concurring specially.
Although I reach the same conclusion as the majority, I feel compelled to specially concur in the judgment since I interpret Code Ann. § 24-2801 (c) (1) (F) as a positive expression on the part of the General Assembly to establish a qualification for the service in the office of sheriff rather than impose a disqualification for such service. In so doing, the General Assembly is simply exercising the power granted under Code Ann. § 2-5808.1 (Art. IX, Sec. I, Par. IX of the Ga. Const, of 1976). In exercise of this authority, the General Assembly is empowered to require reasonable qualifications of those persons serving as sheriffs in the State of Georgia. In my opinion, requiring that such person be free of a conviction of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, whether pardoned or not, is not an unreasonable qualification. It is true that the State Board of Pardons and Paroles relieved appellant of his legal disabilities, but failure to meet reasonable qualifications for public office is not a legal disability. For this reason, I am of the opinion that the trial court should be affirmed.