(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
I believe the majority misconstrues the impact of MCL 500.3008; MSA 24.13008 upon this insurance policy. The statutory section precludes "notice” provisions that invalidate claims that are otherwise within the effective coverage of a policy. The policy in question here was a "discovery” policy which only covered claims discovered and actually brought against the insured during the policy period, regardless of when the acts or omissions causing liability took place. Presumably, such a policy is less expensive than an equivalent "occurrence” policy, which would provide coverage if the act or omission took place during the policy period, regardless of the discovery date. To provide true protection, a discovery policy must be continued until the insured otherwise feels safe from the *181threat of liability or obtains delayed recording or extended discovery coverage.1
Here, coverage was denied not because the insured delayed notice to the insurer but because he allowed the policy to lapse prior to the discovery of the liability claim. Therefore, MCL 500.3008; MSA 24.13008 has no impact on this case.
Like the majority, I am not particularly enamored by this type of insurance policy. However, the Supreme Court has considered similar policy limitations and has determined that when set forth in unambiguous terms they do not violate public policy. Lehr v Professional Underwriters, 296 Mich 693; 296 NW 843 (1941).
I would reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendant._
See 2 Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, § 12.02, p 12-4.
An insured might conclude that coverage is no longer necessary after the running of the six-year abrogation period of MCL 600.5839; MSA 27A.5839. See Bouser v City of Lincoln Park, 83 Mich App 167; 268 NW2d 332 (1978).