concurring.
This court and other appellate courts have held that electrocution does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. I write to urge the General Assembly to reconsider the method of execution in Georgia.
In the late 1880s a commission appointed by the New York legislature ascertained that electrocution was the most humane and practical method of execution.4 In the following two decades, eleven states also concluded that electrocution was less painful and more humane than death by hanging.5 Fortunately, neither our concept of what is humane nor our concept of what is cruel and unusual punishment must remain locked in a vacuum. In this century we have witnessed rapid changes in methods of communication and transportation. Science has caused us to rethink most everything from our views on *792ethics and morals to our concept of space. Perhaps it is also time that Georgia rethinks its method of execution.
Decided November 24, 1997 — Reconsideration denied December 19, 1997. Edwin J. Wilson, Sharon L. Hopkins, for appellant. Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Debra H. Bernes, Nancy I. Jordan, Jack E. Mallard, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Wesley S. Homey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.Just last month our neighbor state of Florida recognized the need to address this issue in view of the time in which we live.6 A bare majority of the Florida Supreme Court held “that electrocution in Florida’s electric chair in its present condition” does not violate either the U. S. or Florida’s constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Half of that majority, however, expressed concerns that electrocution may be declared unconstitutional, and urged the Florida legislature to provide an alternative method of execution. Their concern appears well-founded, as three of the court’s seven justices. concluded that Florida’s present method of execution violates Florida’s constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
The vast majority of the states have addressed the issue through legislation. Of the thirty-eight states that permit the imposition of the death penalty, only Georgia and six other states presently provide no alternative to electrocution.7 Therefore, I urge the General Assembly to revisit the issue in light of modern knowledge and changing attitudes as reflected in other jurisdictions.8
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham joins in this concurrence.
See In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 444 (10 SC 930, 34 LE 519) (1890).
Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. 180, 185, n. 1 (35 SC 507, 59 LE 905) (1915).
Jones v. Butterworth, No. 90,231 (Fla. Oct. 20, 1997) (available on the Internet at htttp://nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/~lawinfo/flsupct/cases).
This information comes from the Death Penalty Information Center, available on the Internet at http://www.essential.org/dpic/.
See Poyner v. Murray, 508 U. S. 931, 933 (113 SC 2397,124 LE2d 299) (1993) (Souter, J., commenting) (noting that Kemmler is not dispositive of constitutionality of electrocution in light of modem knowledge).