dissenting.
In my opinion, Georgia law does not authorize the trial court to require the payment of periodic alimony beyond the death of Mr. Hawkins, by ordering that he maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of Ms. Hawkins. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Contrary to the majority opinion, neither Ritchea v. Ritchea, 244 Ga. 476 (260 SE2d 871) (1979) nor Andrews v. Whitaker, 265 Ga. 76 (453 SE2d 735) (1995) supports the proposition “that a trial court may order a spouse to carry life insurance for the benefit of the other spouse.” (Majority opinion, p. 638.) Ritchea, supra at 477 (2), merely holds that a provision of a final divorce decree related to life insurance “is in full accord with the undisputed evidence and the verdict of the jury in the case.” Thus, the only question addressed in Ritchea was whether the award was authorized as a matter of fact in that case, and that decision did not determine whether the award was or was not valid as a matter of law in this state. Andrews, supra at 77 (3), simply holds that an obligation to purchase an annuity is an award of periodic alimony, rather than a division of property. Thus, the only issue resolved in Andrews related to the proper denomination of the award. Andrews did not deal with the underlying validity of the award itself.
Moreover, even if a trial court may require maintenance of a life insurance policy (but see Gardner v. Gardner, 264 Ga. 138 (441 SE2d 666) (1994)), it does not necessarily follow that the trial court’s award here is authorized. The issue in this case is whether a trial court can require a spouse obligated to pay periodic alimony to maintain a life insurance policy to perpetuate the payment of that alimony beyond the death of the spouse so obligated. The majority cites no case which authorizes the trial court to make such a requirement.
I agree with the majority that “the trial court’s award in this case does not impose a duty on the husband’s estate to pay periodic alimony.” (Majority opinion, p. 638.) Furthermore, a spouse’s future obligation to pay the premiums on a life insurance policy may constitute a valid award of periodic alimony. Sapp v. Sapp, 259 Ga. 238, 240 (4) (378 SE2d 674) (1989). However, these observations are not relevant to the different issue of whether a trial court can order that the proceeds from the policy be used to pay “periodic alimony” to one spouse after the other spouse’s death. The prevailing view is that, while a trial court may impose an obligation to obtain life insurance as security for the payment of lump sum alimony or for the payment of periodic alimony accruing up until the death of a former spouse, a trial court may not require the maintenance of such a policy where the effect is to require the payment of periodic alimony beyond the *640death of the former spouse. Hardin v. Hardin, 365 SE2d 34, 36 (S.C. App. 1987); McClung v. McClung, 465 S2d 637, 638 (Fla. App. 1985); Annot., 59 ALR3d 9, § 5 (1974 & Supp. 1997). The rationale for this prevailing view is that liability for alimony ceases upon the death of the supporting spouse. Hardin v. Hardin, supra. This rationale is, of course, consistent with Georgia law. Winstead v. Winstead, 265 Ga. 690 (461 SE2d 538) (1995).
Decided October 14, 1997 — Reconsideration denied November 14, 1997. Margot S. Roberts, for appellant. McGinn & Daniel, R. Delores Daniel, for appellee.The trial court’s order leaves no room for doubt as to its purpose in requiring Mr. Hawkins to maintain a life insurance policy:
Husband shall maintain said policy of insurance for Wife’s benefit in decreasing amounts to provide Wife with the total benefit she would receive in alimony until she receives her retirement benefit. ... In the event of the death of Husband, the Wife, upon receipt of the benefit provided by the insurance company, shall retain such sum as would equal the remaining alimony to which she is entitled and shall pay any excess to the estate of the Husband.
(Emphasis supplied.) This provision is tantamount to an award of periodic alimony from and after Mr. Hawkins’ death should he die within the five-year period preceding Ms. Hawkins’ receipt of retirement benefits. See Blass v. Blass, 316 S2d 308, 309 (Fla. App. 1975); Wilbur v. Wilbur, 299 S2d 99, 100 (Fla. App. 1974). Therefore, the life insurance provision was invalid, and I respectfully dissent to the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.