concurring.
I agree with the majority that N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c) can be read narrowly such that it withstands a facial challenge based on Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution. I also agree that, in order to ensure section 115C-431(c) is applied in a constitutional manner, limiting jury instructions are necessary in suits brought under that provision. I write separately because, although this case does not appear to present any constitutional violations, the paramount importance of educational funding compels me to address the interplay between section 115C-431 and the General Assembly’s constitutional duty to ensure equal opportunities for a sound basic education for all of North Carolina’s public school students. ,
The right to education is safeguarded in our State Constitution. Article I, Section 15 of the North Carolina Constitution establishes: *509“The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.” Our Constitution goes on to require: “Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.” N.C. Const, art. IX, § 1. Article IX, Section 2 of our Constitution, which is entitled “Uniform system of schools,” provides:
(1) General and uniform, system: term. The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.
(2) Local responsibility. The General Assembly may assign to units of local government such responsibility for the financial support of the free public schools as it may deem appropriate. The governing boards of units of local government with financial responsibility for public education may use local revenues to add to or supplement any public school or post-secondary school program.
By its plain language, Section 2(1) imposes solely on the General Assembly the duty to provide for the State’s “uniform system of free public schools . . . wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.” In Leandro v. State, we concluded that this subsection “requires that access to a sound basic education be provided equally in every school district.” 346 N.C. 336, 349, 488 S.E.2d 249, 256 (1997) (emphasis added). In so doing, we noted that the requirement of equal opportunities for all public school students is part of the General Assembly’s constitutional duty to provide for the public schools. Id. at 348, 488 S.E.2d at 255.
The first sentence of Section 2(2) enables the General Assembly to require units of local government to bear some of the cost of maintaining their local public schools. However, no school budget “may be funded in such a fashion that it fails to provide the resources required to provide the opportunity for a sound basic education.” Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 634, 599 S.E.2d 365, 388 (2004).
The second sentence of Section 2(2) permits local governing boards, if they so choose, to use local revenues to exceed the educational financing requirements placed on them by the General Assembly.
*510Because the North Carolina Constitution expressly states that units of local governments with financial responsibility for public education may provide additional funding to supplement the educational programs provided by the state, there can be nothing unconstitutional about their doing so or in any inequality of opportunity occurring as a result.
Leandro, 346 N.C. at 349-50, 488 S.E.2d at 256.
Read together, the North Carolina Constitution and this Court’s opinions in Leandro and Hoke County lead to the conclusion that, while the General Assembly may require local governments to contribute to the cost of maintaining their local public schools, and the local governments may choose to exceed that basic cost by contributing more than the General Assembly requires, the minimum definition of a sound basic education must be the same throughout the state. Along with the minimum substantive requirements of a sound basic education, see id. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255, there must be a corresponding minimum level of funding that is required for every student. While the legislature may delegate the authority to establish educational funding levels, it may not do so in a manner that allows the per-student financial aspect of a sound basic education to vary substantially by county. Otherwise the General Assembly will have unconstitutionally abdicated its duty to ensure “equal opportunities ... for all students.” N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(1).
The General Assembly has codified the responsibilities, for educational funding in section 115C-426 of the General Statutes, entitled “Uniform budget format.” Three funds are identified: the State Public School Fund, the local current expense fund, and the capital outlay fund. N.C.G.S. § 115C-426(c) (2007). The State Public School Fund includes “appropriations for the current operating expenses of the public school system from moneys made available to the local school administrative unit by the State Board of Education.” Id. § 115C-426(d) (2007). The capital outlay fund is used for facilities and capital improvements. Id. § 115C-426(f) (2007).
The parties to this case stipulated at trial that the only issue in controversy is the portion of the county’s education budget known as the local current expense fund. Section 115C-426(e) defines this fund as follows:
The local current expense fund shall include appropriations sufficient, when added to appropriations from the State Public *511School Fund, for the current operating expense of the public school system in conformity with the educational goals and policies of the State and the local board of education, within the financial resources and consistent with the fiscal policies of the board of county commissioners.
Id. § 115C-426(e) (2007). This .provision must be read in light of Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution and our holdings in Leandro and Hoke County. Thus, at a minimum, the funding must be sufficient to provide a sound basic education. Likewise, the funding cannot interfere with the discretion of the local governing board to provide additional educational funding as established by Article IX, Section 2(2). Between these parameters, the statute envisions an amount,
when added to appropriations from the State Public School Fund, for the current operating expense of the public school system in conformity with the educational goals and policies of the State and the local board of education, within the financial resources and consistent with the fiscal policies of the board of county commissioners.
Id. This is referred to in section 115C-431(c) as the “amount of money . . . needed from sources under the control of the board of county commissioners to maintain a system of free public schools.” N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c) (2007). It is this amount which is in controversy.
The counties’ discretion under Article IX, Section 2(2) regarding whether (and by how much) to exceed the funding responsibility assigned to them by the State belongs to the counties alone, and the General Assembly cannot delegate that discretion away from “[t]he governing boards of units of local government with financial responsibility for public education.” N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(2). I therefore agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that, in a suit under N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c), the fact finder may only determine the amount of funding that is statutorily required and may not decide the amount of discretionary county funding. As noted by the majority, in this case, the court must instruct the jury that the amount of money “needed from sources under the control of the board of county commissioners to maintain a system of free public schools,” N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c), is only the amount necessary to fulfill “the educational goals and policies of the State” as they are set forth in Chapter 115C. Id. § 115C-426(e).
*512Unlike the majority, I believe that even when the statutes are read narrowly, resolving a dispute under section 115C-426(e) through the procedure of section 115C-431(c) still raises constitutional concerns. Under the statutes, the many factors to be considered in reaching a funding decision include “the educational goals and policies of the State,” “the educational goals and policies of . . . the local board of education,” and “the financial resources and . . . fiscal policies of the board of county commissioners.” Id. It concerns me that requiring judicial actors to weigh such policy considerations may be at odds with our Constitution’s requirement that “[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 6. Similarly, I worry that section 115C-431(c) requires the courts to address nonjusticiable political questions. See Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 717, 549 S.E.2d 840, 854, cert. denied, 533 U.S. 975, 122 S. Ct. 22, 150 L. Ed. 2d 804 (2001). The majority opinion maintains that section 115C-431(c) has not “assigned policy-making power to the courts,” but I believe the determination of the amount of funding needed to support the public school system is fraught with political implications. Budgetary decisions by nature reflect policy considerations. Local priorities can shift over time, and those priorities are sure to affect the funding decisions of local governments and courts, especially when jury trial is available. If the constitutional guarantee of a sound basic education is to be realized throughout North Carolina, the funding decision should be left to a body like the General Assembly, which is in the best position to consider the full range of evidence and balance the competing objectives.
I acknowledge, however, that this Court has held it permissible for the General Assembly to delegate to the courts the task of determining school funding levels. In Board of Education v. Board of County Commissioners, this Court upheld a law that required the superior court division to resolve disputes regarding the amount of tax needed to be levied to maintain a county’s public schools for a four month period. 174 N.C. 469, 474, 93 S.E. 1001, 1003 (1917). In accordance with the principle of stare decisis, I adhere to this precedent despite my strong reservations about courts’ ability to properly address the myriad policy considerations that attend educational funding.
I am also concerned that the extent of discretion assigned to the counties under section 115C-431 leaves open the possibility that counties could establish educational funding at a level below that *513which is required to provide a sound basic education. To be sure, the General Assembly has to a large extent acknowledged its duty to ensure that all public school students receive an equally sound basic education. Section 115C-408(b) of the General Statutes provides in pertinent part:
To insure a quality education for every child in North Carolina, and to assure that the necessary resources are provided, it is the policy of the State of North Carolina to provide from State revenue sources the instructional expenses for current operations of the public school system as defined in the standard course of study.
It is the policy of the State of North Carolina that the facilities requirements for a public education system will be met by county governments.
N.C.G.S. § 115C-408(b) (2007). These statements of policy recognize the significant variations in the counties’ educational needs (due to differences in population, for example) and that those variations will be most manifest in the counties’ “facilities requirements.” Id. The General Assembly has therefore expressed a preference to permit the counties to tend to their capital needs as their individual circumstances dictate. “[T]he instructional expenses for current operations of the public school system,” meanwhile, should be substantially equal on a per-student basis, especially since all students are provided the same “standard course of study.” Id. Thus, by opting against county-based funding of instructional expenses for current operations in order “[t]o insure a quality education for every child in North Carolina,” this statute underscores the constitutional policy that a sound basic education should be funded equally throughout the State. Id. The only reason adherence to that policy might not be fully ensured is that the lack of a statewide determination of the amount needed for a sound basic education potentially enables the counties to fund public education below the constitutionally required level. While I recognize the possibility that such a statewide determination is already being made, the record before the Court does not reflect that this is the case.
In summation, I believe the natural consequence of the General Assembly’s constitutional duty to ensure an equally sound basic education for all public school students in North Carolina is a need for a statewide determination of the amount of money that must be expended per student to achieve that constitutional minimum. I fur*514ther believe N.C.G.S. § 115C-431 delegates discretion over educational funding in a manner that does not fully guarantee adherence to the constitutional mandate that “equal opportunities shall be provided'for all students” across our state. N.C. Const, art. IX, § 2(1). Although this particular case does not appear to present any violations of that mandate, I believe the funding of our public schools is important enough to warrant consideration of this issue. Within the context of the instant case, while I believe that a court of law is not the proper mechanism for resolving the political questions associated with educational funding, stare decisis constrains me to concur with the majority.