concurring.
I fully concur in all of the majority opinion, including its conclusion that, pursuant to OCGA § 53-4-48 (a) of the Revised Probate Code of 1998, “the ‘in contemplation of marriage’ clause in Llop’s will was effective to prevent the revocation of his will upon his subsequent marriage,” even though that clause did not identify his future spouse. I write separately, not to detract from the majority’s excellent analysis, but rather to point out that, like his marriage, Llop’s later divorce does not result in the revocation of his will. Although the Probate Code revision did not change the law as to the effect of a subsequent marriage on a will, it substantially changed the law with respect to a subsequent divorce.
As the majority correctly observes in footnote 1, “the 1998 revisions to the Probate Code did not create any substantive changes with regard to the revocation of a will upon a subsequent marriage. [Cit.]” However, the Revised Probate Code did make substantive changes regarding the revocation of a will because of a later divorce. Under former OCGA § 53-2-76, a testator’s total divorce, “subsequent to the making of a will in which no provision is made in contemplation of such an event, shall be a revocation of the will.” Under the currently applicable code section, however, “[a]ll provisions of a will made prior to a testator’s final divorce ... in which no provision is made in contemplation of such event shall take effect as if the former spouse had predeceased the testator. . . .” OCGA § 53-4-49 (also limiting the applicability of the anti-lapse statute in such a situation). Neither the marriage nor the divorce operated as a revocation of Llop’s will under the applicable provisions of the Revised Probate Code of 1998, and the Court correctly affirms the trial court’s judgment.