Plaintiff brought this action for personal injuries sustained in the State of Idaho while a passenger on defendant’s bus. The case was tried to the court, sitting without a jury, and from a judgment of. dismissal on the ground that her claim is barred by the limitation statutes of Idaho and Utah, plaintiff appeals.
The sole issue presented for the trial judge’s determination was one of fact, viz., the place of plaintiff’s domicile. If found not to be domiciled in Utah, plaintiff’s claim would be barred by Idaho’s statute of limitations. If found to be domiciled in Utah, the longer Utah statute of limitations applies which would not bar her claim. The trial court concluded plaintiff was a Montana domiciliary. The plaintiff by this appeal, would have us redetermine that fact and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. This we cannot do. The basic principles of appellate review preclude this Court from disturbing the findings below when they are supported by substantial, competent admissible evidence1 as is the case here.
The evidence at trial was not materially in conflict. Plaintiff and her husband own a dwelling in Ogden, Utah, in which they resided for a number of years. They moved to Dillon, Montana, in 1972 to become live-in managers and operators of a motel in which they had acquired an ownership interest. Their daughter resides in their house in Ogden and they stay with her on periodic visits to Utah. Plaintiff was returning to Dillon after such a visit and was injured as a result of a bus accident which occurred in Pocatello, Idaho, on January 27, 1974. This suit was filed on June 2, 1976, more than two years after the cause of action arose.
Plaintiff readily admits: (1) having established a residence in Montana; (2) having become a member of a church congregation in Montana where she pays tithes; (3) not paying resident of Utah income taxes; (4) having licensed a vehicle in Montana and paying license fees and personal property taxes thereon; and (5) being a registered voter in Montana and exercising her voting privilege there.
The controversy as to domicile arises simply by reason of plaintiff’s declaration that she is still a Utah domiciliary and that at some indefinite time in the future she intends to return to Utah and again reside here.
Faced with the foregoing facts, the trial judge determined that plaintiff’s residence in Montana, coupled with her intention to remain for an indefinite period of time, constituted the establishment of domicile. That decision finds ample support in the evidence and it should not be overturned simply because we or other judges might have interpreted the facts differently.2 The trial judge apparently placed greater weight upon plaintiff’s activities than upon her declaration of intent to remain a domiciliary of Utah as it was clearly his prerogative to do as fact-finder.3
The issue presented here appears not to have been specifically treated by this Court previously; however, the decision below is entirely consistent with the expressions of other jurisdictions as to the general principles of law pertaining to domicile. Domicile is based on residence and intent to *615remain for an indefinite time.4 The intention need not be to remain for all time, it being sufficient if the intention is to remain for an indefinite period.5 Domicile is presumed to follow residency and the burden of proof is on the person contending to the contrary.6 A man’s home is where he makes it, not where he would like to have it.7
The decision is also consistent with Utah statutory provisions pertaining to voting:
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(f) If a person removes to another state with the intention of making it his principal place of residence, he loses his residence in this state.
(g) If a person removes to another state with the intention of remaining there for an indefinite time as a place of permanent residence, he loses his residence in this state, notwithstanding he entertains an intention of returning at some future period.
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(i) A change of residence can only be made by the act of removal joined with the intent to remain in another place. There can only be one residence. A residence cannot be lost until another is gained.8 [Emphasis added.]
Having determined that plaintiff is no longer domiciled in Utah, the trial judge appropriately applied the two-year limitation statute of Idaho9 which bars plaintiff’s cause of action. This he was required to do by virtue of the provisions of Utah’s “borrowing” statute which provides as follows:
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.10 [Emphasis added.]
Although not urged by plaintiff below, or here, Mr. Justice Crockett in his dissent hereto interprets the emphasized language of the foregoing statute as affording plaintiff a right to proceed11 by reason of the fact that she had apparently, at some time in the past, been a citizen of the State of Utah. That interpretation is not deemed proper because it thwarts the purpose of the statute which is designed to prevent forum shopping and circumvents it by applying the law of the forum.
The more reasonable interpretation of the exclusory language of the statute is that it affords the protections of Utah law only to its residents who incur causes of action while outside the state. Such an interpretation serves the legitimate purpose of protecting a limited class (Utah residents) as of the date their cause of action arises, although they may have since- chosen a new state residence. Most importantly, it does no violence to the “borrowing” statute which stands on the books for the purpose of preserving the worthwhile concepts of comity. To extend the protection of the Utah law to any person who was ever a resident does such violence.
The so-called Utah “borrowing” or comity statute apparently has been literally “borrowed” from California which has a verbatim statute dating back to at least 1872.12 The courts of California have construed the identical exclusory language thereof on sev*616eral occasions and they have consistently done so as to afford its protections to residents.13 No reported cases have been found where any jurisdiction has ever been called upon to extend such statutory protections to former residents as well.
Affirmed. Costs to defendant.
WILKINS, J., concurs.. Griffith v. Zumbrennen, Utah, 577 P.2d 129 (1978); Fisher v. Taylor, Utah, 572 P.2d 393 (1977); Cannon v. Wright, .Utah, 531 P.2d 1290 (1975).
. Owen v. Owen, Utah, 579 P.2d 911 (1978).
. Gardner v. Gardner, 118 Utah 496, 222 P.2d 1055 (1950).
. Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Gootrad, 397 F.Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y.1975).
. 25 Am.Jur.2d Domicil, Sec. 24, 25 and 27.
. Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz.App. 270, 492 P.2d 1208 (1972).
. Mitchell v. Delaware State Tax Com’r., 42 Del. 589, 42 A.2d 19 (1945).
.U.C.A., 1953, 20-2-14(1).
. Section 5-219(4), Idaho Code Annotated (1948).
. U.C.A., 1953, 78-12-45.
. U.C.A., 1953, 78-12-25(2) providing for a our-year limitation.
. California Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 361.
. See Stewart v. Spaulding, 72 Cal. 264, 13 P. 661 (1887); Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal.2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941); Western Coal Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal.2d 819, 167 P.2d 719 (1946); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).