concurring:
Although I do not agree with all the majority’s reasons, I concur in the result because Justice Harshbarger should not benefit from his participation in In re Dostert, 174 W.Va. 258, 324 S.E.2d 402 (1984). Dostert liberalized the judicial pension’s eligibility requirements, thereby making Justice Harshbarger eligible for a pension for which he could not otherwise qualify. I agree with the majority that “Justice Harshbarger cannot place any faith in, or rely on a pension that was created by his own act.” Majority opinion supra at 661, 403 S.E.2d at 404. Stated more plainly, “no man ought to be a judge in his own cause.” Id. at 660, 403 S.E.2d at 402, 403. But for Justice Harshbarger’s participation, I would have been persuaded otherwise.
Justice Harshbarger’s participation in Dostert makes his case philosophically and factually different from Oakley v. Gainer, 175 W.Va. 115, 331 S.E.2d 846 (1985) and DePond v. Gainer, 177 W.Va. 173, 351 S.E.2d 358 (1986) — a distinction that the majority fails to appreciate. In Oakley and DePond, the widows of Judge Arthur R. Kingdon and Judge Frank J. DePond, relied on what they thought the law was at that particular time and had no involvement in the Dostert decision. Thus the distinguishing factor between Justice Harshbarger and the widows is reliance. See DePond, supra, 177 W.Va. at 217-18, 351 S.E.2d at 403-04 (Miller, J., concurring).
In failing to base its decision on Justice Harshbarger’s participation, the majority abandons the doctrine of stare decisis as if adherence to precedent has little value in our system of jurisprudence. However the principle of stare decisis is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence. Although “the principle of stare decisis admits of exception,” we have long required that “deviation from its application should not occur absent some urgent and compelling reason.” Dailey v. Bechtel Corp., 157 W.Va. 1023, 1029, 207 S.E.2d 169, 173 (1974). See Adkins v. St. Francis Hospital of Charleston, W.Va., 149 W.Va. 705, 718, 143 S.E.2d 154, 162 (1965).
The adherence to precedent is particularly important in areas of property interest, such as entitlement to judicial retirement benefits. This Court recognized the need for reliance and certainty concerning property interests, when we said: “Predictability is at the heart of the doctrine of stare decisis, and regardless of what we think of the merits of this case, we must be true to a reasonable interpretation of prior law in the area of property where certainty above all else is the preeminent compelling public policy to be served.” Hock v. City of Morgantown, 162 W.Va. 853, 856, 253 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1979); see also Signaigo v. N & W Ry. Co., 171 W.Va. 547, 301 S.E.2d 178, 181-82 (1982).
The widows in Oakley and DePond, along with others who did not participate in *663Dostert, relied on the pension benefits that Dostert made available. The majority’s chastisement of the judiciary, except for the righteous few it mentioned, for a lack of courage in failing to strike a fatal blow against the Dostert retirement system, fails again to recognize the judiciary’s awareness of the principle of stare decisis. Although the majority attempts to show that Dostert was based on serious judicial error, most of the members of the judiciary were unaware of any error and relied on Dostert, and its progeny — Oakley and De-Pond. This Court in Dailey, supra 157 W.Va. at 1029, 207 S.E.2d at 173, said: “If the doctrine of stare decisis is to play any judicial role ... we cannot overrule a decision so recently rendered without any evidence of changing conditions or serious judicial error.” See Oakley supra 175 W.Va. at 122, 331 S.E.2d at 854.
Because of the need for certainty with respect to property interests, including entitlement to judicial retirement benefits, the majority should not have overruled Dos-tert, Oakley and DePond. The majority could have reached its decision based on Justice Harshbarger’s participation and did not need to introduce uncertainty for those who rely on precedent. Whomsoever relied on what they perceived the law to be at that given time, utilized their mature judgment to do so, and stare decisis is at least one doctrine that assists one in that reliance.