dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion in Division 1 that when the injured contractor Holmes admitted that Clear Channel was a proper party, he also admitted that Clear Channel obtained whatever rights its subsidiary Eller had bargained for in its agreement with Holmes. I part ways with the majority as to Division 2, however, concerning Holmes’s contractual waiver of “any recovery” for damages “incurred by [Holmes] in providing the services hereunder, provided that such waiver of recovery does not invalidate the insurance coverage.” Under the facts of this case, the latter provision does not implicate either Holmes’s waiver of claims against Clear Channel or his responsibility to provide insurance policies for the benefit of both parties to the contract. I therefore dissent.
The first paragraph of the provision at issue here provided that Holmes would indemnify Eller against all claims related to Holmes’s *479work, including “any of Contractor’s operations pursuant to this Agreement,” any act or omission of Holmes’s, and any ruling finding Eller liable for payment of taxes arising from Holmes’s employment. The second paragraph provides that if Holmes suffered a loss caused by someone working for Eller, Holmes would proceed only against that person, and not against Eller. And the third paragraph, quoted in full by the majority, provides that Holmes waives “all” of his rights for “any recovery against Eller ... for any damages incurred by [Holmes] in providing the services hereunder, provided that such waiver of recovery does not invalidate the insurance coverage.” (Emphasis supplied.) The “insurance coverage” in this last paragraph was the subject of an earlier provision that Holmes would obtain four kinds of insurance: general commercial liability, workers’ compensation insurance, work vehicle automobile liability, and umbrella liability. Holmes in fact obtained all this coverage, naming Eller as an additional insured and as the certificate holder.
The majority holds that Holmes “only waived his rights to recover against Eller for damages if the waiver did not invalidate ‘the insurance coverage’ ” and reverses the grant of summary judgment so that the trial court may consider “whether the waiver invalidated Holmes’s insurance.” This is unnecessary as a matter of law, with the consequence that the majority’s reversal of summary judgment is erroneous.
The parties to this contract added the language at issue to protect their insurance coverage from any possible effects of Holmes’s waiver on that coverage. If a stranger to the contract alleged a claim against one of the parties to it, for example, it is conceivable that the insurer covering that claim might obtain a subrogated claim against the other party. The Supreme Court of Georgia has held, however, that exculpatory clauses, and insurance arrangements made in furtherance of them, do not violate any public policy, and that a promisor who agrees to obtain insurance cannot pursue the promisee for liability contemplated by that agreement. See Tuxedo Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Lie-Nielsen, 245 Ga. 27, 29 (1) (262 SE2d 794) (1980). Holmes pleads only negligence in his complaint, moreover, which takes this case beyond the reach of those involving wilful or wanton acts. See, e.g., McFann v. Sky Warriors, Inc., 268 Ga. App. 750 (603 SE2d 7) (2004) (where question of fact existed concerning a party’s gross negligence, exculpatory agreement could be unenforceable as against public policy).
We are bound to read contracts so as to “give a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention by the parties rather than an interpretation which leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable or of no effect.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Whitmire v. Colwell, 159 Ga. App. 682, 683 (285 SE2d 28) *480(1981). When the majority uses a contract provision not implicated under the facts before it to invalidate a second, inarguably relevant provision, it violates this precept of contract interpretation. See Tuxedo Plumbing, supra (the only reasonable construction of promises to exculpate and to provide insurance was that promisee would also obtain the benefit of insurance procured by promisor). I therefore dissent.
Decided March 23, 2007. Roane & Roane, Matthew H. Roane, Clark & Goldner, C. Lawrence Jewett, Jr., for appellant. Jean F. Johnson, for appellee.