dissenting. The petition alleges valid reasons why the discretion exercised was grossly abused because it was capricious, arbitrary and discriminating. This action was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. I do not agree that such a judgment was correct. There is nothing in the petition which shows that the discretion of the city was not capricious, arbitrary and discriminatory. There is nothing in the petition which shows that the appellant is not entitled to a mandamus absolute as to the rights of appellant to a contract which does *760not preclude it from submitting a proposal and requiring a contract which as to details is not significantly different from the proposals of the appellant. See Code Ann. § 81A-112 (b) (6) and dissenting opinion in Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Service, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 498 (164 SE2d 246). “[A] motion to' dismiss should not be granted unless the allegations in the complaint disclose with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.” Residential Development, Inc. v. Mann, 225 Ga. 393, 397 (169 SE2d 305).
If the allegations of the petition are proved, the appellant is at least entitled to an opportunity to bid on even terms with its competitor and have the opportunity to negotiate in competition with its competitor. Under the facts pleaded, the commissioners have precluded appellant from even negotiating by deceiving it into making a low bid for the amount to be charged customers. I know of no law or reason why the city could not negotiate with two separate bidders at the same time without excluding one by deception.