Karol Tripp filed a lawsuit against Burnett seeking $252,500 in damages for injuries suffered as a result of being shot between the eyes with a pistol then being held by Burnett while she was a passenger in his automobile. Burnett held an automobile liability insurance policy issued by Georgia Farm Bureau and he looked to this insurer for defense in the litigation.
Georgia Farm Bureau initiated the present action seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether it was liable under the policy. The evidence in this case shows that Burnett was angry with his lady friend Tripp. He admitted depositing a pistol with a friend, apparently because he was afraid of what he might do. Thereafter, he, in effect, forced her to accompany him in his pickup truck. After riding around with Tripp for perhaps a half hour, during which time *481he verbally abused her, he drove back to his friend and retrieved the weapon taking it out of the bag containing it and placing it between his legs. He continued to “fuss” at her but according to Tripp, she “tuned him out.” After her continued personal coolness toward Burnett, she observed him raise the pistol from the car seat and point it in her direction. Burnett turned down a bumpy street and started to brake the car. Tripp stated she saw nothing or felt nothing so abrupt that should have caused the gun to discharge. Apparently she feared he might shoot her and initially believed that he intentionally pulled the trigger (by deposition testimony). Burnett testified he knew the gun was loaded; that he pointed it in her direction but neither he nor Tripp were aware of what might have occurred to cause the gun to discharge. Though Burnett conceded that it could have been the squeeze of his finger, he did not recall doing so.
The case proceeded to trial based virtually upon the above uncontroverted facts. At the close of the evidence, two issues were presented by way of special interrogatory for jury determination. The issues were (1) whether the injury to Tripp arose out of the ownership, maintenance or use of Burnett’s automobile and (2) whether the injury was intentionally inflicted. Burnett and Georgia Farm Bureau moved for directed verdict. The trial court denied Georgia Farm Bureau’s motion and granted Burnett’s motion as to the first special interrogatory. The jury was presented the second issue and decided that the injury was unintentional. Held:
1. Under the facts presented, Burnett’s use of the pistol in this case in contemplation of law constituted an assault with a deadly weapon. Johnson v. State, 122 Ga. App. 542 (1) (178 SE2d 42). There is no contention that Burnett accidentally pointed the weapon at Tripp. He admitted he deliberately and intentionally pointed a loaded weapon at her. As was said in Washington v. Hartford Accident &c. Co., 161 Ga. App. 431-432 (288 SE2d 343), “ ‘where a connection appears between the“use”of the vehicle and the discharge of the firearm and resulting injury such as to render it more likely that the one grew out of the other, it comes within the coverage defined’____ In the case before us now, however, the injury bears no apparent relation to the operation of the vehicle or the use to which it was being put. Instead, it resulted from a deliberate assault which took place in the vehicle simply because that is where the victim happened to be when the assailant came ‘gunning’ for him. Under these circumstances, we can discern no causal connection or relationship between the use of the vehicle and the injury. . . .”
In American Protection Ins. Co. v. Parker, 150 Ga. App. 732, 733 (3) (a) (258 SE2d 540), it was stated: “... the word ‘accident’ does not mean that under all circumstances the occurrence must be pure *482accident, but the ‘Fact that injury is caused by... “accident”... if in that act something unforeseen, unusual and unexpected occurs which produces the result’... [and] whether or not such an occurrence is accidental must be decided by viewing it through the eyes of the victim....”
This declaratory judgment hinges on whether Burnett intentionally shot Tripp or that the discharge of the gun was unforeseen and caused by the “bumpy” road. Tripp’s testimony discloses that in all probability the assault, as viewed by her, was neither unforeseen nor accidental. Thus the question more pertinently is whether the injury (i.e., resulting from the discharge of the gun) as opposed to the assault was unforeseen and an accident arising out of the use of the automobile by Burnett. To justify a charge on a given subject, it is not necessary that there should be direct compelling evidence going to that point. It is enough if there be something from which a legitimate process of reasoning can be carried on in respect to it. East Side Auto Parts v. Wilson, 146 Ga. App. 753 (2) (247 SE2d 571). In view of Burnett’s contention that the discharge of the weapon was accidental and may have resulted from the bumpy road, we conclude that he has raised a question of fact as to whether he intentionally shot Tripp as a part and continuation of the intentional assault committed upon her or whether the gun discharged unintentionally from the use of the vehicle.
By the conclusion and ruling of the trial court on the first interrogatory, as a matter of law, that the discharge of the gun emanated from the use of the vehicle, and thus presumptively may have been accidental, the jury was placed in the difficult position of having to disagree with that conclusion of the court in its consideration of the second interrogatory should it have been inclined to find the discharge of the gun was intentional and not as a result of the use of the car. We conclude the first question as well as the second should have been decided by the jury. Accordingly, it was error to remove the first disputed question of fact from the jury while requiring the jury to answer the second. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 125 Ga. App. 352 (187 SE2d 878); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ware, 140 Ga. App. 660, 666 (231 SE2d 556).
2. Georgia Farm’s remaining enumerations of error relate to the court’s charge to the jury. It is first contended that the trial court erred in charging the jury that the insurance policy should be construed most favorably toward the insured. Georgia Farm Bureau argues that contract construction is not a jury function and there was no ambiguity in the policy to warrant judicial construction.
The trial court charged: “In Georgia, contracts of insurance are to be construed — that is, interpreted — most strongly against the *483insurer — that is, the insurance company — and in favor of the insured person or persons. If a policy of insurance is fairly susceptible of more than one construction, the interpretation most favorable to the insured shall be given effect.”
This court in two recent cases has ruled to the contrary. In Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Thrift-Mart, 159 Ga. App. 874, 879 (285 SE2d 566) and Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Hart, 162 Ga. App. 333, 336 (291 SE2d 410), this court held: “ ‘Contracts, even when ambiguous, are to be construed by the court and no jury question is presented unless after application of applicable rules of construction an ambiguity remains. . . . Insurance policies being contracts, the decisions have held that the matter of construction is for the court.’ ”
The insurance contract in this case provided coverage for accidental injuries arising out of the use of the insured vehicle, but precluded coverage for intentionally caused injuries. In Division 1 it was concluded that the shooting in this case was not unambiguously “accidental” nor did it unquestionably arise out of the use of the automobile. Thus it was concluded these questions should have been submitted to the jury. The policy terms themselves are not in issue, only whether the facts show the shooting to be accidental or otherwise and whether it resulted from the use of the automobile or was unrelated thereto. Because there was no issue of law as to the meaning of the words “use” or “accident,” these words being neither obscurely written nor ambiguous, the court’s charge to construe the contract in favor of the insured perforce had to be erroneous as to Georgia Farm Bureau particularly where the construction would be affected by the court’s conclusion that the discharge of the gun was related to the use of the car. Transamerica Ins. Co., supra. Under the facts of this case, such error cannot be termed harmless. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., supra.
3. Georgia Farm Bureau next contends the trial court erred in charging the jury as to the definition of accident. Georgia Farm Bureau, however, concedes that this portion of the charge “undoubtedly came from the case of American Protection Ins. Co. v. Parker, 150 Ga. App. 732 [(3) 258 SE2d 540].” Georgia Farm Bureau focuses its challenge upon the language to the effect that the jury must determine whether the occurrence was accidental or intentional by viewing it through the eyes of the victim. Assuming the jury viewed the assault through Tripp’s eyes, as we view that evidence this was beneficial to the insurer for it portrayed an intentional assault. Moreover, this language was taken directly from American Protection Ins. Co. v. Parker, supra, is a correct statement of law and therefore does not constitute error.
4. Appellant’s final contention is that the trial court erred in its charge as to the definition of insured under the no-fault provisions of *484the policy. Georgia Farm Bureau contends that “[u]nder that charge the jury would have been entitled to find that Karol Eldoria Tripp was an insured.” This may be so, but the challenged portion of the charge substantially tracked the language of OCGA § 33-34-2 (5) (formerly Code Ann. § 56-3402b (b), Ga. L. 1974, pp. 113, 114; 1975, pp. 1202, 1203), was applicable to the case and therefore no error was committed.
Decided July 15, 1983. Terry A. Dillard, for appellant. Robert H. Baer, Edward E. Boshears, for appellees.5. In view of the holding of Divisions 1 and 2, we conclude the errors committed by the trial court require a new trial wherein both special interrogatories should be presented to the jury for determination under correct instructions.
Judgment reversed.
Shulman, C. J., Deen, P. J., Quillian, P. J., Banke, Carley and Sognier, JJ., concur. Pope, J., concurs specially. McMurray, P. J., dissents.