dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.) (Evans I), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 419, 126 L.Ed.2d 365 (1993), the majority crafted a new fundamental right that had never been recognized by the United States Supreme Court or by any court other than a federal district court in Ohio that relied on Evans I. Ironically, judicial review of Amendment 2 has accomplished exactly what the voters who passed Amendment 2 sought to prevent — the majority has effectively created a heightened protection for homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals.
In establishing what is essentially a new substantive due process right disguised as a previously unrecognized “fundamental right,” the majority disregarded the warnings of Chief Justice Burger, who stated in his dissent to Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2409, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982): “If ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly result-oriented approach, this case is a prime example.” Chief Justice Burger stated:
Were it our business to set the Nation’s social policy, I would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children — including illegal aliens — of an elementary education.... However, the Constitution does not constitute us as “Platonic Guardians” nor does it vest in this Court the authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy, “wisdom,” or “common sense.” We trespass on the assigned function of the political branches under our structure of limited and separated powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today.
Id. at 242, 102 S.Ct. at 2408 (citations omitted).
The majority opinion has overlooked a crucial aspect of the case before us: we are not evaluating an act of the legislature or pronouncement of the executive — we are reviewing a constitutional amendment adopted by the people of the State of Colorado. While there are certainly some initiated constitutional amendments that a majority of the electorate may attempt to visit on a minority that will not pass constitutional scrutiny, we must not ignore the fact that we are reviewing the expressed will of the citizens of this state.
In Evans I, we remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the preliminary injunction sustained by a majority of this court should be made permanent. The district court, following Evans I with great precision, made extensive findings and made the preliminary injunction permanent. Nev*1357ertheless, people of homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation have never been adjudicated to be a protected class and the right to participate equally in the political process has never been determined, apart from Evans I, to be a fundamental right. Accordingly, I would employ a rational relation standard to Amendment 2 and vacate the permanent injunction. For the reasons set forth in my dissent to Evans I, and for the reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent.
I
The majority relies on Evans I and applies the strict scrutiny standard of review to Amendment 2 because it holds that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process. Maj. op. at 1339; Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1276. Evans I established this standard of review by assembling several United States Supreme Court decisions and interpreting their collective teachings as implying a new fundamental right. See Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1276 (citing voting cases, ballot access eases, and “cases involving attempts to limit the ability of certain groups to have desired legislation implemented through the normal political processes”). In my view, no fundamental right or suspect class is implicated by Amendment 2, and therefore the standard of judicial scrutiny applied by the majority is erroneous.
A
The majority in Evans I extensively reviewed many United States Supreme Court decisions to reach its conclusion, and emphasized a line of cases relating to citizen participation in the political process. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 73 L.Ed.2d 896 (1982); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1889, 29 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S.Ct. 557, 21 L.Ed.2d 616 (1969). The majority in Evans I interpreted these cases to create the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process. Properly understood, however, these cases involve suspect classifications and not the alleged fundamental right to participate equally in the political process.
In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S.Ct. 557, 21 L.Ed.2d 616 (1969), the United States Supreme Court addressed a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution. Hunter involved a city charter amendment that repealed a racial anti-discrimination ordinance and required voter action before such an ordinance could be enacted. Id. at 387, 89 S.Ct. at 558. Although Hunter involved the political process, the Court invalidated the amendment because it created an unjustified distinction based on race. The Court held:
Because the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified official distinctions based on race, racial classifications are “constitutionally suspect,” and subject to the “most rigid scrutiny.” They “bear a far heavier burden of justification” than other classifications.
Id. at 391-92, 89 S.Ct. at 561 (citations omitted). Courts and scholars reviewing Hunter have recognized that the holding was predicated on an unconstitutional racial classification. See Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1099 (5th Cir.1975) (stating that Hunter struck down an amendment that was based on a racial classification), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940, 96 S.Ct. 2660, 49 L.Ed.2d 393 (1976); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F.Supp. 710, 718 (W.D.N.Y.1970) (“The principle of Hunter is that the state creates an ‘explicitly racial classification’ whenever it differentiates between the treatment of problems involving racial matters and that afforded other problems in the same area.”), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935, 91 S.Ct. 1618, 29 L.Ed.2d 105 (1971); Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.App.4th 1013, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 655 (4 Dist.1991) (stating that “Hunter was a ‘strict scrutiny’ case in which the law invalidly classified the affected parties on the basis of traditionally suspect characteristics”); Michael Klarman, An Interpretative History of Modem Equal Protection, 90 Mich.L.Rev. 213, 314 (1991) (noting that in place of a political process theory of equal protection review, racial- classifications are and should be considered presumptively unconstitutional *1358because they should be irrelevant to decision-making); Robert H. Beinfield, Note, The Hunter Doctrine: An Equal Protection Theory that Threatens Democracy, 38 Vand. L.Rev. 397, 405 (1985) (suggesting that the decision in Hunter is based on racial classifications).
In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 73 L.Ed.2d 896 (1982), the Court applied Hunter and struck down a state-wide initiative to terminate the use of busing to achieve racial integration in the public schools. In finding that the initiative violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court held:
[T]he political majority may generally restructure the political process to place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental action. But a different analysis is required when the State allocates governmental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the deci-sionmaking process. State action of this kind, the Court said, “places special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process,” thereby “making it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities than for other members of the community to achieve legislation that is in their interest.”
Id. at 470, 102 S.Ct. at 3195 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The Court thus did not approve of “distinctions based on race” and struck down the initiative because it would have created additional burdens for a class of citizens who have had historical difficulty in changing the political process. Id. at 486, 102 S.Ct. at 3203. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547, 563-65, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 3008-09, 111 L.Ed.2d 445 (1990) (holding that members of a traditionally suspect class merit special protection); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-91, 109 S.Ct. 706, 720-21, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) (same); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783-84 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938) (noting that special protection may be offered for “discrete and insular” minority groups).
A similar issue was addressed in Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527, 102 S.Ct. 3211, 73 L.Ed.2d 948 (1982), which was announced on the same day as Washington. In Crawford, the Court upheld a state constitutional amendment that prohibited state courts from ordering mandatory student assignment or transportation. The Court stated that if the constitutional amendment employed a racial classification such as the classification in Hunter, the Court would apply the strict scrutiny standard of review, but found Hunter inapplicable because the amendment at issue did not “embody a racial classification.” Crawford, 458 U.S. at 536-37, 102 S.Ct. at 3217.
The fact that the fundamental right created by the majority in Evans I has never been recognized by the Supreme Court is evident in two cases, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971), and Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1889, 29 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971). In James and Gordon, the Court could have used the fundamental right found in Evans I and applied strict scrutiny'review to strike down constitutional measures. Instead, in both cases, the Court upheld the provisions and refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard enunciated in Hunter.
In James, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a California constitutional measure that prohibited state public bodies from developing, constructing, or acquiring low-income housing projects until voters approved of the project in a referendum. Thus, the citizens singled out in James were low-income people who would qualify for low-rent housing and therefore the Court did not apply strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court said:
Unlike the case before us, Hunter rested on the conclusion that Akron’s referendum law denied equal protection by placing “special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process.” ... Unlike the Akron referendum provision, it cannot be said that California’s Article XXXIV rests on “distinctions based on race.” ... The present case could be affirmed only by *1359extending Hunter, and this we decline to do.
James, 402 U.S. at 140-41, 91 S.Ct. at 1333.
Similarly, in Gordon, the plaintiffs challenged West Virginia’s constitutional provision that required a sixty-percent approval for any bonded indebtedness incurred by the political subdivisions of the state. As in James, the Supreme Court did not apply the strict scrutiny standard of review because:
Unlike the restrictions in our previous cases, the West Virginia Constitution singles out no “discrete and insular minority” for special treatment.... We are not, therefore, presented with a case like Hunter, ... in which fair housing legislation alone was subject to an automatic referendum requirement. The class singled out in Hunter was clear — “those who would benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations.”
Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5, 91 S.Ct. at 1891-92. James and Gordon demonstrate that strict scrutiny should not be applied to review a restriction on the political process unless the restriction singles out a discrete and insular minority.1 The Supreme Court of the United States has never held, however, that the right to participate equally in the political process is a fundamental right.
B
The development of fundamental rights in our jurisprudence has never been a matter for ad hoc determination. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 151-52, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937) (stating that fundamental rights are those that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed”); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1937-38, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (noting that fundamental rights are liberties that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2844-45, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1679-83, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). Fundamental rights must be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the United States Constitution. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1296-97, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). Among the fundamental rights delineated by the Supreme Court are the right to vote, the right to interstate travel, the right to privacy, and the guarantees contained in the First Amendment. See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2293, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (First Amendment); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (voting); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484, 85 S.Ct. at 1681-82 (privacy).
The Court has been reluctant to recognize new rights as fundamental. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195, 106 S.Ct. at 2846 (“There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the Due Process Clauses], particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.”); Geoffrey Stone, et.al., Constitutional Law, at 831 (1986) (stating that the Court “has essentially frozen the list of ‘fundamental’ interests”). The Court has refused to declare education, housing, the right to refuse medical treatment, welfare payments, or governmental employment to be fundamental rights worthy of heightened constitutional protection. See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2852, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990) (right to refuse medical treatment); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (employment); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35, 93 S.Ct. at 1297-98 (education); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161-62, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (welfare). Never before has any court recognized the right to participate equally in the political process as a *1360fundamental right, the curtailing of which warrants strict judicial scrutiny.2 “It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.” Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33, 93 S.Ct. at 1297.
It is crucial to note, however, that even though equal participation in the political process does not merit strict scrutiny analysis, the United States Constitution offers protection for those who may be adversely affected by legislation. When individuals or groups are singled out, as they have been here, they may still be protected by the Due Process Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause.3 In this ease, the class of citizens is protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, Amendment 2 must be struck down only if its challengers can demonstrate that the legislation is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
II
During oral argument before this court, counsel for the plaintiffs-appellees asserted that even if strict scrutiny review were inappropriate, we should analyze Amendment 2 under a rational basis standard of review. Counsel noted that in Heller v. Doe by Doe, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993), the Supreme Court did not engage in strict scrutiny review because it was not properly preserved at the lower levels and therefore urged this court not to preclude rational basis review by ruling merely under strict scrutiny standards. I find counsel’s contention persuasive and therefore address Amendment 2 under a rational relation standard.
A
In reviewing an act of the legislature or a voter-mandated constitutional amendment that creates a classification involving neither a fundamental right nor suspect classes, a court will review the classification under the “rational basis” standard of review. See Heller, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2642; Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 462, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 2489-90, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988). Under the rational basis standard of review, the classification will be “upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Federal Communications Comm’n v. Beach Communication, Inc., — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); see also Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485, 110 S.Ct. 2499, 2504, 110 L.Ed.2d 438 (1990); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111, 99 S.Ct. 939, 949-50, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 484-85, 90 S.Ct. at 1161-62. “Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2642; see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331-32, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992).
The inquiry into whether there is a rational basis for the classification, however, does not authorize “the judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations.” New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (per curiam). Instead, a classification that involves neither suspect classes nor fundamental rights is accorded a strong presumption of validity. Beach Communication, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2098; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-332, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 2386-87, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314, 96 S.Ct. at 2567.
*1361Because of the strong presumption of validity, the purpose or rationale behind the legislation need not be articulated at any time. Heller, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2642; Nordlinger, — U.S. at —, 112 S.Ct. at 2334; Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 368 U.S. 522, 528, 79 S.Ct. 437, 441-42, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959). Additionally, the party challenging the classification bears the burden of “negat[ing] every conceivable basis which might support it” whether or not it is supported by the record. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973); see also Heller, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2643.
In an effort to ensure that rational basis review does not become a “license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices,” Beach Communication, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2101, the reasons articulated are given great deference. See Id. at 2098 (“[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-71, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2406-07, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (“In cases where a classification burdens neither a suspect group nor a fundamental interest, ‘courts are quite reluctant to overturn governmental action on the ground that it denies equal protection of the laws.’ ”) (citation omitted); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 62, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2637-38, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (“The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people, including imponderable aesthetic assumptions, is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional.”); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485, 90 S.Ct. at 1161-62 (noting that a classification does not fail because “in practice it results in some inequality”) (citation omitted); Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 33 S.Ct. 441, 443, 57 L.Ed. 730 (1913) (“The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific.”); see also Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1440 (2d ed. 1988) (“Within very broad limits, courts have traditionally exhibited extreme deference to the legislative definition of ‘the general good,’ either out of judicial sympathy for the difficulties of the legislative process, or out of a belief in judicial restraint generally.”); John Nowak, Ronald Rotunda, Nelson Young, Constitutional Law 596 (2d ed. 1983) (“A majority of the justices today will uphold governmental classifications under this standard unless no reasonably conceivable set of facts could establish a rational relationship between the classification and an arguably legitimate end of government.”); Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 Temp.L.Rev. 937, 941 (1991) (“The rational basis test is notoriously weak. When applied, there is ‘little doubt about the outcome; the challenged legislation is always upheld.’ ”) (quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. at 319, 96 S.Ct. at 2569-70 (Marshall, J. dissenting)); but see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 447, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3258, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (striking down on rational basis review a zoning law that prohibited mentally retarded individuals from residing in certain areas of town because the law was based on the “bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group”) (citation omitted). This is so because:
The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted. Thus, we will not overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational.
Vance, 440 U.S. at 97, 99 S.Ct. at 942-43 (footnote omitted). Although the purposes and rationale of a voter initiative are even more difficult to assess than legislative pronouncements, initiatives passed by the citizens of the state which contain classifications not related to fundamental rights or suspect classes are also given deference. See Grego*1362ry, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. at 2406 (applying the rational basis standard to a constitutional restriction enacted by the people); MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir.1991) (applying a rational basis test to measures adopted through a referendum).
It is the prerogative of the people of the State of Colorado, and not this or any other court, to weigh the evidence and determine the wisdom and utility of the purposes behind a measure adopted through the initiative process. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469, 101 S.Ct. 715, 726-27, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (stating that the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the legislature). Thus, whether in fact Amendment 2 will meet its objectives is not the relevant question: the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied if the people of Colorado could have rationally decided that prohibiting homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals from enacting certain legislation might further a legitimate interest. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2330, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984); Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 466, 101 S.Ct. at 725.
Amendment 2 was put to a plebiscite by initiative petitions and eventually won voter approval by 813,966 votes to 710,151 votes. Because Amendment 2 was a product of a vote of the citizens of Colorado, no purpose or rationale for Amendment 2 was explicitly set forth. See MSM Farms, 927 F.2d at 332 (“Because the law was adopted through the initiative and referendum process, there is little traditional legislative history regarding its purpose.”). However, the state has articulated several rationale in this court and in the district court to establish that the interest behind Amendment 2 is not only a rational interest but also a compelling state interest.4
Ill
Although only one legitimate state interest rationally related to the state’s goals for a constitutional amendment is necessary, the state has set forth several. The district court found that two rationale — the promotion of religious freedom and the promotion of family privacy — demonstrated compelling state interests, although it found that the means for achieving the interests were not narrowly tailored to achieve the objectives.5 In my view, there are at least three interests that satisfy the constitutional standard and those asserting the invalidity of Amendment 2 have not met their burden of demonstrating that there is no rational basis for the constitutional amendment.
A
The state asserts that the rational basis of Amendment 2 is that it prevents the government from interfering with religious privacy. The root of the state’s contention is that under ordinances preempted by Amendment 2, individual landlords or employers, including churches, who have profound religious objections to homosexuality, would nonetheless be compelled to compromise those convictions under threat of government sanctions. Thus, Amendment 2 prevents any political body from enacting legislation that would hinder the right of individuals to choose who to rent to or who to employ on religious grounds. The district court found that “[pjreserving religious freedom is a compelling state interest” but that Amendment 2 *1363was “not narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose in the least restrictive manner possible.”
Freedom of individuals to practice and hold particular religious beliefs is among the highest values in our society. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115-17, 63 S.Ct. 870, 876-77, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, 104, 63 S.Ct. 890, 87 L.Ed. 1290 (1943); see also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149-50, 63 S.Ct. 862, 866-67, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring). It is not within the discretion of this or any court to determine which beliefs are valid because “courts are not the arbiters of scriptural interpretation.” United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1055, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982). In fact, “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit [free exercise] protection.” Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1430, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). Not only is it impermissible for courts to determine the validity of religious practices and beliefs, but no government official or body may delineate what is a “proper” form of faith and require citizens to act in accordance with government-mandated religious standards. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1187, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by work or act their faith therein”).
Nevertheless, not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257, 102 S.Ct. at 1055; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718, 101 S.Ct. at 1432 (stating that “only those interests of the highest order ... can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion”). Even the highest values, including religious freedom, must sometimes give way to the greater public good. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793-94, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). Thus, governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1602-03, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990).
In this case, the state asserts that Amendment 2 is an attempt to protect religious freedom by precluding legislation that would threaten sanctions against those who would refuse to employ or rent to homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals. The state indicates several examples of instances in which individuals or groups were forced to set aside their religious beliefs based on legislative enactments protecting homosexuals. In Aspen, for example, section 13-98 of the sexual orientation ordinance required churches to open their facilities to homosexual organizations if the facilities were opened to any community organization. Churches apparently could not refuse to hire employees, including pastors or priests, on the basis of their sexual orientation. Similarly, Title 12 of the Boulder Municipal Code did not allow a church or religious organization with deeply held moral and religious views on the subject of homosexuality to refuse to hire someone based on his or her sexual orientation.
In my view, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting religious freedoms and Amendment 2 bears a rational relationship to that interest.
B
Although the district court found that the state did not have a compelling interest in deterring “factionalism,” or “political fragmentation,” the state does have a legitimate interest in promoting state-wide uniformity and Amendment 2 is rationally related to that interest.
Prohibiting local action on matters affecting the entire state is advantageous inasmuch as the state has an interest in uniformity of regulation:
The central inquiry implicit in the concept of pre-emption is whether there should be statewide uniformity in the regulation of specific conduct. If there is no need for statewide uniformity, there is no need for state law to preempt local power to regulate ... This is the core of the preemption *1364question — to consider, on the one hand, the need for statewide uniformity of regulation of a specific type of conduct, and, on the other hand, the need of local governments to be able to respond to local, as distinguished from statewide problems.
Daniel R. Mandelker & Dawn C. Netsch, State and Local Government in a Federal System 237 (1977); see also Osborne M. Reynolds, Local Government Law 120 (1982) (stating that the critical inquiry in the context of state preemption of local law is: “[I]s this an area where it is desirable to have a single, all-encompassing scheme of regulation, so that local laws — not just local laws that conflict with the state’s, but any local laws — would unduly complicate the picture?”); Charles S. Rhyne, The Law of Local Government Operations § 19.11 (recognizing that preemption is rooted in the necessity of statewide uniformity of regulation).
In determining what is a matter of statewide concern, this court has not set forth a strict legal standard. Instead, we have determined the nature of the concern on an ad hoc basis. See Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 673 P.2d 354, 358 (Colo.1983). In City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo.1990), we stated:
Although we have found it useful to employ the “local,” “mixed,” and “state-wide” categories in resolving conflicts between local and state legislation, these legal categories should not be mistaken for mutually exclusive or factually perfect descriptions of the relevant interests of the state and local governments. Those affairs which are municipal, mixed or of statewide concern often imperceptibly merge.
State regulation is a matter of statewide concern in a broad variety of contexts. See Robertson v. City & County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 350 (Colo.1994) (Erickson, J., dissenting).
In this case, the state has a legitimate interest in promoting Amendment 2 because it is a matter of statewide concern. Amendment 2 involves a matter of statewide concern because the public is deeply divided over the issue of homosexuality.6 In fact, civil rights has never been the type of concern reserved exclusively for local governments.7 By adopting Amendment 2, the people of the state have sought to ensure that the government will act on a uniform basis. Several local governments, such as Denver, Aspen, and Boulder enacted sexual orientation laws, while others did not. By voting to approve Amendment 2, the voters of Colorado indicated that they wanted a statewide resolution of the issue that had formerly only been locally regulated and subject to great debate. The citizens of the state have a right to the initiative process which resolves conflicts between municipal and local governments when the issue is a matter of statewide concern and the process is not repugnant to the constitution.8 The Supreme Court has noted that “referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice.”9 James, 402 U.S. at 141, 91 S.Ct. at 1334.
*1365In my view, the state has a legitimate interest in promoting statewide uniformity in matters of statewide concern and Amendment 2 bears a rational relationship to that interest.
C
The state also contends that it has a legitimate interest in allocating its resources. Specifically, the state suggests that laws prohibited by Amendment 2 would drain the state’s financial and labor resources set aside and budgeted for the protection of traditionally suspect classes and diminish respect for traditional civil rights categories.
In this case, the testimony reflected that, although there was no current statute that required the state to enforce civil rights legislation on behalf of homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals, any such statute would decrease the funding available to enforce existing laws protecting traditionally suspect classes.10 For example, the investigative arm of the Civil Rights Commission has experienced steadily increasing demands upon a shrinking budget. Two out of the last three years, the Division has been unable to fulfill its part of a federally funded work-share agreement.11 The Division received complaints from the black community that claims were not being thoroughly investigated and prosecuted. The state, therefore, reasonably postulates that a law requiring the protection of an additional group would further stretch scarce resources, and Amendment 2 protects the civil rights enforcement for traditionally suspect groups.12 Thus, the decision of the people of the State of Colorado to allocate government resources in a particular manner is a legitimate state interest in this case. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. at 2516-17 (upholding a New Orleans ordinance noting that states have wide latitude in regulating their local economies); James, 402 U.S. at 143, 91 S.Ct. at 1334-35 (noting that a referendum procedure “ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds” and therefore found that a referendum measure did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
Additionally, the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the traditionally suspect classes remain respected. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539, 102 S.Ct. at 3218-19 (“And certainly the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment would not be advanced by an interpretation that discouraged the States from providing greater protection to racial minorities.”). Professor Joseph Broadus testified that the addition of homosexuals to civil rights statutes or ordinances would *1366lessen the public’s respect for historic civil rights categories. Testimony also indicated that, unlike the traditionally suspect classes, homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals are a relatively politically powerful and privileged special interest group. Indeed, former Civil Rights Commission Chairman Ignacio Rodriguez testified that the inclusion of homosexuals as a suspect class would represent a “drastic departure” from the historical aims of the civil rights laws.
The State of Colorado, through entities such as the Colorado Civil Rights Division, has attempted to further the interest in remedying specific instances of sexual and racial discrimination through existing civil rights laws and enforcement programs. However, owing to the fiscal constraints which are inevitably a part of public administration, unlimited funds are not available for this purpose. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the state to set priorities for its enforcement efforts. In this case, the setting of priorities is a legitimate state interest and Amendment 2 is rationally related to that interest.
IV
In my view, the correct standard of judicial review of Amendment 2 is a rational basis standard of review. Additionally, the plaintiffs have not shown that Amendment 2 is not rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting religious freedom, encouraging statewide uniformity in the law, and allocating resources. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the district court and vacate the injunction. Therefore, I dissent.
. Homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals have never been adjudicated to be a discrete and insular minority by the Supreme Court. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir.1990); Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F.Supp. 1319, 1323-25 (E.D.Cal.1993).
. Recently, however, a federal district judge, relying on Evans I, struck down an anti-gay-rights measure approved by Cincinnati voters. In Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.Supp. at 430 (S.D.Ohio 1994), the federal district court declared that a City Charter Amendment was unconstitutionally vague and violated the First Amendment right of homosexuals to participate in the political process. See also Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F.Supp. 1235 (S.D.Ohio 1993).
. When fundamental rights are denied to everyone, it raises due process concerns. When fundamental rights are denied to some individuals only, it raises equal protection concerns. The applicable standard in either case, however, is strict scrutiny.
. The district court found that the state alleged six compelling state interests: (1) deterring factionalism; (2) preserving the integrity of the state’s political functions; (3) preserving the ability of the state to remedy discrimination against suspect classes; (4) preventing the government from interfering with personal, familial and religious privacy; (5) preventing the government from subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest group; and (6) promoting the physical and psychological well-being of children.
. The district court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review which requires the state to prove that classifications affecting fundamental rights were necessary to promote a compelling or overriding interest which is narrowly tailored. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2395, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (noting that the classification must be "precisely tailored”); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (stating a classification involving a fundamental right must be a compelling state interest); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (noting that there needed to be a compelling reason for the government to restrict interstate travel).
. The issue of homosexuality and bisexuality is deeply controversial and divisive. Unlike race and sex, there is no national consensus that sexual orientation is an inappropriate basis for governmental, much less private, decisionmak-ing. A series of constitutional amendments and acts of Congress have authoritatively settled the place of race and sex in American life. The same simply cannot be said of non-traditional sexual orientation.
. For example, in 1989, the General Assembly passed a law prohibiting insurance companies from inquiring about or making coverage decisions on the basis of sexual orientation. See § 10-3-1104(l)(f), 4A C.R.S. (1993 Supp.). In 1992, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission went on record recommending legislation adding sexual orientation to the list of protected classes.
. Testimony of Harvard Government Professor Harvey Mansfield indicated that the use of the initiative process to enact Amendment 2 supported stability and respect for the political process, by giving "the people a sense that ... government is not alien to them, and that they can get together by their own initiative ... to produce a result that gives them a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment.”
. The Court in James went on to cogently state:
But of course a lawmaking procedure that "disadvantages” a particular group does not always deny equal protection. Under any such holding, presumably a State would not be able to require referendums on any subject unless referendums were required on all, because they would always disadvantage some group. *1365And this Court would be required to analyze governmental structures to determine whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster rule is likely to "disadvantage” any of the diverse and shifting groups that make up the American people.
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 1334, 28 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971).
. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783-84, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938), the Supreme Court announced its standard for reviewing legislative enactments in the economic sphere:
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
. Under the agreement, the Division works on a certain number of cases involving only federally-protected classes which, of course, does not in-elude sexual orientation. The Division only met the goals last year because the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission reduced the number of cases necessary to satisfy the agreement.
.The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of fiscal concerns impacting certain rights. In Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222-24, 102 S.Ct. at 2397-98 the Court held that whatever savings might be achieved by the state by denying public education to undocumented aliens were insubstantial compared to the costs to the children, the state, and the nation of not educating them. In Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618, 89 S.Ct. at 1322, and in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971), the Court found fiscal integrity not to be a compelling interest balanced against the right to interstate travel and the right to welfare assistance to aliens. These cases are distinguishable as either fundamental rights cases or cases in which the object was saving money not a basic allocation of funds.