dissenting.
The majority invokes the rule of construction which states that in the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See No Frills Supermarket v. Nebraska Liq. Control Comm., 246 Neb. 822, 523 N.W.2d 528 (1994). However, the following principle of law has been a part of Nebraska jurisprudence since at least 1897: “[A] law will not be given a retrospective operation, unless that intention has been manifested by the most clear and unequivocal expression.” State v. City of Kearney, 49 Neb. 337, 339, 70 N.W. 255, 256 (1897). “ A legislative act operates only prospectively and not retrospectively unless the legislative intent and purpose that it should operate retrospectively is clearly disclosed.’ ” Young v. Dodge Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 242 Neb. 1, 6, 493 N.W.2d 160, 163 (1992).
The statute at issue states in pertinent part: “When any amount of transfer tax in excess of that legally due has been paid to the State Treasurer, the party making such overpayment . . . shall be entitled to refund of such overpayment plus interest . . . .” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2106.01 (Cum. Supp. 1992). The majority states that the phrase “has been paid” does not limit interest on overpayments of estate tax to those overpayments made after the effective date of 1992 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1004, § 11. I point out that before the enactment of L.B. 1004, the taxpayer had no right to interest on an overpayment. See Peterson v. State, 114 Neb. 612, 209 N.W. 221 (1926). Thus, the enactment of L.B. 1004 created a new right for the taxpayer. Had the Legislature desired to make § 77-2106.01 apply retroactively to the date of the overpayment, the phrase “plus interest from the date of the overpayment” could have been used. It was not.
Nothing in § 77-2106.01 or its legislative history clearly and unequivocally indicates that the statute should be given *713retroactive effect. I conclude that the calculation of interest was authorized only prospectively from the effective date of L.B. 1004. The district court properly recognized the rule set forth in State v. City of Kearney, supra. I would affirm the order of the district court.
Caporale, J., joins in this dissent.