dissenting in part.
I agree with the dissenters that the trial court erred in taking from the jury the issue of Philip Morris’ negligence and in further ruling, as a matter of law, that Philip Morris’ negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The fact that reasonable jurors might differ upon those issues was plainly demonstrated by subsequent events.
After taking those issues from the jury, the trial court found itself in the odd position of resubmitting them to the jury as a part of instruction 11, which is quoted in the dissent. That instruction required that the jury, in order to find against Texaco, must first *417find that Texaco had created or actively concealed from Philip Morris a dangerous condition and that, at the time of the accident, Philip Morris had not had a reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against the danger. The jury, thus given its only opportunity to pass upon the issues of Philip Morris’ negligence and proximate cause, exonerated Philip Morris in order to find against Texaco.**
The trial court nevertheless entered judgment against both Philip Morris and Texaco. Seldom has a jury’s verdict been treated as such a superfluous appendage. The majority opinion dismisses this invasion of the jury’s province on the ground that the “thrust” of instruction 11 was against Texaco. Unfortunately, a jury has no way of knowing the “thrust” or purpose of any instruction. Juries simply receive instructions as judicial pronouncements of the applicable law. The jury took the instruction as the law of the case and applied it to the facts as it found them.
The majority opinion further undertakes to justify the trial court’s disregard of the verdict by a lengthy recital of the acts and omissions of Saddington, Philip Morris’ employee, which the majority characterizes as negligent. That recital would be most cogent if we occupied the jury box, but none of us did. Those who were in that position took a different view.
Accordingly, I depart from my fellow dissenters’ conclusion that the case against Philip Morris should be remanded for new trial. I would enter final judgment here in Philip Morris’ favor. In all respects other than the judgments against Philip Morris, I join in the majority opinion.
GORDON, Retired Justice, dissenting in part.
Something is amiss.
In view of Instruction 11,1 the jury necessarily found by its verdict that:
*418(1) Texaco created an artificial condition, or actively concealed the condition from Philip Morris.
(2) The artificial condition involved an unreasonable risk of harm to others outside the land (where Texaco buried the cylinders) because of plan, construction, location, or other reason.
(3) At the time of the accident in Hanover County, Philip Morris had not had a reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against the happening of the accident.
(4) The artificial condition was a proximate cause of the accident.
Yet, the judge found as a matter of law that Philip Morris’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
Reason cannot support both findings.
One might doubt that Philip Morris lacked reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against the happening of the accident. On the other hand, the evidence makes a jury issue whether Philip Morris took reasonable precautions.
Texaco refused to assist Philip Morris in identifying and disposing of the cylinders without a hold-harmless agreement. Reasonable men could conclude Philip Morris had justification for refusing to make that agreement.
Over a period of fifteen months, two companies hired by Philip Morris attempted unsuccessfully to find a contractor that would dispose of the cylinders. No disposal firm would accept the job because government regulations required knowledge of the cylin*419ders’ contents. To acquire knowledge of contents required taking a sample. Corrosion on the cylinder valves raised fear the valves would not close after opening.
Ultimately, a large waste disposal firm gave Philip Morris the names of two companies who might perform the job. One firm, ALine, inspected the cylinders and gave Philip Morris a brochure describing its previous disposal activities and experience.
Reasonable men could conclude Philip Morris exercised ordinary care in entrusting the disposal to A-Line.
Having entrusted the disposal to A-Line, Philip Morris could not control this independent contractor’s disposal operations. Philip Morris’s chemical engineer, Saddington, observed the operations for two days and during part of the third and final day. When Saddington left the site on the third day, he thought the work was essentially finished and the men were cleaning up.
Saddington may have had authority to stop the operations if, in his opinion, they were being performed in an unsafe manner. The jury should have been permitted to decide whether Saddington acted reasonably in failing to exercise his discretion to stop the operations.
These problems in my opinion require a new trial. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Philip Morris, reasonable men could differ whether it was guilty of negligence. A jury should therefore determine the issue of Philip Morris’s liability.2
STEPHENSON, J., joins in dissent.
Ironically, instruction 11 was given at Texaco’s request, over Philip Morris’ objection.
A seller of land who has created an artificial condition, or has actively concealed it from the purchaser, which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others outside of the land because of its plan, construction, location, or otherwise, is subject to liability to such persons for physical harm caused by the condition after the purchaser has taken possession of the land.
Such liability continues until the purchaser discovers the condition and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it. Otherwise, the liability continues only *418until the purchaser has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to take such precautions.
In either case, however, once the purchaser has in fact discovered the danger, and has had reasonable opportunity to take precautions against it, his liability supercedes that of the seller, and the liability of the seller is terminated.
If you believe from the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant, Texaco, Incorporated, created an artificial condition, or has actively concealed such condition from the defendant Philip Morris, Inc., which artificial condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others outside of the land because of its plan, construction, location, or otherwise; and if you further believe from the greater weight of the evidence that at the time of the accident involved herein in Hanover County that Philip Morris, Inc., had not had a reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it, considering all of the facts and circumstances of this case; and if you further believe from the greater weight of the evidence that this artificial condition was a proximate cause of the accident which occurred in Hanover County, you shall find your verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Texaco, Inc.
Counsel for Philip Morris makes the logical argument that the jury verdict against Texaco acquitted Philip Morris of negligence. I cannot subscribe, however, to the conclusion that an instruction and verdict directed only to Texaco can acquit another party.