We first discuss the assignments of error brought forth by both defendants regarding Patrolman Wilson’s testimony as to the statements made by defendant Porter immediately after the two defendants’ arrest. Defendant Porter contends that as to him, the testimony should have been excluded under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because his statements were made before he was warned of his right to remain silent. Defendant Ross contends that as to him, the testimony should have been excluded under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), because the extrajudicial statement of a codefendant was used against him without his having a chance to cross-examine the declarant.
The State contends Porter’s statements were spontaneous utterances and were so found by the superior court judge, which *571finding is binding on this Court. As such, the State contends the statements were not the result of an in-custody interrogation and are admissible against defendant Porter. The State further contends Porter’s statement did not implicate defendant Ross and he may not complain.
We deal first with Porter’s contention. It is clear from the record that defendant Porter made his statements to Patrolman Wilson before Miranda warnings were given and that the defendants were in custody; but, clearly, the first question coming over the radio from the supervisor was addressed to Patrolman Wilson and not to either defendant. Defendant Porter interrupted the conversation between the two officers and volunteered the location of the bank bag. A volunteered confession is admissible even in the absence of warnings or waiver of rights. Miranda, supra.
The issue then becomes whether the next question posed by Patrolman Wilson converts his conversation with Porter into a “custodial interrogation,” thus rendering Porter’s next statement inadmissible. We conclude that it does not.
Patrolman Wilson had not been at the scene of the robbery. There is no evidence that he knew what was taken at the store. Wilson only later came onto the scene when he pursued the Aspen in his car first and later pursued the defendants with the aid of the bloodhound. It was a natural response by Wilson — and, in our opinion, not to be construed as custodial interrogation — to ask in response to Porter’s volunteered statement, “What bank bag?”
Porter contends that when the question was put — however innocently — the police investigation entered into the accusatory stage and that Wilson was required to tell Porter of his right to remain silent. We are not persuaded.
“A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect . . . amounts to interrogation. But since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis, _U.S__, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308 (1980).
This case boils down to whether, in the brief conversation *572between defendant Porter and Patrolman Wilson, the officer should have known that the respondent would suddenly be moved to make an incriminating response. We conclude not, particularly in light of Innis’s emphasis on the brevity and “off-hand” nature of the policeman’s remarks.
Although the facts are somewhat different in the case of State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 201 (1975), modified as to death penalty 428 U.S. 904 (1976), the language of Chief Justice Sharp, on page 433, is helpful in the case sub judice.
As we said in State v. Haddock, 281 N.C. 675, 682, 190 S.E. 2d 208, 212 (1972), ‘[a] voluntary in-custody statement does not become the product of an “in-custody interrogation” simply because an officer, in the course of appellant’s narration, asks defendant to explain or clarify something he has already said voluntarily.’ Since there is no evidence here that defendant’s statements were made in response to overbearing police questioning or other police procedures designed to elicit a statement, we conclude that they were the product of free choice and without the slightest compulsion of in-custody interrogation procedures. Therefore they were properly admissible. See Holloway v. U.S., 495 F. 2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974); State v. Thomas, 284 N.C. 212, 200 S.E. 2d 3 (1973), and cases cited therein; State v. Blackmon, 284 N.C. 1, 199 S.E. 2d 431 (1973).
Patrolman Wilson was still getting the big picture when he asked “What bank bag?” There was no “focus on the accused,” and the officer was not motivated “to elicit a confession.” Porter’s assignment of error is without merit and overruled.
Next, we deal with the State’s contention that defendant Porter’s extrajudicial statements did not implicate defendant Ross.
Patrolman Wilson was prepared to testify that when he asked Porter “What bank bag?”, Porter said, “The bag we got from the robbery,” (Emphasis added.) This statement was edited by the trial judge on voir dire so that Wilson testified before the jury that Porter said, “The bag from the robbery.” We do not believe this editing so sanitized the statement that it did not implicate Ross.
The two defendants were arrested after being chased by a *573bloodhound for approximately one mile. Upon being caught, the two were both handcuffed. When Porter referred to a robbery, we believe the only natural inference the jury could have made at trial is that both men had been involved in the robbery.
Although we hold that the statement implicated Ross, we do not believe it necessarily follows that the statement should have been excluded as to him.
Contrary to defendant Ross’s contention, the rule set forth in the Bruton case cited would not apply to the case sub judice if Porter’s statements constituted spontaneous utterances. In Bruton, the Supreme Court overruled Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278 (1957), saying that it was no longer permissible for a trial court to instruct a jury that while the confession of a defendant could be introduced as competent evidence against that defendant as an exception to the hearsay rule, that such confession could not be considered by the jury against a codefendant because it was inadmissible hearsay as to the codefendant. The Court held that, as a practical matter, the jury could not be expected to heed the limiting instruction and would consider against the codefendant the incriminating extrajudicial statement of the defendant, even though as to the codefendant the statement was inadmissible hearsay. The result would be a violation of codefendant’s rights granted by the Confrontation Clause.
In the case sub judice, if defendant Porter’s exclamations can be characterized as spontaneous utterances, they would not constitute inadmissible hearsay as to codefendant Ross. The Bruton rule would not apply. For the reasons stated above, if we find that defendant Porter’s statements can be characterized as spontaneous utterances, Ross would have no constitutional rights under Bruton to cross-examine Porter.
We must determine whether Porter’s statements were spontaneous utterances. A spontaneous utterance is a statement which is considered reliable because of its spontaneity. It is considered that if a statement is made in immediate reaction to the stimulus of an occurrence and without opportunity to reflect, it is unlikely that the statement would be fabricated. See 1 Stansbury’s N.C. Evidence, § 164, p. 554 (Brandis rev. 1973). It does not matter that the statement is in response to a question. See State v. Johnson, 294 N.C. 288, 291, 239 S.E.2d 829 (1978); State v. Deck, 285 N.C. 209, 214, 203 S.E.2d 830 (1974).
*574In the case sub judice, there is evidence that both defendants had just been involved in a high speed automobile chase; they had been tracked on foot for approximately one mile by officers with a bloodhound; and they had been brought from under a bridge at gunpoint and handcuffed. At that time a voice on the radio asked Patrolman Wilson whether the officers had found a bank bag. In immediate response to the stimulus of this question, defendant Porter exclaimed that the bag was in the car. When Officer Wilson asked, “What bag?”, Porter responded, “The bag from the robbery.”
Defendant Porter was undergoing a traumatic experience. In the excitement of all that was surrounding him, we find that Porter’s statements were spontaneous to the extent he was unlikely to have fabricated them. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, we hold Porter’s spontaneous utterances were admissible against defendant Ross and that the rule established in Bruton predicating admission of extrajudicial statements on the right of a codefendant to cross-examine his codefendant-declarant does not apply and was not violated. Ross’s assignment of error as to the admissibility of Porter’s statements is overruled.
Both defendants assign as error the denial of their motions to dismiss. The motions to dismiss should have been denied as to each defendant if there was, as to each, substantial evidence of all material elements of the offense. It does not matter whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. See State v. Smith, 40 N.C. App. 72, 252 S.E.2d 535 (1979). In the case sub judice, there was evidence that Hal B. Martin was robbed at gunpoint by more than one person; that the robbers fled from the scene of the robbery in a red Dodge Aspen; that at least one person left the red Dodge Aspen as it was being pursued by a policeman; that officers used a bloodhound to follow the trail of those leaving the red Dodge Aspen for approximately one mile until they found both defendants under a bridge; that a .32 caliber revolver was found under the bridge; and that one of the defendants referred to a bag taken in the robbery. We hold that this is substantial evidence from which the jury could find that both defendants participated in the robbery. See State v. Collins, 35 N.C. App. 250, 241 S.E.2d 98 (1978). These assignments of error are overruled.
We have examined the other assignments of error brought forward by the defendants and find them to be without merit.
*575No error.
Judge Webb concurs. Judge MARTIN (Harry C.) dissents.