NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
Nos. 12-1155 & 12-1172
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL R. JOHNSON,
Appellant
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. Nos. 2-00-cr-00136-007 & 2-00-cr-00146-001)
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 23, 2013
______________
Before: RENDELL and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL,*
District Judge.
(Opinion Filed: July 1, 2013)
______________
OPINION
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
*
Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, District Judge for the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
Appellant Michael R. Johnson violated the terms of his supervised release by
conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 400 pounds of marijuana. The District
Court revoked Johnson‟s supervised release and sentenced him to three consecutive terms
of 11 months‟ imprisonment, reflecting Johnson‟s multiple violations. For the following
reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. BACKGROUND
Since we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the
essential facts.
On September 21, 2000, Johnson pled guilty to several criminal charges —
conspiracy to distribute more than 700 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846; conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h);
and one count of possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Johnson received a sentence of 188 months‟
imprisonment and a term of five years of supervised release. Based on his cooperation,
Johnson‟s sentence was later reduced to 72 months‟ imprisonment.
After his incarceration, Johnson served his supervised release in Pennsylvania and
New Mexico. While in New Mexico, Johnson violated the terms of his supervised
release by driving under the influence. As a result, the conditions of his supervised
release were modified. Ten months later, Johnson again violated the terms of his
2
supervised release based on his arrest for violating a protection order, aggravated
stalking, assaulting a household member, and disorderly conduct.
This appeal relates to Johnson‟s third violation of his supervised release based on
an arrest by federal authorities in El Paso, Texas.
II. JURISDICTION
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III. ANALYSIS
We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the District Court‟s
sentence upon revocation of supervised release for an abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d
766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010). Procedural reasonableness requires that courts apply the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors meaningfully, although courts need not exhaustively explain the
application of each individual factor. See Friedman, 658 F.3d at 360; Doe, 617 F.3d at
769-70; United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006). Procedural
reasonableness also requires consideration of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines and
correct calculation of any Guidelines ranges. See Friedman, 658 F.3d at 360; United
States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). A sentence is substantively
reasonable unless “„no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same
3
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.‟”
Friedman, 658 F.3d at 360 (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir.
2009) (en banc)). We focus on the totality of the circumstances, and the party
challenging the sentence has the burden of proving the sentence‟s substantive
unreasonableness. Id.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
The District Court‟s sentence was procedurally reasonable because it considered
the § 3553(a) factors, along with the appropriate provisions of Chapter 7 of the
Guidelines and § 3583(e). The District Court explained its reasoning regarding
§§ 3553(a)(1), (2), and (4) by discussing Johnson‟s history of violating the terms of his
supervised release, the need for deterrence, and the Guidelines provisions concerning
violations of supervised release. There is no basis to determine that the District Court
erred.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
The District Court‟s consecutive sentences of 11 months‟ imprisonment for the
violation of supervised release were certainly substantively reasonable. The District
Court fully justified its sentence, particularly in light of Johnson‟s two previous
violations of his supervised release. The District Court‟s sentence was within the
Guidelines range and satisfies all of the elements of a substantively reasonable sentence.
4
Johnson has not met his burden of showing that a reasonable sentencing court would not
have imposed the same sentence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
5