dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, Sgt. Jeff Mulbery and Deputy Anthony Lytle did not have reasonable suspicion to continue Kandie A. Lee’s detention after completing their initial investigation. As such, the positive canine sniff resulting from Lee’s continued detention should be excised from the affidavit for search warrant. See State v. Ortiz, 257 Neb. 784, 600 N.W.2d 805 (1999). Considered without the averments regarding the canine sniff and the area’s being known to be used for drag transactions, the affidavit for search warrant would not, in my opinion, establish probable cause to justify its issuance. Therefore, because the search warrant was invalidly issued, the resulting search was illegal and the fruit of that illegal search — the methamphetamine — should have been suppressed.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that insofar as the trial court made a factual finding that Mulbery and Lytle possessed information prior to Lee’s continued detention that the recreation area in question had been used for drug transactions, such finding was clearly erroneous. I agree, therefore, that such factor should not be considered within the totality of the circumstances in evaluating whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to continue Lee’s detention.
I disagree with the majority’s determination, however, that the remaining four factors amount to reasonable suspicion. For the reasons discussed below, I believe the record demonstrates that each of the factors is of minimal significance in the ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion.
Lee’s arrest record lacks a “temporal nexus” to the officers’ suspicion that Lee was involved in drug activity. See State v. Johnson, 256 Neb. 133, 144, 589 N.W.2d 108, 116 (1999), overruled on other grounds, State v. Davidson, 260 Neb. 417, 618 N.W.2d 418 (2000) (concluding averment in affidavit regarding suspect’s prior drug conviction was insufficient to establish probable cause due to absence of additional facts establishing temporal nexus to current investigation of suspect). See, also, State v. Ortiz, supra. Unless there is some temporal nexus between a *681suspect’s arrest record and the circumstances of the suspect’s detention, such factor is of limited significance and, therefore, does not establish reasonable suspicion. Id. Since the State’s evidence that “drug dealers and users are meeting at this location for drug transactions” cannot be considered within the totality of the circumstances, the required nexus is not present. See State v. Johnson, supra.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Lee’s nervousness is “of limited significance” since, as a general matter, most citizens become nervous when confronted by law enforcement officers. However, I believe the significance of Lee’s nervousness is even further diminished by the fact that the record with respect to Lee’s nervousness would appear to consist primarily of the four following words: “she was really nervous.” Nowhere in the record can there be found a description of Lee’s conduct from which Mulbery concluded Lee was “really nervous.” We do not know, inter alia, whether Lee was shaking or had difficulty locating her registration, see State v. Anderson, 258 Neb. 627, 605 N.W.2d 124 (2000), or failed to make eye contact, see U.S. v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 1998). In my view, the absence of any particularized description of Lee’s nervousness or an explanation as to why Lee’s nervousness was suspicious prevents the court from accurately assessing whether such factor reasonably led the officers to suspect Lee was involved in drug activity.
With respect to Lee’s “divergent stories,” it is clear from the record that any divergence was, at the very most, minor. At the suppression hearing, Mulbery testified:
Q. What was, what did she say that led to your conclusion that her story was misleading or false?
A. Well, she first said she was out to meet her boyfriend Stacy Talbott. And then she turned around and said that her brother, Stacy Talbott is her brother. And then said that her boyfriend was with Stacy Talbott with the last name of Johnson.
Q. Isn’t it entirely possible that what she was saying was that she was there to see her boyfriend and Stacy Talbott?
A. Could have been.
*682Moreover, given Lee’s nervousness, there was an equally innocent explanation for the inconsistency.
With respect to Lee’s presence in the unauthorized location within the recreation area at 9 p.m. in late November, I find little indication in the record that such factor was objectively suspicious or indicative of drug activity. Although Lee’s vehicle was in an unauthorized area, the record demonstrates that it was only the presence of Lee’s vehicle that was unauthorized. At all relevant times, the recreation area was open to the public. Had Lee parked her vehicle in an authorized area and walked to the location in question, there would have been no violation and no reason for the officers to stop her. Additionally, since the evidence relating to this area’s being used for “drug transactions” cannot be considered, any link between Lee’s presence in the recreation area and drug activity is further attenuated.
The majority determines that when all four of the above factors are considered collectively, they amount to reasonable suspicion. I disagree. Missing is any nexus between Lee’s presence and drug activity. I find no adequate explanation in the record as to why such seemingly innocent factors, considered collectively, led the officers to suspect that Lee was involved in drug activity. To the contrary, I believe the record demonstrates the officers simply acted out of an inchoate hunch rather than suspicion based on articulable facts. I believe this conclusion is inescapable given that (1) the officers radioed for the drug dog before learning of Lee’s drug arrest history and (2) there is no evidence in the record from which to conclude the officers knew that drug activity had occurred previously in the recreation area.
Therefore, I believe there is insufficient evidence in this record from which to conclude that the officers’ suspicion was reasonable under the circumstances. The court is left to simply adopt the State’s characterization of the officers’ conduct. I do not believe this is permissible, since
[i]t is for the courts to determine when an officer’s conduct squares with the Fourth Amendment, giving “due weight,” as the Court put it in Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)], “to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” And, it is for the police to *683articulate the facts and what their experience reveals as to those facts. Such generalities as “he didn’t look right” will not suffice;... the officer must relate what he has observed, and, when appropriate, indicate why his knowledge of the crime problem and the habits of the residents on his beat or of the practices of those planning or engaging in certain forms of criminal conduct gives special significance to what he observed.
(Emphasis in original.) 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, a Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.4(a) at 141-42 (3d ed. 1996).
In view of the record, the four factors relied upon by the majority are not, in my opinion, inherently or objectively indicative of dmg activity. Moreover, any inferences of dmg activity the officers were permitted to draw from such factors are simply not adequately set forth or thoroughly explained. Based upon this record, I am unable to conclude that the officers’ suspicion that Lee was involved in dmg activity was reasonable. I would reverse.
Stephan, J., joins in this dissent.