concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur fully in Division 6 of the majority opinion that no private cause of action arises from violations of the Georgia Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, OCGA § 33-6-30 et seq., and concur in the judgment only as to the disposition of Case No. A05A1090, I must respectfully dissent from the other divisions and to the judgments in Case Nos. A05A0726 and A05A1077. An insured whose insurer systematically and fraudulently undervalues insured vehicles, only paying fair market value when the insured invokes a contractual appraisal clause, states a claim for relief that should not be dismissed on the insurer’s motion. If it could be so dismissed, then an insurance company could consistently undervalue all of its claims, only pay full value to those insureds who have the time and resources to persevere through an additional procedural level, and never have to account to its underpaid customers. Further, I cannot agree that Eberhardt v. Ga. Farm &c. Ins. Co., 223 Ga. App. 478, 479 (2) (477 SE2d 907) (1996), and Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Kent, 187 Ga. App. 496, 497 (1) (370 SE2d 663) (1988), render moot McGowan and Dasher’s claims for breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the RICO statute.
Our Supreme Court declared in Brack v. Brownlee, 246 Ga. 818, 819 (273 SE2d 390) (1980) that the parties to a contract “are under an implied duty of good faith in carrying out the mutual promises of their contract.” Jackson Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ga. Power Co., 257 Ga. 772, 774 (1) (364 SE2d 556) (1988). Thus, a duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in all contracts in this State and insurance policies are merely a specialized form of contract. McGowan and Dasher thus *496were entitled to expect that Progressive Preferred and Atlanta Casualty would exercise good faith in carrying out their obligations under their policies and, in this context, that means that the insurers would pay the fair retail replacement value or the actual cash value of their vehicles in accordance with their policies and not resort to some stratagem or conspiracy to undervalue their vehicles. Here McGowan and Dasher contended that they were fraudulently induced to contract with the insurers because the companies promised to pay the fair retail replacement value or the actual cash value of their vehicles while the insurers, in cooperation with CCC, had a secret scheme to undervalue their vehicles and pay them less than the policies required.
These misconduct or fraud claims remain, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court required the parties to invoke the appraisal clause in the policies to ascertain the proper value of McGowan and Dasher’s vehicles. Although the dispute in these cases arose from the undervaluation of the vehicles, finally establishing the proper value of the vehicles does not mean that the other claims were extinguished just because the proper values were determined. These other claims were not dependent upon the actual value established by the appraisal; instead they were dependent upon whether schemes or conspiracies existed to systematically undervalue the insured vehicles so as to deprive the insureds of the payment for the fair retail value or the actual cash value of the insured vehicles as required by their insurance policies. The actual values of the vehicles were only part of the proof required to establish those claims.
Both Eberhardt v. Ga. Farm &c. Ins. Co. and Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Kent were concerned primarily with the proper valuation of the insured property. Although Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Kent included a statutory bad faith claim that was determined to be untimely and Eberhardt v. Ga. Farm &c. Ins. Co. considered whether the appraisal clause was enforceable, neither case contained claims such as those asserted by McGowan and Dasher in these cases, i.e., claims of fraud in the inducement, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conspiracy, or RICO violations. Acareful reading of those cases shows that they did not decide any claims independent of the value of the vehicles. To hold that the appraisal can resolve anything other than the value of the vehicles is to convert the appraisal process to arbitration, and that is prohibited by OCGA § 9-9-2 (c) (3). See Continental Ins. Co. v. Equity Residential Properties Trust, 255 Ga. App. 445 (565 SE2d 603) (2002).
Because these cases were decided below on motions to dismiss under OCGA§ 9-11-12 (b) (6), we are required to take the allegations in the complaint as true. Lathem v. Hestley, 270 Ga. 849, 849-850 (514 *497SE2d 440) (1999). The complaints allege that these insurance companies and CCC engaged in a conspiracy to undervalue the vehicles systematically. Presented with this scheme, the insureds were required to promptly accept payments for less than the actual value of their vehicles, contrary to the policy’s provision, or engage in a protracted appraisal process at further expense and delay to the insureds. Under these circumstances, the fact that the proper value was finally determined cannot render moot the claims based on the companies’ actions in undervaluing the vehicles in the first instance.
Decided July 15, 2005 Butler, Wooten, Fryhofer, Daughtery & Crawford, James E. Butler, Jr., Jason L. Crawford, James C. Fuller, Campbell, Waller & McCallum, Jonathan H. Waller, Gary O. Bruce, for appellants. Troutman Sanders, Alan W. Loeffler, Herbert D. Shellhouse, Wesley B. Tailor, McKenna, Long & Aldridge, JohnL. Watkins, David N. Stern, for Progressive Preferred Insurance Company. Rogers & Hardin, Tony G. Powers, Kimberly L. Myers, for Atlanta Casualty Company.Moreover, these are not cases in which rescission must be attempted before a party brings an action for damages, as nothing in the insurance policies precludes these actions. Therefore, McGowan and Dasher could affirm the policies and sue for damages resulting from the fraud. Ben Farmer Realty v. Woodard, 212 Ga. App. 74, 74-75 (441 SE2d 421) (1994) (“Such ‘[a] suit for damages by the defrauded party for the fraud committed is not a suit for the violation of the contract, but is one for a tort and involves affirmance of the contract, and [the defrauded party] may keep the fruits of the contract and maintain an action for the damages suffered by reason of the fraud.’ ”). In these cases the insured property was destroyed before the alleged fraud was discovered, and thus rescission was effectively impossible. See also McBride v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 190 FSupp.2d 1366 (M.D. Ga. 2002).
Consequently, McGowan and Dasher should be given the opportunity to have their class action allegations considered and to prove these claims in the trial court.
Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent to the divisions of the majority opinion concerning Case Nos. A05A0726 andA05Al077 and the disposition of those appeals.
I am authorized to state that Judge Ellington and Judge Bernes join in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.
*498Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, John A. Chandler, Thomas M. Byrne, Teresa W. Roseborough, Kristin B. Wilhelm, Russell S. Bonds, for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.