Attorney disciplinary proceeding; attorney publicly reprimanded.
This is an appeal by the respondent, Attorney John J. Crosetto, from the conclusion of the referee that he violated the court's rules governing the professional conduct of attorneys by his conduct toward and statements to a family court commissioner during the course of a hearing. Attorney Crosetto also appealed from the referee's recommendation that he be publicly reprimanded as discipline for that professional misconduct.
Before reaching the merits of the appeal, we address the motion filed by Attorney Crosetto on December 10, 1990, more than four months after he filed the appeal in this proceeding, asking the members of this court to recuse themselves in the proceeding, pursuant to sec. 757.19(2), Stats., and pursuant to federal and state constitutional provisions, on the ground that the risk of bias is, in his terms, "impermissibly high" because the members of the court were defendants in a federal action in which he is a named plaintiff. That action sought declaratory and injunctive relief and a claim for damages arising out of this court's having required attorneys to be members of the State Bar of Wisconsin. Notwithstanding that the justices had been dismissed as parties to that action, Attorney Crosetto contended that we have a significant personal interest in the outcome of this proceeding.
The disqualification statute Attorney Crosetto cited in his motion, sec. 757.19(2), Stats., lists seven circum*584stances requiring a judge to disqualify himself or herself from a civil or criminal action or proceeding.1 The motion for disqualification alleged that each justice of this court has a significant personal interest in the outcome of this disciplinary proceeding because of personal criticism made against the justices in the pleadings and briefs filed in that action; further, it was asserted that each justice should determine that he or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in an impartial manner.
The members of this court, individually, have determined that none has a significant personal interest in the outcome of this disciplinary proceeding such as would require our disqualification. Each is satisfied that his or her impartiality in this proceeding is unimpaired and, further, that our acting in this matter does not create the appearance of a lack of impartiality. Accord*585ingly, we deny the motion for recusal and address the merits of the appeal.
We determine that the referee's conclusions concerning Attorney Crosetto's conduct were properly drawn from the undisputed facts. The referee had concluded that Attorney Crosetto engaged in conduct intended to disrupt the tribunal, in violation of SCR 20:3.5,2 and violated that portion of the Attorney's Oath, SCR 40.15,3 by which an attorney swears to maintain *586the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. We adopt those conclusions and determine that a public reprimand is appropriate discipline for Attorney Crosetto's breach of his fundamental professional duty to abstain from disrespectful, disruptive conduct toward the judicial system and its officers.
Attorney Crosetto was licensed to practice law in Wisconsin in 1967 and practices in Kenosha. He has not previously been the subject of an attorney disciplinary proceeding. The referee is Attorney Rudolph P. Regez.
Although not in total agreement on the sequence of events, the parties did not dispute the facts found by the referee. In 1988, Attorney Crosetto represented a man in a divorce action in which the wife was awarded temporary custody of the couple's five-year-old son. Both parents had a history of drug abuse and, while the father had discontinued the use of drugs, it appeared the mother had not. In September, 1988, Attorney Crosetto filed a motion seeking a transfer of temporary custody of the child to his client, based on the wife's alleged continued use of cocaine. Prior to the hearing on the motion, the wife's attorney withdrew from representation and the wife appeared at the hearing unrepresented.
At that hearing, with no court reporter present, the husband testified to having observed evidence of his wife's continued cocaine use after the divorce proceeding had commenced. The wife denied the incident to which her husband had testified but admitted to using cocaine following the commencement of the proceeding. She subsequently denied having made that admission and, because a reporter had not been present and the presiding family court commissioner, Carl M. Greco, had kept *587no minutes or notes of the testimony, this remains in dispute.
Following the hearing, Attorney Crosetto prepared for Commissioner Greco's signature an order setting forth findings of fact and an order transfering custody of the child to the husband, striking his support obligation and granting visitation rights to the mother. Included in the documents submitted to Commissioner Greco and which he signed were specific findings that at the hearing the wife had admitted to using cocaine after the commencement of the divorce action and that the child was in danger in her custody.
Shortly thereafter, the wife retained Attorney Mari Higgins-Frost, who then filed a motion to vacate the order transfering custody to the father and to obtain temporary joint custody and reinstatement of the husband's support obligation. A hearing on that motion was held November 10,1988, and it was at that hearing that Attorney Crosetto's conduct now before us occurred.
The parties appeared at the hearing with their respective counsel and a witness was present to testify in support of the husband. However, the child's guardian ad litem had not been notified of the hearing until earlier the same day and was not present when it commenced. Because of his absence and because there was no court reporter present, Commissioner Greco stated he was going to adjourn the hearing. Nonetheless, Attorney Frost began to argue that her client should be awarded the relief she had requested, stating that she herself had been present at the prior hearing, waiting for another matter to be heard, and observed that her client had made no admission to any cocaine use subsequent to the commencement of the divorce action. Attorney Crosetto then requested permission to take the witness' testimony but his request was denied and the witness was excused.
*588Attorney Frost continued to argue that Commissioner Greco's order based on the testimony at the prior hearing should be vacated, to which Attorney Crosetto responded by calling her arguments "stupid," saying that as a disinterested observer at the prior hearing, she would have had no reason to focus attention on the testimony as would the court commissioner and he himself. Attorney Frost then accused Attorney Crosetto of having taken "gross advantage of an unrepresented litigant" at that hearing by not providing her a copy of the findings and order he subsequently prepared for Commissioner Greco's signature and giving her an opportunity to object to their content. Attorney Crosetto responded by again calling Attorney Frost's remarks "stupid" and asserting that she was acting unethically as both attorney and witness.
Commissioner Greco told the parties to stop arguing and said he would hold an evidentiary hearing at a later date. Thereupon, Attorney Crosetto questioned the need for a hearing, particularly in light of the fact that Commissioner Greco and Attorney Frost would be witnesses to what had occurred at the prior hearing. Commissioner Greco responded that he was setting the motion for hearing because he had no recollection of the evidence presented at the prior hearing, had no notes or minutes of the testimony given and did not know whether the findings set forth in the order Attorney Crosetto prepared and he signed were correct.
In response, Attorney Crosetto reminded Commissioner Greco that he had signed the order the same day as the hearing, when the testimony would still have been fresh in his memory. When Commissioner Greco responded that he had no memory of the hearing, Attorney Crosetto asked, "Well, you read your orders before you sign them, don't you?" He then suggested that Corn-*589missioner Greco review his minutes of the hearing and when Commissioner Greco said he had no minutes, Attorney Crosetto said, "What business do you having signing orders, if you don't read them carefully and if you have no minutes to check them against?"
Commissioner Greco then replied, "I am going to have to scrutinize your orders more closely as some other judges have found necessary." To this Attorney Crosetto responded by pointing a finger in Commissioner Greco's face, calling him a "big mouth" and challenging him to name a judge who had found it necessary to closely scrutinize orders he had prepared. Commissioner Greco did not do so and Attorney Crosetto responded in a loud voice, "You can make the accusations but don't have the guts to back them up," adding, "Who the hell do you think you are" and "You're totally nuts.1'
Commissioner Greco later testified that his remark about having to scrutinize orders as other judges had found necessary was directed at himself and referred to orders prepared by attorneys generally. Notwithstanding that elaboration, the referee specifically found that his remark was directed specifically against Attorney Crosetto.
On the basis of these facts, the referee concluded that Attorney Crosetto's conduct and statements to Commissioner Greco were disrespectful and in violation of SCR 20:3.5(c), and that his conduct violated that portion of the Attorney's Oath requiring attorneys to "maintain the respect due courts of justice and judicial officers."
In recommending that Attorney Crosetto be publicly reprimanded for such conduct, the referee considered Attorney Crosetto's remarks and conduct to be of such a nature that they must be "judicially decided as rude, demeaning and disrespectful" and "were such as to *590upset the dignity and decorum required not only by the court but by simple courtesy and etiquette." He added, "The Bar and public must not in any way be allowed to have an inference of judicial or other approval of such conduct." In making his recommendation of discipline, the referee spécifically considered that Attorney Crosetto's remarks had been precipitated by Commissioner Greco's uncalled for statement directed against him, which labeled him, in the referee's view, as "dishonest, devious and guilty of sharp practices, accusations that would enrage any self-respecting attorney." Nevertheless, the referee stressed that conduct such as Attorney Crosetto's cannot be accepted. However, because of what he considered Commissioner Greco's provocation, the referee recommended that Attorney Crosetto be required to pay only one-half the costs of this proceeding.
In his appeal from the referee's conclusions and recommendation of discipline, Attorney Crosetto first argued that the conclusion that his conduct violated SCR 20:3.5(c) is not supported by the facts for the reason that the referee did not specifically find that he had intended to disrupt a tribunal. Attorney Crosetto took the position that the referee was in fact applying the prior rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility, SCR 20.40(3) (f), which proscribed a lawyer's engaging in "undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal." Attorney Crosetto insisted that his conduct toward Commissioner Greco was intended to defend his reputation and to support the findings of fact and order transferring custody he had drafted and submitted to Commissioner Greco. That argument is without merit. The finding that Attorney Crosetto intended by his conduct to disrupt the proceeding was implicit in the referee's conclusion that " [Attorney Crosetto's] con*591duct and statements were disrespectful and such as would disrupt a tribunal contrary to SCR 20:3.5(c)."
Attorney Crosetto next argued that the referee's conclusion regarding the violation of SCR 20:3.5(c) was not supported by the facts for the reason that, when his conduct occurred, Commissioner Greco was not acting as a tribunal but had already adjourned the motion hearing because the guardian ad litem had not yet appeared and there was no court reporter. This argument, too, is without merit, for it ignores the fact that counsel for the party adverse to Attorney Crosetto's client was presenting argument to Commissioner Greco in order to obtain an immediate transfer of temporary custody of the child and Attorney Crosetto was "arguing" for the position that the commissioner's prior order should not be disturbed. Attorney Crosetto's attempting to prevent the family court commissioner from vacating his prior custody order is inconsistent with his claim in this appeal that Commissioner Greco was not acting as a tribunal when Attorney Crosetto engaged in the offensive conduct.
In response to the referee's conclusion that he violated the Attorney's Oath, Attorney Crosetto contended that, because of Commissioner Greco's having permitted opposing counsel's "slanderous" statement that he had taken advantage of an unrepresented litigant to go unchallenged and his own "slanderous" statement concerning the need to scrutinize more carefully orders presented for his signature, Commissioner Greco was not due any more respect than that which Attorney Crosetto accorded him. That argument merits response only to emphasize, as did the referee, that any provocation that might have occurred by virtue of Commissioner Greco's *592remark does not excuse Attorney Crosetto's intemperate, disrespectful outbursts and gestures.
Finally, Attorney Crosetto contended that the referee abused his discretion by recommending discipline greater than that requested by the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board) both prior to commencing this proceeding and in its disciplinary complaint filed with the court. In that complaint, the Board had sought a private reprimand as discipline for Attorney Crosetto's misconduct; prior to filing it, the Board had asked Attorney Crosetto to consent to the Board's imposing a private reprimand, without the necessity of a formal proceeding, pursuant to SCR 21.09(2), but Attorney Crosetto refused.
That argument is meritless. Pursuant to the procedure governing the enforcement of the rules of attorney professional conduct, SCR 21.09(5), the referee is appointed by the court to conduct a hearing on the Board's complaint and file a report stating findings and disposition of the complaint by recommendation of dismissal or imposition of discipline. The recommendation of discipline is the product of the referee's assessment of the seriousness of the attorney's misconduct and the harm it caused others and it may or may not coincide with the discipline the Board had sought prior to or during the proceeding. Regardless, after the referee files the report with this court, we review it and determine appropriate discipline to be imposed.
We adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and accept his recommendation of discipline to be imposed for Attorney Crosetto's professional misconduct in this matter. However, we do not accept the referee's recommendation that, because of provocation on the part of Commissioner Greco, Attorney Crosetto *593should be required to pay only one-half the costs of this proceeding. To whatever extent that provocation might affect this proceeding, it is with respect to the seriousness of Attorney Crosetto's misconduct and the severity of discipline to be imposed for it; it does not affect the amount of costs the offending attorney should be required to pay.
IT IS ORDERED that Attorney John J. Crosetto is publicly reprimanded for professional misconduct.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order Attorney John J. Crosetto pay to the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility the costs of this disciplinary proceeding, provided that if the costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, the license of John J. Crosetto to practice law in Wisconsin shall be suspended until further order of the court.
Section 757.19(2), Stats., provides:
Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from any civil or criminal action or proceeding when one of the following situations occurs:
(a)' When a judge is related to any party or counsel thereto or their spouses within the 3rd degree of kinship.
(b) When a judge is a party or a material witness, except that a judge need not disqualify himself or herself if the judge determines that any pleading purporting to make him or her a party is false, sham or frivolous.
(c) When a judge previously acted as counsel to any party in the same action or proceeding.
(d) When a judge prepared as counsel any legal instrument or paper whose validity or construction is at issue.
(e) When a judge of an appellate court previously handled the action or proceeding while judge of an inferior court.
(f) When a judge has a significant financial or personal interest in the outcome of the matter. Such interest does not occur solely by the judge being a member of a political or taxing body that is a party.
(g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, he or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in an impartial manner.
SCR 20:3.5 provides:
Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal.
A lawyer shall not:
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law; or
(c) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
SCR 40.15 provides:
Attorney's oath. The oath or affirmation to be taken to qualify for admission to the practice of law shall be in substantially the following form:
I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Wisconsin;
I will maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers;
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be unjust, or any defense, except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land;
I will employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client and will accept no compensation in connection with my client's business except ftom my client or with my client's knowledge and approval;
I will abstain from all offensive personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged;
*586I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any person's cause for lucre or malice. So help me God.
Referee's Report and Recommendation, p. 10.