dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, Article VIII, § 14 of the South Carolina Constitution does not prohibit local governments from criminalizing conduct which is not unlawful under State law.
Appellant Greenville County (County) enacted Ordinance 2727 which makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally appear nude in public or to operate any public place where persons would be appearing nude.1 Respondent Diamonds, a nightclub specializing in “adult entertainment,” brought this declaratory judgment action seeking to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional.
South Carolina Constitution Article VIII, § 14, provides:
In enacting provisions required or authorized by this article, general law provisions applicable to the following matters shall not be set aside:
(1) The freedoms guaranteed every person; (2) election and suffrage qualifications; (3) bonded indebtedness of governmental units; (4) the structure for and the administration of *161the State’s judicial system; (5) criminal laws and the penalties and sanctions for the transgression thereof; and (6) the structure and the administration of any governmental service or function, responsibility for which rests with the State government or which requires statewide uniformity.
When construing the Constitution, the Court applies rules similar to those relating to the construction of statutes. McKenzie v. McLeod, 251 S.C. 226, 161 S.E.2d 659 (1968). In construing a statute, the Court must give clear and unambiguous terms their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute’s operation. Gilstrap v. South Carolina Budget and Control Bd., 310 S.C. 210, 423 S.E.2d 101 (1992).
Article VIII, § 14 does not require statewide uniformity of general law provisions regarding “criminal laws and the penalties and sanctions for the transgression thereof.” Instead, the preamble to Article VIII, § 14, provides “general law provisions applicable to the following matters shall not be set aside.” (emphasis added). The plain meaning of this provision requires local enactments “set aside” some existing provision of the general law before a constitutional violation occurs.
Ordinance 2727 is not inconsistent with any State law relating to nudity and, therefore, does not “set aside” any criminal laws enacted by the State. Accordingly, I would hold that the enactment of Ordinance 2727 does not violate Article VIII, § 14 of the South Carolina Constitution.
The majority relies on Connor v. Hilton Head Island, 314 S.C. 251, 442 S.E.2d 608 (1994), where this Court held, inter alia, a municipal enactment prohibiting nude dancing violative of Article VIII, § 14, even though no State law prohibited nude dancing. In my opinion the Connor Court erred. The Court held that conduct which is not unlawful under State laws cannot be made unlawful by local enactment. In effect, the Court provides all conduct is lawful unless made unlawful by enactment of the General Assembly. Article VIII, § 14 does not yield to such an interpretation. Local government enactments which are not inconsistent with any State law do not “set aside” any criminal laws enacted by the General Assembly. See Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. 550, 397 S.E.2d 662 (1990) (in order to preempt *162an entire field, an act must make manifest a legislative intent that no other enactment may touch upon the subject in any way).
The majority also relies on Davis v. County of Greenville, 322 S.C. 73, 470 S.E.2d 94 (1996), and Robinson v. Richland County Council, 293 S.C. 27, 358 S.E.2d 392 (1987). Neither of these decisions, however, addressed the validity of local legislation which set aside a subject encompassed by Article VIII, § 14 of the South Carolina Constitution.
I would reverse and I would overrule Connor insofar as it holds that local governments may not criminalize conduct which is not unlawful under statewide criminal law.
. The ordinance has several exceptions, each of which respondents concede would be met.