs" as "prepackaged ready-to-use programs" stemmed from its longstanding position that prewritten programs need not be ready for use off-the-shelf. In two "technical information memoranda" dated April 2, 1976, and August 7, 1978, the Department of Revenue defined the term "prewritten (canned) programs" as "programs prepared, held or existing for general or repeated use, including programs developed for in-house use and subsequently held or offered for *679sale or lease."55 The technical information memoranda elaborated upon this definition by explaining that "pre-written (canned) programs" need not be ready for use off-the-shelf. The memoranda stated that "[i]n some cases [prewritten programs] are usable as written" but that "in most cases it is necessary that the program be modified, adapted and tested to meet the customer's particular needs."56
*680¶ 195. Third, the Tax Appeals Commission's decision yields unreasonable and absurd results. In its decision the Commission considers the Menasha Corporation's seven-year history working with the R/3 System in determining that the R/3 System was not a prewritten program because it was "useful only after a significant investment of resources in planning, testing, training, enhancement, and maintenance... ,"57 Yet the seller and buyer need to determine the taxability of the transaction in the year the agreement is completed. At the time of the agreement, the vendor and customer may not know what future steps the customer may take to customize the software to its own needs, or how *681much the customer may invest relative to the purchase price.
¶ 196. Fourth, the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code Tax § (l)(e)6. reduces the factor to mere surplusage. Thus the Tax Appeals Commission bases its interpretation of factor six largely on the rule's first four factors, each of which (according to the Commission) "hinges on the degree to which the software is ready for use off-the-shelf."58 Why conclude that factor six seeks to measure the same attributes of the software program that the other factors measure? The plain language of enumerated factor six does not refer to the other five preceding factors. Each factor in the definition of "custom program" is independent of the others, and each must be interpreted individually based on the plain language of the rule.
¶ 197. Factor six states simply that "custom program" does not include a prewritten program. The other enumerated factors do not influence the plain language of enumerated factor six. By interpreting factor six to mean nothing more than the combined meaning the first four factors, the Tax Appeals Commission reduced factor six to surplusage.
¶ 198. Again, I could end the dissent here. Like the first sentence of Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e) defining "custom programs," the rule's definition of "pre-written programs" and the veto provision in the rule's sixth factor clearly demonstrate that the R/3 System is not a custom program. Nevertheless, I will address two other errors in the Tax Appeals Commission's decision that render the decision in conflict with the plain text of the administrative rule.
*682¶ 199. The Tax Appeals Commission errs in interpreting enumerated factor two, which has two parts: (1) "[w]hether the program is loaded into the customer's computer by the vendor" and (2) "the extent to which the installed program must be tested against the program's specifications."59
¶ 200. With regard to the first part, the Tax Appeals Commission found that "the fact that a former SAP employee loaded the [R/3] software weighs in favor of a finding that the software at issue is custom software."60 The Commission's finding ignores the plain language of the rule, which requires that the program is loaded "by the vendor" (emphasis added). A former employee of the vendor is not the vendor.
¶ 201. The language of the rule is clear, and the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation and application of factor two is inconsistent with the language of the administrative rule. The Commission did not apply the "by the vendor" language literally. The Commission's interpretation is unreasonable.
¶ 202. Finally, the Tax Appeals Commission does not account for the seventh factor. The seventh factor states, "If an existing program is selected for modification, there must be a significant modification of that program by the vendor so that it may be used in the customer's specific hardware and software environment." Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e)7.
¶ 203. The Tax Appeals Commission concluded that the reference in factor seven to " 'existing program' means an 'existing program for general use' as that phrase is used in the definition of 'prewritten pro*683grams ..."61 The Commission then determined that, because the Commission had already concluded that the R/3 System is not a prewritten program, "this factor does not come into play."62 According to the Tax Appeals Commission, the seventh factor comes into play only if the software is prewritten.
¶ 204. The Tax Appeals Commission's reasoning is odd. As counsel for Menasha Corporation has explained, the Commission's decision does not apply factor seven literally.63 Furthermore, the Commission's conclusion that factor seven comes into play only when a program is prewritten implies that factor seven is surplusage. As the Commission itself seemed to recognize, the "veto" provision in factor six states that any program which is prewritten cannot be a custom program. If factor seven comes into play only when a program is prewritten, it thus has no effect.
¶ 205. In sum, I agree with the circuit court. I would apply Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e), (k), and (m) according to their clear text and would conclude that the R/3 System that SAP leased to Menasha is not a "custom program" as that term is defined in the text of the rule. It is undisputed that the R/3 software that SAP leased to Menasha Corporation did not "accommodate the special processing needs of the customer." Rather, the exact same package of 70 software modules was sold to thousands of different customers regardless of each customer's individual processing needs. The R/3 System is a "prewritten program" al*684ready existing for general use, not a program created or customized for Menasha's special use. Because the R/3 System was not customized, Menasha Corporation had to enter into separate service contracts, subsequent to licensing the software, to customize the software to meet Menasha Corporation's special processing needs.
¶ 206. To reach a result favorable to Menasha Corporation, the Tax Appeals Commission and the majority opinion do violence to the plain language of Wis. Admin. Code Tax 11.71(1). The Tax Appeals Commission and majority opinion reach their holding in the only way they can: by disregarding the definition of "custom programs" set forth in Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e) and by rewriting the definition of "prewritten programs" set forth in Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(1)00-
¶ 207. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 208. I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this dissent.
Majority op., ¶ 5.
See letter from Robert Wm. Lang, Director, Legislative Fiscal Bureau, to Sen. Russell Decker & Rep. Kitty Rhoades, Chairs, Joint Committee on Finance (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/Misc/2007_01_30_Revenue Estimates.pdf (last visited June 27, 2008).
Wisconsin's retail sales tax applies to receipts from the sale, lease, or rental of tangible personal property. See Wis. Stat. § 77.52(1) (providing in relevant part that "[f|or the privilege of *652selling, leasing or renting tangible personal property... at retail a tax is imposed upon all retailers at the rate of 5% of the gross receipts from the sale, lease or rental of tangible personal property ... sold, leased or rented at retail in this state").
Wisconsin's use tax applies to the use of tangible personal property purchased from a retailer. See Wis. Stat. § 77.53(1) (providing in relevant part that "an excise tax is levied and imposed... on the storage, use or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased from any retailer, at the rate of 5% of the sales price of that property ...").
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(e) (Sept. 2006).
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e)6. (Sept. 2006).
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(k) (Sept. 2006).
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(m) (Sept. 2006) ("For purposes of this section a program is either a prewritten or custom program.").
Martin Campbell-Kelly, From Airline Reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog: A History of the Software Industry 196 (MIT Press 2003).
Campbell-Kelly, supra note 9, at 197 (quoting Gail Ed-mondson et al., "Silicon Valley on the Rhine," Business Week, Nov. 3, 1997, at 40, 42).
Majority op., ¶ 88.
Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Wis. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶ 14, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.
Id.
In several tax cases the court has stated that when the facts are undisputed, a court may substitute its judgment for that of the Department of Revenue or the Tax Appeals Commission regarding the interpretation and application of a statute to the undisputed facts. See, e.g.,DOR v. Bailey-Bohrman Steel Corp., 93 Wis. 2d 602, 606-07, 287 N.W.2d 715 (1980); H. Samuels Co. v. DOR, 70 Wis. 2d 1076, 1083-84, 236 N.W.2d 250 (1975). Later cases have moved away from these cases without explanation and without overruling these cases.
Majority op., ¶¶ 53-54, citing DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶¶ 11, 13, 19, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311.
Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶ 14.
I do not reach the hypothetical issue whether deference would be due to the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation of the administrative rule if the Commission's interpretation were reasonable. I do, however, disagree with the majority opinion's discussion of the issue of deference in the instant case. I note two obvious errors in the majority opinion.
First, it does not make sense for the majority opinion to conclude that although this court owes only "due weight" deference to the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 77.51, the court must give the Commission "controlling weight" deference insofar as the Commission interprets the Department of Revenue's administrative rule interpreting Wis. Stat. § 77.51. See majority op., ¶ 53. How can the majority opinion hold that the Commission's interpretation of the Department's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 77.51 is entitled to a higher level of deference than the Commission's interpretation of the statute itself?
Second, the majority opinion is incorrect to conclude that whether the Department of Revenue has acquiesced in the Commission's interpretation of a statute or administrative rule has "no relationship" to this court's determination whether deference is due (and how much deference may he due) to the Commission's interpretation. See majority op., ¶ 71. This court has previously recognized that whether an adjudicative agency's interpretation of a statute has been embraced by a line agency (the Department of Revenue in the instant case) may be relevant to the question what level of deference is due to the adjudicative agency's interpretation. See Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶ 53 (stating that when the Divi*657sion of Hearings and Appeals adjudicates disputes under certain statutes, the level of deference owed to the Division's decision depends upon whether the line agency sharing concurrent jurisdiction with the Division has adopted the Division's decision as its own).
For the statutory provisions regarding the Department of Revenue's power to acquiesce or not acquiesce in the Commission's interpretation of a statute, see Wis. Stat. § 73.01(4)(e)l. and § 73.015(2) (providing that the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation of a statute is not binding upon the Department in future cases when the Department seeks review of the order or decision of the Commission construing the statute); Wis. Stat. § 73.01(4)(e)2. (providing that even when the Department does not seek review of the Commission's decision or order, the Department may issue a "notice of nonacquiescence," the effect of which is that "although the decision or order is binding on the parties for the instant case, the commission's conclusions of law, the rationale and construction of statutes in the instant case are not binding upon or required to be followed by the department of revenue in other cases.").
The Internal Revenue Service similarly may acquiesce or not acquiesce in decisions of the United States Tax Court. Susan A. Berson, Federal Tax Litigation § 1.01[7], at 1-13 (2008). In reviewing decisions of the United States Tax Court, the federal courts owe no deference to the Tax Court's interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, or to the Tax Court's interpretations of the law generally. 3 Laurence F. Casey, Federal Tax Practice § 9.06, 9-13 to 9-14 (2007).
See, e.g., majority op., ¶ 78 (acknowledging that a portion of the rule's text conflicts with the Commission's application of the rule); majority op., ¶ 85 n.24 ("While the Commission's language is somewhat perplexing. . ."); majority op., ¶ 96 (raising a question about the Tax Appeals Commission's interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code Tax § 11.71(l)(e)7.); majority op., ¶ 95 ("While the Commission could have used different language ...").
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,856 (WTAC 2003).
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,843 (WTAC 2003).
See majority op., ¶ 20; Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,845, 32,847 (WTAC 2003).
In 1995, Menasha Corporation agreed to lease the R/3 software from SAP for approximately $5.2 million dollars. In 1997, Menasha Corporation then made an additional payment of $100,000 in licensing fees to SAP, bringing the total sum that Menasha Corporation paid for the lease of SAP's R/3 software to approximately $5.3 million.
*662The record does not make clear what Menasha Corporation received in consideration for the additional $100,000 in licensing fees that it paid to SAP in 1997. The parties do not seem to distinguish between Menasha Corporation's initial payment of $5.2 million and its subsequent payment of $100,000. Thus, I assume for purposes of this opinion that the additional payment of $100,000 was, like the initial payment of $5.2 million, for the lease of the R/3 software.
SAP's transaction with Menasha Corporation is denominated a "license" agreement, not a "lease" agreement. However, the term "lease," as it is defined for purposes of Wis. Stat. §§ 77.51-66, "includes rental, hire and license." Wis. Stat. § 77.51(7). Thus, for purposes of this opinion, I make no distinction between an agreement to "lease" and an agreement to "license." Software license agreements are also ordinarily referred to as "sales." See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (N.D. Ca. 2004) ("These copyrighted software programs are licensed ('sold' is the term applied to these license transactions)....").
See Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,845 (WTAC 2003).
See Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,847-32,848 (WTAC 2003). See also Campbell-Kelly, supra note 9, at 196-97.
Professor Campbell-Kelly explains that although SAP once operated "as a 50-person custom programming outfit rather than a software products firm," SAP's "switch to a software products firm came in 1978," when "SAP decided to rewrite its software as E/2 [a predecessor of R/3], with the medium-term aim of turning it into a product." Campbell-Kelly, supra note 9, at 193.
Professor Campbell-Kelly's history of the software industry is accepted as an authoritative text. The United States District Court about Oracle Corporation's efforts to acquire the stock of PeopleSoft, Inc. See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101, 1004 (N.D. Ca. 2004).
See Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,845 (WTAC 2003).
See Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,845 (WTAC 2003).
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,845 (WTAC 2003).
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,848 (WTAC 2003).
Id.
SAP's business practice is to distinguish between and to separate the sale of its R/3 software and any sale of consulting services to its customers. Thus SAP keeps its licensing agreement separate from any agreement for consulting services. The licensing agreement did not obligate SAP to modify the software to suit Menasha Corporation's particular work environment as part of the 1995 license transaction.
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,847 (WTAC 2003).
Id. at 32,848.
Campbell-Kelly, supra note 9, at 172.
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,843 (WTAC 2003).
Campbell-Kelly, supra note 9, at 172.
See majority op., ¶ 22; Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,847 (WTAC 2003).
$265,093 is approximately 5% of $5.3 million.
Both Menasha Corporation and the Tax Appeals Commission are not consistent in referring to the taxes at issue as "sales" taxes or "use" taxes. The Tax Appeals Commission variously characterizes Menasha Corporation's claim as one for the refund of "use tax" payments, "sales tax" payments, and "sales and use tax" payments. Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,843, 32,848, 32,857 (WTAC 2003).
The retail sales tax ordinarily is imposed on the retailer, in this case SAE Wis. Stat. § 77.52(1). However, Menasha Corporation apparently contracted with SAP to pay any retail sales tax arising from SAP and Menasha Corporation's lease agreement for the R/3 software. See majority op., ¶ 30; Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,848 (WTAC 2003).
Menasha Corporation initially sought a refund of $342,614.45. Majority op., ¶ 24; Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,843 (WTAC 2003). However, the $342,614.45 figure represented not only the $265,093 that Menasha Corporation paid in sales or use taxes on the lease transaction but also an additional $77,521 in tax payments on $1,550,424 that Menasha Corporation paid to SAP for maintenance of the R/3 software. These facts are set forth in the petition for review (and its appendices) that Menasha Corporation filed with the Tax Appeals Commission.
The $77,521 in tax payments arising from Menasha Corporation and SAP's transactions for maintenance of the R/3 soft*666ware is no longer at issue. The parties settled their dispute about Menasha Corporation's liability for these taxes while proceeding before the Tax Appeals Commission. See Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,848 (WTAC 2003). Under the parties' settlement agreement, Menasha Corporation received a partial refund of $38,760.
Wisconsin Stat. § 277.11(2) and (2)(a) authorize an agency such as the Department of Revenue to "promulgate rules interpreting the provisions of any statute enforced or administered by it, if the agency considers it necessary to effectuate the purposes of the statute ...."
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(2).
Wisconsin Admin. Code ch. Tax 11, including § Tax 11.71(1), is applicable to the state sales and use taxes imposed under Wis. Stat. §§ 77.51-66. See Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.001(1).
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,854 (WTAC 2003) (emphasis added).
*669The Commission refers to "Section TAX 11.71(l)(e)(intro)." In legislative parlance, an introduction is "an unnumbered subunit of a section, subsection, paragraph, or subdivision of the statutes with a colon at the end followed by a list of two or more items in numbered subunits." Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual 2007-2008, § 1.001(20) at 9. Accordingly, the Commission's reference to "Section TAX 11.71(l)(e)(intro)" is to all the text in Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e) preceding the rule's colon and numbered subunits.
See Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual 2007-2008, § 2.01(l)(i) at 39 ("In a definition do not use 'means and includes.' 'Means' is complete and 'includes' is partial. Using 'includes' allows a court or administering agency to adopt additional meanings; using 'means' restricts them to reasonable constructions of your wording.") (emphasis added).
See concurring op., ¶¶ 115-116.
As the majority opinion acknowledges, the R/3 System "did not provide adequate processing for Menasha." Majority op., ¶ 16.
Brief and Supplemental Appendix of Petitioner Wisconsin Department of Revenue in Response to Non-Party Brief of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce at 11.
Id. at 12.
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(k).
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,855 (WTAC 2003).
Strangely, the majority opinion does not appear to defer to the Commission's conclusion that factor 6 functions as a veto. The majority opinion determines, in contradiction to the Commission, that factor 6 cannot alone be dispositive of the question whether a computer program is custom. See majority op., ¶ 92.
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,855 (WTAC 2003).
Majority op., ¶ 88.
Id., ¶ 89.
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,856 (WTAC 2003). The Tax Appeals Commission decided that "[t]he issue is not whether the end result is a program that provides standard business application, but rather the obstacles one must overcome to get to apply the software." Id. at 32,855.
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,855 (WTAC 2003).
Id. at 32,854.
The Department of Revenue promulgated Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71 in 1986. 361 Wis. Admin. Reg. 28 (Jan. 15, 1986). The Department amended Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71 once, in 1993. 447 Wis. Admin. Reg. 24 (Mar. 14, 1993). Among other things, this amendment added language to Wis. Admin. § Tax 11.71(l)(e)6. clarifying the Department's position that custom programs do not include prewritten programs. Under the then-existing statute, the Department of Revenue had considered "prewritten programs" as taxable.
The legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 77.51(20) in 1992 to provide that "tangible personal property" includes "computer programs except custom computer programs." 1991 Wis. Act 269. According to a Department of Revenue memo included in the drafting file for the 1992 amendment, the object of this amendment was to adopt the Department's interpretation of computer *678programs (except custom computer programs) as tangible personal property. Drafting File, 1991 Wis. Act 269, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.
The record contains a letter that the Department of Revenue sent to the attorney in response to his request.
DOR Tech. Info. Mem. 38.4 (Aug. 7, 1978); DOR Tech. Info. Mem. 38.1 (Apr. 2, 1976).
This definition of "prewritten (canned) programs" is nearly identical to the definition of "prewritten programs" now set forth in the text of Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(k).
Although the Department of Revenue's technical information memoranda are not binding upon the Department, the Department may be equitably estopped from collecting taxes in a manner inconsistent with the positions set forth in its technical information memoranda. See DOR v. Family Hosp., Inc., 105 Wis. 2d 250, 255-56, 313 N.W.2d 828 (1982) (holding that the Department was equitably estopped from collecting a certain tax from the defendant hospital when the hospital had reasonably relied to its detriment upon a DOR technical information memorandum stating that hospitals were exempt from the tax).
DOR Tech. Info. Mem. 38.4 (Aug. 7, 1978); DOR Tech. Info. Mem. 38.1 (Apr. 2, 1976).
The Department of Revenue also remained consistent in its position after promulgating Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71. For example, in a 1992 "tax release," the Department stated that under Wis. Stat. § 77.51(20) (as amended by 1991 Wis. Act 269), "[a]ny customizing, other than changes made by the vendor prior to sale or license, does not affect the taxability of the sale." Wis. Tax Bull. 79, Oct. 1992, at 23. The DOR also has published one additional tax release, as well as eight private letter rulings, interpreting Wis. Stat. § 77.51(20) and Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71 consistently with the Department's longstanding position that the distinction between "custom" and "prewritten" programs does not hinge upon whether a program is ready for use *680off the shelf. See Wis. Tax Bull. 122, Oct. 2000, at 42 ("Modifications made hy Customer D or other third parties, subsequent to the initial licensing [of a computer program], do not impact on the determination of taxability at the time of sale."). See also Wis. Tax Bull. Ill, Oct. 1998, at 33-38 (Private Letter Rulings W9831006 & W9832007); Wis. Tax Bull. 107, Apr. 1998, at 31-33 (Private Letter Ruling W9810003); Wis. Tax Bull. 91, Apr. 1995, at 33-37 (Private Letter Ruling W9452010); Wis. Tax Bull. 81, Apr. 1993, at 31-34 (Private Letter Rulings W9251014 & W9253016); Wis. Tax Bull. 78, July 1992, at 19-20 (Private Letter Ruling W9214005); Wis. Tax Bull. 76, Apr. 1992, at 19-20 (Private Letter Ruling W9202001).
The Wisconsin Tax Bulletin, a quarterly newsletter that includes the Department of Revenue's published tax releases and private letter rulings, is available at the Department's Web site, http://www.revenue.wi.gov/ise/wtb/index.html (last visited June 30, 2008).
Under Wis. Stat. § 73.035, the DOR may issue and publish a private letter ruling in response to a request for a ruling about facts relating to a tax that the DOR administers. A private letter ruling does not bind the requester and may not he appealed. Wis. Stat. § 73.035(2).
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,856 (WTAC 2003).
Id. at 32,855. See also id. at 32,856.
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(l)(e)2.
Menasha Corp. v. DOR, Wis. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 400-719, at 32,855 (WTAC 2003).
Id. at 32,856.
Id.
See Foley and Lardner LLR Legal News: Federal and State Controversy, Apr. 2004, at 6, available at http://www.foley. com/publications/newsletters_archive.aspx?year_2004 (last visited June 30, 2008).
See Legislative Fiscal Bureau revenue and expenditure projections, January 30, 2007, 4. Available at http://www. legis.state.wi.us/lfb/Misc/2007_01_30_"revenueestimates.pdf (last visited June 25, 2008).