Following a bench trial, Ronald Dale Smith appeals his conviction for first degree homicide by vehicle, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the homicide by vehicle statute (OCGA § 40-6-393 (a)) is unconstitutional. We affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence reveals that, on March 8, 2005, Smith, an escaped prisoner from Florida, was driving a white Dodge pick-up truck with a North Carolina tag through Carroll County. A BOLO (“be on the lookout”) had been issued for the white pick-up truck, and Carroll County Sheriffs Deputy Jamie K. Godbee spotted the vehicle as Smith drove *726down Highway 27 in Carroll County. Officer Godbee activated his emergency lights and pursued Smith from Carroll County into Haralson County. Smith sped through a red light at the intersection of Highway 27 and Highway 78, with Officer Godbee close behind. A car driven by Rebecca Partain was stopped at the red light at the intersection. Officer Godbee, unable to see Ms. Partain’s vehicle due to his close proximity to Smith’s truck, collided with Ms. Partain’s vehicle, killing Ms. Partain.1
The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Smith guilty of first degree homicide by vehicle. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) (“Any person who, without malice aforethought, causes the death of another person through the violation of subsection (a) of Code Section 40-6-163 [overtaking a school bus], Code Section 40-6-390 [reckless driving] or 40-6-391 [driving under the influence], or subsection (a) of Code Section 40-6-395 [fleeing or attempting to elude an officer] commits the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree”). See also Ponder v. State, 274 Ga. App. 93 (1) (616 SE2d 857) (2005) (evidence sufficient to sustain first degree vehicular homicide conviction where officer who was pursuing defendant was forced to suddenly swerve left during the pursuit, and died when he collided with oncoming car).
2. Smith contends that the homicide by vehicle statute is unconstitutional because its terms fail to provide sufficient notice to enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits. However, “[a] criminal statute is sufficiently definite if its terms furnish a test based on normal criteria which men of common intelligence who come in contact with the statute may use with reasonable safety in determining its command.” (Citation omitted.) Wilson v. State, 245 Ga. 49, 53 (262 SE2d 810) (1980). Indeed, “[a]U the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.” (Footnote omitted.) Rose v. Locke, 423 U. S. 48, 50 (96 SC 243, 46 LE2d 185) (1975). Here, the plain language of OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) makes clear that a person is guilty of homicide by vehicle if he or she causes the death of another, without malice aforethought, by illegally overtaking a school bus, driving recklessly, driving under the influence, or fleeing or attempting to elude an officer. There is nothing in the statute that would have prevented Smith, or any *727person of ordinary intelligence, from understanding that actions taken to elude police that result in the death of another person could lead to a prosecution and conviction for first degree homicide by vehicle. See id. Smith’s argument to the contrary is without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
Carley, P. J., Benham, Thompson and Hines, JJ., concur. Hunstein, C. J., dissents.In an August 6, 2008 bench trial, Smith stipulated to the facts outlined above, and on that same day, Smith argued to the trial court that the homicide by vehicle statute, OCGA § 40-6-393 (a), was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. On August 13, 2008, the trial court found Smith guilty of vehicular homicide, and further specifically found that OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) was constitutional.