Thompson v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co.

MESCHKE, Justice,

dissenting.

Pertinent policy language for under-insured coverage is scattered over six policy pages and interspersed with clauses for uninsured motorist coverage. The majority opinion correctly quotes relevant language from pp. 38-39 and 42-43 of the policy but omits an important part from pp. 40-41 of the policy:

Under-insured Motor Vehicle means a land motor vehicle or attached trailer, the ownership, maintenance or use of which is insured or bonded for bodily injury liability in amounts that:
1. meet the requirements of the laws of the state in which your auto is mainly garaged; and
2. are less than the amount needed to compensate the insured for damages.

Thus, this policy plainly said that an under-insured motor vehicle was one insured in amounts that “are less than the amount needed to compensate the insured for damages.” (My emphasis). In this case, the claim is that the vehicle that struck the insured decedent was insured for $500,000 and less than the amount needed to compensate for the damages to the insured decedent.

Nodak could have agreed that an under-insured vehicle was one which is insured in amounts that “are less than the coverage under this policy.” If so, our decision in Davis v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 420 N.W.2d 347 (N.D.1988) would have been controlling, and then I would agree with today’s decision. But that is not No-dak’s insuring agreement. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

Nodak begins its under-insured policy by stipulating that “THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY INJURY ... POLICIES THAT APPLY HAVE BEEN USED UP BY PAYMENTS....” Here, $500,000 was paid by a bodily injury policy that did pay its limits. These injuries are claimed to be more serious, so there clearly would be coverage by Nodak here.

The next pertinent language of Nodak’s policy stipulates that an under-insured ve-*120hide is one “insured ... for bodily injury liability in amounts that ... are less than the amount needed to compensate the insured for damages.” The applicable insurance of $500,000 was “less than the amount needed to compensate the insured for damages.” Again, there clearly would be coverage by Nodak here.

Further reading the policy, we reach a section on “Limits of Liability.” At this point, Nodak’s policy says the “amount of coverage is shown on the front of the Declarations under T-2 — Each Person-Each Accident.’ ” That amount is $100,000.

Later, when we read an exclusion clause, doubt arises. The exclusion says: “Any amount payable under this coverage shall be reduced by any amount paid or payable to or for the insured ... by or for any person ... who is ... legally liable for the bodily injury to the insured.” Thus the same circumstance that defines the amount of coverage also defines the exclusion. There is no way that Nodak would ever have to pay the amount of coverage that it agreed to furnish. This kind of double-talk is ambiguous, and should be construed against the insurer.

The author of today’s decision has aptly summarized applicable principles of interpreting an insurance policy:

[I]t is well-established in North Dakota that, because an insurance policy is a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity or reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the policy is to be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. If the language in an insurance contract will support an interpretation which will impose liability on the insurer and one which will not, the former interpretation will be adopted.

AID Ins. Services, Inc. v. Geiger, 294 N.W.2d 411, 414 (N.D.1980) (citations omitted). See also, Emcasco Ins. Co. v. L & M Development, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 908 (N.D.1985). Absent other clear evidence of mutual intention, these standards of interpretation should be followed. Walle Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sweeney, 419 N.W.2d 176 (N.D.1988). Therefore, I would reverse the summary judgment and hold that there is under-insured coverage by Nodak up to $100,000, subject to the plaintiff’s proof of damages in an amount exceeding $500,000.

Because I would reverse, I respectfully dissent.

GIERKE, J., concurs.