dissenting.
Because I believe Matthews v. DeKalb County Hosp. Auth., 211 Ga. App. 166 (438 SE2d 404) (1993) is indistinguishable from the Poes’ situation, I respectfully dissent. I do not believe that the patient-health care provider relationship had been established and, even if the required consensual relationship is assumed, the failure, if any, to comply with the requisite standard regarding assessment of the baby was not the proximate cause of baby Poe’s death.
In addition to the facts contained in the majority opinion, viewing the record under the standard for consideration of a motion for j.n.o.v., the following evidence also was adduced. Dr. Tilelli, one of the Poes’ expert witnesses, stated that the baby was not in shock when the triage was performed. In his experience, with the baby’s symptoms, a “septic workup would have to be done as part of routine care of the baby” once treatment began. He stated that, for Gunnin to tell the Poes that the “baby is okay now” was “an appropriate remark” because one aspect of triage nursing is to be reassuring and to calm people down. He also stated that “[i]f they had stayed, they would *113[have seen] a doctor.”
Also, Dr. Cullen, another of the Poes’ experts, opined that, had the baby been seen 15 to 30 minutes after arriving at the hospital, which would have occurred if the Poes had not left, that would have been appropriate treatment.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Poe stated that Gunnin kept assuring them that the baby was all right. However, as Dr. Cullen stated, that was appropriate for Gunnin to do. Mrs. Poe acknowledged that she was given the clip board with forms to complete and that she knew that Gunnin did not mean that she was to leave without seeing a doctor. “I know that she did not mean that, but she ... I was convinced that . . . maybe I was overreacting.” Mrs. Poe knew that, had they remained, they would have seen a doctor. Similarly, Mr. Poe acknowledged that Gunnin gave them the forms to fill out, that they waited in the waiting room for a while, and that, despite Gunnin’s .attitude toward him, they would have seen a doctor had they remained. He and Mrs. Poe discussed leaving because they thought, based on what Gunnin had said, they were overreacting. They left without telling anyone they were leaving. It is not disputed that the consent to treat form was never signed.
1. In Matthews, supra, Mrs. Matthews went to the emergency room at 11:25 p.m., complaining of pain in her chest radiating down her arm. While her vital signs, like baby Poe’s, were slightly elevated, she was not in pain at that time. She was classified as a category 2 non-life threatening condition and told it would be a long wait. After a four and a half hour wait, Mrs. Matthews was told she would be seen next, but because she felt she had not been seen quickly enough, she left. Similarly, here, the Poes, although about to be seen by a doctor, chose to leave the facility without signing the consent form or advising anyone that they were leaving without treatment. In such a situation, the patient-health care provider relationship was not established, as a matter of law. Id.; Minster v. Pohl, 206 Ga. App. 617 (426 SE2d 204) (1992); Clough v. Lively, 193 Ga. App. 286 (387 SE2d 573) (1989); compare Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute, 188 Ga. App. 106, 112 (2) (372 SE2d 265) (1988), aff’d 259 Ga. 376 (382 SE2d 597) (1989).
This conclusion is also supported by the counterbalancing legal principle that a person is allowed the choice of foregoing needed medical care, and giving treatment without the required consent could have resulted in a claim of battery. OCGA § 31-9-6; In re L. H. R., 253 Ga. 439, 446 (321 SE2d 716) (1984); see Smith v. Wilfong, 218 Ga. App. 503, 507 (2) (462 SE2d 163) (1995).
2. Even assuming that such a relationship was established, however, the improper classification of baby Poe was not the proximate cause of his death, nor was the reassurance given by Gunnin, which *114plaintiffs’ own experts acknowledge was appropriate.
Decided November 21, 1996 Reconsideration denied December 19, 1996 Sullivan, Hall, Booth & Smith, Terrance C. Sullivan, Rush S. Smith, Jr., Phillip E. Friduss, Dan S. McDevitt, for appellant. Thomas, Kennedy, Sampson & Patterson, Thomas G. Sampson, La’Sean M. Zilton, Love & Willingham, Traci G. Courville, H & M Johnson, E. Duane Jones, for appellees.OCGA § 51-12-9 provides that “[djamages which are the legal and natural result of the act done, though contingent to some extent, are not too remote to be recovered. However, damages traceable to the act, but which are not its legal and natural consequence, are too remote and contingent to be recovered.”
“To recover damages in a tort action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s negligence was both the ‘cause in fact’ and the ‘proximate cause’ of the injury. The requirement of proximate cause constitutes a limit on legal liability; it is a ‘policy decision . . . that, for a variety of reasons, e.g., intervening act, the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s injury are too remote for the law to countenance recovery.’ McAuley [v. Wills, 251 Ga. 3, 7 (303 SE2d 258) (1983)].” Atlanta Ob. & Gyn. Group v. Coleman, 260 Ga. 569 (398 SE2d 16) (1990).
The decision of the Poes based on their conclusion that they were “overreacting” was an intervening act not reasonably foreseeable at the time it occurred. The Poes, when last seen by Gunnin, were in the process of completing the necessary paperwork for treatment of their child. I find it impossible to conclude that it was foreseeable to the hospital personnel that the parents would walk out of the emergency room without notifying anyone of their intentions to do so, particularly in light of the intensity with which they had insisted on immediate treatment. Therefore, I do not believe that, even assuming a provider-patient relationship, the Poes were entitled to recover because the alleged breach of the duty owed, i.e., the misclassification of the baby’s condition, while perhaps a “cause in fact,” cannot be said to have been the proximate cause of the baby’s tragic death. E.g., Wright v. Ashe, 220 Ga. App. 91, 94 (469 SE2d 268) (1996); Wanless v. Winner’s Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 785 (3) (341 SE2d 250) (1986).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Judge Smith and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.