¶ 50. (concurring). I agree with the majority's decision today and write separately only to comment on the harmless error analysis. For at least the past 38 years, this court has wrestled with formulating a standard for harmless error. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987); Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-57, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973); State v. Spring, 48 Wis. 2d 333, 339-40, 179 N.W.2d 841 (1970); Pulaski v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 450, 456-57, 129 N.W.2d 204 (1964). The previous standard, applied in several recent decisions, see, e.g., Green v. Smith, 2001 WI 109, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727; Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201; Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768; Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698; Nommensen v. American Cont'l Ins. Co., 2001 WI 112, 246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 301, was whether there existed a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the outcome, and that a reasonable possibility is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. See State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543-545, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). I have written dissents or concurrences in those recent decisions urging the court to clarify that Dyess' use of the term "reasonable possibility" was intended to require "reasonable probability." The majority opinion recognizes, at ¶ 41, that in Dyess we stated that those two terms had the same meaning.
¶ 51. I write, then, only to note that the harmless error dispute is finally put to rest in Wisconsin, at least *469in criminal cases, both by the majority opinion here and in State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367. By establishing that an error is harmless if "it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error," Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999), this court has finally corrected the confusion by no longer relying on the term "reasonable possibility." The majority, in ¶ 46, has set forth the language from Neder that explains the reason why the United States Supreme Court stated the harmless error rule in the manner it did.
To set a barrier so high that it could never be surmounted would justify the very criticism that spawned the harmless-error doctrine in the first place: "Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it."
Neder, 527 U.S. at 18. (quoting Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970)).
¶ 52. I wholeheartedly agree with this articulation of the justification for a common sense harmless error rule — one that looks at whether it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt that absent the error, a rational jury would have reached the same verdict.1
¶ 53. For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
¶ 54. I am authorized to state that Justice JON R WILCOX joins this concurrence.
I respectfully disagree with the dissenting opinion's position that this test, adopted by the majority here and in State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367, "ignore[s] the Chapman approach" and "misstates the U.S. Supreme Court's harmless-error test." Dissent, ¶ 75.