(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. Under the majority opinion, there were two conspiracies in this case. The concurring opinion holds that there were two conspiracies, but if there was one *393double jeopardy would apply. In my opinion, State v. Dasher is indistinguishable, and there was but one conspiracy in this case.
Dasher states that:
The question is what is the nature of the agreement. If there is one overall agreement among the various parties to perform different functions in order to carry out the objectives of the conspiracy, the agreement among all the parties constitutes a single conspiracy. Id. 298 S.E. (2d) at 217, quoting 16 Am. Jur. (2d) § 11 (1979).
The more persuasive evidence in this case is that the many acts which constituted the conspiracy were but parts of a grand scheme to import, sell and distribute marijuana and cocaine. In the present case, just as in Dasher, the dates of the conspiracies overlapped and the key principles were substantially the same. Dasher stands for the proposition that where there is one grand conspiracy of substantial duration to sell, transport and distribute marijuana and cocaine, double jeopardy arises where any subsequent prosecution rests solely upon the same agreement.
The majority also attempts to distinguish the present case by indicating that in Dasher, the defendants were charged in two separate indictments with “conspiring to distribute controlled substances,” but assert that here conspiring to traffic in cocaine and conspiring to traffic in marijuana are two separate substantive offenses under subsection (e) of § 44-53-370. I find this distinction to be extremely tenuous.
Although appellants were charged with conspiracy pursuant to § 44-53-370(e)(2)(e) and § 44-53-370(e)(l)(b), the basic elements of conspiracy in this State have not been altered. Under the majority’s analysis, the mere fact that the conspiracy is two separate substantive offenses under the Controlled Substances Act somehow transforms the nature of the agreement into separate agreements. Two separate conspiracies do not arise simply because the State alleges two separate conspiracies. Moreover, since this decision allows for the framing of the indictment to determine whether there is one conspiracy or two, the State could easily manipulate the indictment to extract the maximum punishment, without regard to the actual crime.
*394The Double Jeopardy Clause provides against being subjected to successive prosecutions for the same offense, without regard to the actual imposition of punishment. United States v. Ragins, 840 F. (2d) 1184 (4th Cir. 1988).
Finding no legitimate distinction between the present case and Dasher, I would find that the 1990 indictment for trafficking in marijuana constitutes double jeopardy, requiring reversal of these subsequent convictions.