¶ 38. (dissenting). Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01(1) (2003-04)1 provides: "In construing this chapter, the best interests of the child or unborn child shall always be of paramount consideration." Because the majority adopts an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(b) that is inconsistent with the text of the statute and in contravention of the best interests of children, I dissent.
¶ 39. Section 48.315(2m)(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Failure to comply with any time limit specified in par. (a) does not deprive the court of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or of competency to exercise that jurisdiction." Wisconsin Stat. § 48.315(2m)(a) governs the granting of a continuance or extension "of a time limit specified in this chapter. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 40. Thus, this court was correct in Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶ 12 n.4, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190, when we stated that § 48.315(2m)(b) "specif[ies] that failure to comply with time limitations for continuances, extensions of time or periods of delay in Ch. 48 'does not deprive the court of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or of competency to exercise that jurisdiction.'" Given that § 48.315(2m)(a) applies to granting continuances or extensions "of a time limit specified in this chapter," *174Mikrut was correct in stating that § 48.315(2m)(b) is similar to Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3), in that both apply to any time period in the respective chapter. Id.
¶ 41. The majority erroneously concludes that the operation of § 48.315(2m)(b) is limited to those time periods specified in subdivisions 1.-2. of § 48.315(2m)(a). Majority op., ¶ 32. Contrary to the assertion of the majority, the statute says no such thing. While § 48.315(2m)(a) provides that a court may not grant a continuance or extension if the continuance or extension would result in certain other time limits specified in subdivisions 1.-2. being violated, the application of § 48.315(2m)(b) is not limited to those time periods enumerated in subdivisions 1.-2. of § 48.315(2m)(a). Rather, the text of § 48.315(2m)(b) expressly applies to "any time limit specified in par. (a)." As paragraph (a) governs the granting of continuances and extensions "of a time limit specified in this chapter[,]" it is of no consequence that paragraph (a) "does not mention the mandatory time limit presented in this case." Majority op., ¶ 33.
¶ 42. In addition to being inconsistent with the text of the statute, the majority's interpretation of § 48.315(2m)(b) fails to adhere to the legislative mandate that in construing all provisions of chapter 48, "the best interests of the child or unborn child shall always be of paramount consideration." Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01(1). The time period at issue in this case, Wis. Stat. § 48.222(2), was not met in large part due to scheduling conflicts between the parties' attorneys. See majority op., ¶¶ 6-7. The majority fails to explain how interpreting § 48.315(2m)(b) in such a manner so as to deprive a circuit court of its competency to adjudicate the termination of parental rights (TPR) petition under these circumstances is in the best interests of Joshua S. *175The interests of children, such as Joshua S., are best protected by interpreting § 48.315(2m)(a) & (b) in conformity with their plain language so as to allow a circuit court to retain competency over the TPR petition if a time period within chapter 48 has not been met.
¶ 43. Accordingly, I would hold that pursuant to § 48.315(2m)(a) & (b), a circuit court does not lose competency when it fails to comply with the time period set forth in § 48.222(2). This interpretation conforms to the plain statutory language and the best interests of the child sought to be protected by the TPR petition. Therefore, I would affirm the order of the circuit court.
¶ 44. I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join in this dissent.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.