(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the commissioner had authority to dismiss the appeal. However, the exercise of this authority was abused when the commissioner failed to impose a lesser sanction that would have accomplished the same purpose as a dismissal.
Although judges have a great deal of discretion in imposing sanctions for failing to comply with procedural rules, the range of discretion narrows when dismissal is imposed. Kendall/Hunt Publ’g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Iowa 1988) (citing Smiley v. Twin City Beef Co., 236 N.W.2d 356, 360 (Iowa 1975)). Thus, before imposing the sanction of dismissal, we have required a judge to find that the failure “to comply was the result of willfulness, fault or bad faith.” Id. (citing Smiley, 236 N.W.2d at 360). The rationale for this special “rule reflects the ‘proper balance between the conflicting policies of the need to prevent delays and the sound public policy of deciding cases on them merits.’ ” Id. (quoting Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir.1977); citing Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989, 996 (8th Cir.1975)). Moreover, this balance should render the sanction of dismissal a “rare judicial act.” Id. A sane*788tion that deprives litigants of their day in court carries due process implications. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1094, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255, 1265 (1958).
In this case, the majority departs from this accepted standard by elevating the policy of moving cases through the judicial system without' delay over the venerable and time-honored judicial policy of deciding cases on their merits. Instead of requiring willfulness, fault; or bad faith as a basis for a dismissal, the majority establishes a new standard based on the .absence of “good cause.” Under the new standard, if an attorney is unable to establish “good cause” for the failure to file a brief with the court within an established deadline, judges are permitted to dismiss the case with no final adjudication on the merits. This new standard is not only hostile to the fundamental existence of our system of justice, but the practice of law. It gives judges too much authority to deprive litigants of a final adjudication of a claim on the merits, and it will give rise to tension between judges and lawyers, as well as lawyers and clients. It is a step in the wrong direction, and it falls short of the due process standard of fault that must be met to support the dismissal of a claim. See Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1066-68 (2d Cir.1979) (considerations of fair play dictate courts eschew the harshest sanctions when faced with conduct amounting to mere oversight of counsel).
The reality of this case is that the attorney responsible for filing the brief honestly acknowledged his neglect in missing the briefing deadline, and he promptly filed the required brief prior to the sanction hearing once informed of his mistake. There was no evidence that- the attorney had ignored deadlines in the past. Moreover, the employer did not object to the late-filed brief and promptly filed a brief addressing the substantive issues in the case. There were simply no aggravating circumstances supporting any form of bad faith or willfulness by the attorney. The delay was minimal, and a lesser sanction, such as assessment of a fine against the attorney, would easily have sustained the goal of moving cases through the system without unnecessary delay. Dismissal under the circumstances of this case was a harsh and punitive sanction, contrary to the concept of due process. Discretion permits a judge to make a choice among alternatives, but does not permit a judge to impose the severe sanction of dismissal when a less drastic sanction would equally serve as a proper deterrent or would otherwise satisfy the need for imposing a sanction. By failing to intervene in the decision of the commissioner, we have abrogated our important responsibility to place proper limits on judicial discretion, and we have failed to fully consider the impact of our decision on lawyers, clients, and the practice of law.