¶ 25. {concurring). I agree with the Majority that, as explained in Part II.A. of the Majority opinion, Anthony J. Randle waived his right to challenge the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court over the charge to which he ultimately pled no contest and which is central to this appeal, third-degree sexual assault. Thus, I do not believe that we have to consider the related though different issue discussed in Part II.B. of the Majority opinion.
¶ 26. I also disassociate myself from the Majority's apparent agreement with the trial court's comments quoted in paragraph 16 of the Majority opinion. The facts here are horrendous and fully support the original charges of: second-degree sexual assault under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) — Randle raped *756his wife by both "use" and "threat of force or violence"; and kidnapping under Wis. Stat. § 940.31(l)(a) or (b). He fully deserved to face the full penalty the legislature provided: a maximum penalty of thirty years' imprisonment, plus a $10,000 fine for the second-degree sexual assault, and an additional sixty years' imprisonment for the kidnapping. See Wis. Stat. § 939.50.
¶ 27. But the case was plea-bargained: Randle was allowed to plead no contest to third-degree sexual assault, which, as material here, is defined by Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3) as "sexual intercourse with a person without the consent of that person," and "false imprisonment" under Wis. Stat. § 940.30. Oh my: beatings, manhandling, forced abduction, humiliation, and force-induced rape all bargained away to grease the skids of what the trial court called the. "administration of justice." To me at least, and, I would bet to Randle's abused wife and others who have been and will be in her place of terror, what happened here is the administration of injustice. For Randle to challenge the incredible break he received at the hands of the Milwaukee County district attorney's office and the trial court is nothing less than chutzpah.
¶ 28. I respectfully concur.