dissenting.
In my opinion, the statements of fact in the complaint, accepted as evidence and deemed to be true for the purposes of this appeal, that as a result of defendants’ negligence “the plaintiff, Connie Woodell, underwent physical pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress” and “expended sums of money for duplicate baby clothing and other items” raises a damages *234issue that a jury should decide. “[G]iven the broad interpretation of ‘physical injury’ in our case law,” Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 198-99, 254 S.E. 2d 611, 623 (1979), it seems plain to me that physical pain and suffering, when inflicted by another, is not only evidence of physical injury — it is physical injury. Nor was the injury either unforeseeable or too trivial to warrant the law’s concern. The mind does not exist in a vacuum, and anxiety is not necessarily harmless, as some of the old cases suggest; pregnant women do sometimes worry themselves into harmful states because of problems that their pregnancies are believed to involve and obstetricians spend a goodly part of their time attempting to allay such anxieties; and being advised by her doctor that her child may be born dead can be profoundly injurious to any woman. The stipulated evidence as to her extra expenditures for unneeded clothing and other items also tends to show that defendants’ negligence was actionable in another respect. That the damages are not large neither eliminates their existence not nullifies the principle of law that authorizes their recovery.
Furthermore, expert medical testimony and other evidence presented by plaintiffs raised an issue of fact as to whether the defendants were recklessly indifferent to her well being and are therefore subject to punitive damages. That improperly conducted diagnostic examinations by unqualified operators is evidence of professional negligence requires no discussion, and is why this issue was not argued on appeal. But the evidence shows more, in my opinion. It tends to show that though the defendants knew that the ultrasound operator was incompetent and had misread other examinations, they nevertheless chose to base their diagnosis of plaintiffs condition on the operator’s examinations and interpretations. This indicates more than mere inadvertence and oversight; it indicates an “intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of’ the plaintiff, which plaintiffs alleged and for which punitive damages are authorized. Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 28, 92 S.E. 2d 393, 397 (1956). Since the evidence tends to show a conscious and persistent willingness by apparently skilled, experienced professionals to expose plaintiff to the harm inherent in a false diagnosis, it supports a cause of action, whether any physical injury is deemed to have been suffered or not.