¶ 21. (dissenting). In State v. Williams, 2003 WI App 116, ¶ 1, 265 Wis. 2d 229, 666 N.W.2d 58, we adopted a rule regarding judicial involvement in plea bargaining which we believed would definitively settle this issue once and for all. We said:
We conclude that judicial participation in the bargaining process that precedes a defendant's plea raises a conclusive presumption that the plea was involuntary. Therefore, we adopt a bright-line rule barring any form of judicial participation in plea negotiations before a plea agreement has been reached.
Not two years later, the majority has changed this "bright-line rule" to a gray area rule which applies only if the exact facts in Williams are repeated.
¶ 22. The purpose of our bright-line rule in Williams was to make after-the-fact inquiries and prejudice determinations unnecessary. We did not write Williams for only the facts of that case. Our whole opinion was an attempt to lay out a rule for future cases that would be easy to understand and follow. We quoted State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis. 2d 478, 488, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970), for the reasons why judicial involvement in plea bargaining was inadvisable:
*435(1) [T]he defendant can receive the impression from the trial judge's participation in the plea discussions that he would not receive a fair trial if he went to trial before the same judge; (2) if the judge takes part in the preplea discussions he may destroy his objectivity when it comes to determining the voluntariness of the plea when it is offered; (3) judicial participation to the extent of promising a certain sentence is inconsistent with the theory behind the use of the presentence investigation report and (4) the defendant may feel that the risk of not going along with the disposition which is apparently desired by the judge is so great that he will be induced to plead guilty even if innocent.
Id.
¶ 23. The majority focuses only on the voluntariness rationale for avoiding judicial involvement in plea bargaining. Wolfe shows that there is more to it than that. The Williams bright-line rule was our attempt to make judicial inquiry and analysis by the trial court unnecessary. We recognized the problems inherent in a trial court examining what it said at a previous hearing to see whether its statements did, in fact, coerce a defendant into a plea. The problem, of course, is that Wisconsin trial judges strive to do the right thing, and usually do. But asking a trial judge whether his or her comments coerced a defendant into a guilty plea is unrealistic. Trial judges do not attempt to coerce guilty pleas knowing that they are participating in the forbidden plea negotiation process. The problem arises when trying to determine where in a broad gray area the line is located.
¶ 24. The issue of voluntariness permeated the hearings in this case. On October 25, 2000, Hunter's attorney told the court that he was unsure whether Hunter was willing to plead guilty. The trial court made it clear to Hunter that if he refused to plead guilty and *436demanded a trial, he would be convicted and sentenced more harshly than he would have been had he pled guilty. After hearing this, Hunter asked: "May I say something?" The court replied: "No, you may not."
¶ 25. There is no question that the trial court's comments affected Hunter. At a January 3, 2001 hearing, his attorney told the court:
[M]y client has raised some concerns in regards to a motion hearing that was held before this court back on October 25th of last year .... [H]e is also at this time wanting me to ask the court to recuse itself in regards to further handling of his case. He stated to me that comments that were made by the court during the motion hearing, and again, I'm not here to talk about the truthfulness of what he's telling me, but he does not feel comfortable proceeding in front of this court, whether it be with a trial or a guilty plea.
¶ 26. After the trial court explained to Hunter that it would not dismiss his case even though Hunter maintained that he was not present at the scene of the crime, Hunter said: "I know everybody wants me to just take a plea so this will get resolved." The court replied: "I just said that I'm happy to give you a trial." When, on April 30, 2001, Hunter changed his plea to no contest, the court asked: "Are you making your decision to plead no contest voluntarily?" Hunter replied, "Yes." The court noted: "Took a deep breath before you said that." Hunter said: "Yes."
¶ 27. The majority's conclusion that the passage of time rendered Hunter's plea voluntary is curious. Despite the passage of six months, Hunter was still reluctant to plead no contest. His attorney explained that the reason for this was Hunter's concern with the trial judge's comments at the October 25 hearing. The majority explains this as time Hunter used to decide *437that a plea was the best course of action. Given the record, that makes no sense to me. I view the situation as Hunter finally deciding to enter a plea because he realized that if he did not, the judge had told him he would be punished more severely. Coercion does not evaporate just because time has passed. The record here shows that the judge's comments stayed with Hunter from the time they were made until the time he pled no contest.
¶ 28. Coercion is not the only reason why judicial participation in plea bargaining is inadvisable. In a criminal case, "a defendant is entitled to not only a fair trial, but the appearance of a fair trial. . . ." Flowers v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 352, 362, 168 N.W.2d 843 (1969). After telling Hunter that if he did not plead guilty, his sentence would be more lengthy, the judge explained: "It is unlikely in this case that you're going to be acquitted .. . ." While lawyers and judges would view this as a realistic assessment of a case, a defendant is in a different position. To a defendant, a judge, the person most responsible for his or her fate, has just explained that even before the case is heard, the verdict will be guilty.
¶ 29. The majority does not discuss institutional problems arising after a judge tells a defendant that his or her jury is going to return a verdict of guilty. Perhaps a convicted defendant's belief as to how the judge arranged for that (erroneous as that belief is) is of little import. But we should strive for a criminal justice system that is viewed as fair and impartial by as many as possible. A judge's expressed pre-trial predictions of a guilty verdict are not helpful to that view.
¶ 30. What the majority has really done is to overrule Williams in all hut the case that reoccurs but once in ten years. The bright-line rule has been re*438placed by a gray-area rule that encourages coercion and will only lead to more appeals. The majority fears an avalanche of cases in which a judge's question whether the parties have discussed settlement results in plea withdrawal. Those fears are unfounded. A question, unless deliberately worded to be a comment, is merely that. Trial courts must be able to control their calendars. That is often done by judicial staff asking attorneys whether a case is going to trial. This, without more, cannot be coercive. Even a judge's on-the-record questions about scheduling are not coercive if all the court needs to know is whether the case is going to trial, the anticipated length of trial and whether the case will be terminated by a plea. I have every confidence that had Williams remained the rule, Wisconsin's judges would easily be able to avoid the problems the majority posits.
¶ 31. I joined Williams because I concluded that a bright-line rule would soon become as easily understood as anything can be in the practice of criminal law. For me, it is still the best way to handle a subset of the issue of allegedly involuntary guilty pleas. The majority believes otherwise, and I therefore cannot join its opinion. I would reverse, with instructions to grant Hunter's motion to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.