dissenting.
The Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council (Council) was formed to be of assistance to the prosecutors of the courts throughout the various state jurisdictions. The statute creating the Council establishes parameters for the exercise of those supportive duties by that Council. The clear language of and limitations inherent in those parameters force me reluctantly to enter my dissent to the well-reasoned opinion of my esteemed brothers.
In substance, the linchpin of the majority’s decision is that the members of the Council lawfully may act as special prosecutors in a specified, single jurisdiction because as. individuals, the four members of the Council are not acting as a part of or on behalf of the Council as such and further that the four Council members are acting as surrogates for the district attorney and not in a personal capacity.
It is clear, however, that the two special prosecutors did not volunteer or seek leave of absence from the Council. They were requested by the Chatham County prosecutor from the Council to assist the county prosecutor in the investigation, compilation, and prosecution of a complex and difficult criminal case involving a member of the state judiciary. The four members of the Council were made available (i.e., consigned) by the Council for that express purpose, as the majority recognizes in its opinion.
OCGA § 15-18-40 establishes that the primary purpose of the Council is to assist prosecuting attorneys throughout the state in their efforts at successful suppression of criminal activity. The statute however carefully delimits of what that activity may consist. While the authorized activities are intended to be supportive, it would appear that those activities are designed to offer broad suggestions; proce*443dures and practices that provide uniform and effective investigation, development and prosecution of criminal activity in general and not to assist in or act in specific criminal cases. More specifically, the Council may assist district attorneys throughout the state by preparing indices and digests of decisions of appellate courts as well as opinions of other courts; preparation and dissemination of a prosecutor’s manual; preparation of model indictments, warrants and other legal documents; training programs; legal research assistance; and as a “catch all,” other “lawful” assistance. Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis to “other lawful assistance,” that other assistance must be limited to the same general type assistance as that class of assistance immediately preceeding in the statute.
While undoubtedly it is true that the Council is not on record as seeking affirmatively the prosecution and conviction of Judge Cook, it stretches the common meaning of words to say that the Council did not act when it made available at the request of a district attorney four of its nine members. Without the Council’s acquiescence, the special prosecutors could not have responded to the call for help. It seems to beg the question to argue semantically that short of the Council directing the prosecution, it has not acted in its official capacity. Moreover, a conclusion that the four special prosecutors are under the control and thus acting through the Council is supported by the fact that the four members of the Council continued to receive their remuneration from state funds through the aegis of the state-created Council and apparently are still subject to assignment or reassignment by the Council.
OCGA § 15-18-46, its creating legislation, expressly prohibits the Council from exercising any power or undertaking which is the duty and thus may be exercised by a district attorney. OCGA § 15-18-6 et seq. provides that district attorneys are to attend upon grand juries; swear and examine witnesses before grand juries; draw up indictments; and prosecute indictable offenses. There is no question that the employees of the Council were made available to Chatham County to perform each of those functions and did indeed so act.
The only part of the enabling statute pertaining to the Council which could include these supporting functions would be that authorizing the Council to provide other “lawful assistance.” In my opinion, the assignment by the Council of its membership to perform duties on behalf of a requesting prosecutor of duties exclusively within the realm of a district attorney violates the proscription of the statute creating the Council prohibiting such activities. OCGA § 15-18-46. Inasmuch as the Council has actively participated in these duties by assigning some of its membership to perform the prohibited activities, the special prosecutors in this case are ineligible to participate in that capacity so long as they are members of the Council. Accordingly, I *444would affirm the decision of the trial court in dismissing the indictment as it was obtained in violation of law. The cross-appeal becomes moot upon dismissal of the indictment inasmuch as that is the remedy sought in the cross-appeal as well.
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Presiding Judge Quillian join in this dissent.