I respectfully dissent. I would hold that uninsured motorist coverage is not “portable” for a party who is injured while operating or while a passenger of a vehicle of which the party would be an insured had he or she purchased insurance coverage.
Just as it does in the context of underinsured motorist coverage, S.C.Code Ann. § 38-77-160 (2002) contains a limitation on just how “personal and portable” uninsured motorist coverage can be. We recognized this limitation and made good use of it in deciding that an insured may not apply underinsured coverage from an insurance policy covering one vehicle to a separate policy, covering a separate vehicle, under which the insured declined the insurance company’s offer of such coverage. See Burgess v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Op. No. 26304 (S.C. Sup.Ct. filed April 9, 2007). In reaching that decision, we noted that “[ujpholding this limit on portability encourages persons to purchase UIM insurance on all their vehicles.” Id. Because this situation is no different, and because the public policy concerns are identical, I see no need to retreat from that holding in the instant case.3
I think the majority rightly expresses concern at the thought that under similar logic to that used in the court of appeals’ decision, an owner of an uninsured vehicle involved in *93an accident could be entitled to use uninsured motorist coverage from a separate vehicle to recover for his or her injuries. Undeniably, this result would be absurd. Instead, the owner of multiple vehicles who chooses to insure only one with uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage ought to be precluded from recovering basic UM and-.UIM limits on any of his or her vehicles for which he or she has not purchased this coverage. In my view, this is the precise concern that drove us to hold as we did in Burgess, and by holding as the majority does in the instant case, we chip away at that foundation. :
Although I appreciate the view expressed by my brother Justice Burnett in dissent, I believe it is far too late in the day to argue that the language of an insurance contract is the end of the inquiry in these cases. See Charleston County Sch. Dist. v. State Budget & Control Bd., 313 S.C. 1, 6, 437 S.E.2d 6, 8 (1993) (noting that statutory provisions relating to insurance contracts have long been held by this Court to be part of these contracts). Because the court of appeals found a provision of the contract in the instant case was contrary to public policy and therefore void, we must necessarily proceed beyond the terms of the contract in our analysis. ’
For the reasons I have outlined, I would reverse the court of appeals’ decision and find that Respondent is not entitled to basic uninsured motorist coverage from her automobile insured by Nationwide.
. In reaching this conclusion, I note that S.C.Code Ann. § 38-77-30(7) (2002) defines an insured as both the named insured and, if a resident of the same household, the spouse of the named insured.