dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. But first I must state that I agree with the majority’s view of Bohl v. Buffalo Cty., 251 Neb. 492, 557 N.W.2d 668 (1997), and with portions of the majority’s well-reasoned opinion, particularly that the Woodards’ evidence is not as complete as one would expect. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the evidence is sufficient to allow for the inference that the City engaged in conduct calculated to convey the impression to the Woodards that formal legal proceedings and rules were not going to govern this claim. The Woodards are not lawyers, and their perceptions and impressions must not be judged as if they were.
The relationship here existed from June 1992 through November 1995, nearly 372 years. The statute ran in May 1994. *27It was not until after the negotiations broke off in November 1995 that the Woodards sought legal counsel. Presumably, that was also the first time the City sought legal counsel, at least if it were true to the “Letter of Understanding.” It was also the first time the defense of the statute of limitations was raised.
That the City continued to negotiate with the Woodards for approximately Vh years after the statute of limitations had run is very interesting. One conclusion to draw from the continued negotiations is the one noted by the majority, which is that it is difficult to infer that the City was engaged in “trickery and dishonesty.” I agree that is a fair conclusion. I suggest an equally reasonable, and not inconsistent, inference is that the City, like the Woodards, was operating under the impression that formal rules, including those regarding the passage of time, had been set aside and that consistent with that impression, good faith settlement negotiations should and would continue to a final resolution.
The majority concludes that there is no proof that the City made a false representation or concealed a material fact. Frankly, I find it hard to accept that concealing something as critical as the statute of limitations under these circumstances is not the concealment of a material fact, but I realize there is law that suggests as much. But even assuming, without conceding, that Nebraska law would allow such a material fact to be concealed with impunity, I do not believe that proof of a false representation or the concealment of a material fact is a prerequisite to the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Certainly, such findings would ease the burden of one attempting to invoke the doctrine’s effect, but as Bohl makes clear, conduct sufficient to work an estoppel may be something less than making false statements or concealing facts. It need be only such conduct which, apparently in the eye of a reasonable person and under the circumstances of the case, is found to be calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than subsequently asserted.
Simply put, I believe the evidence here is sufficient to support the inference that the City engaged in conduct calculated to convey to the Woodards that their dispute was going to be resolved without insisting that the strict “letter of the law” be *28followed. Indeed, the participation in the process of those trained as “experts” in law — lawyers—was discouraged, and payments were to be made voluntarily without lawsuits and judgments and such things that the law and lawyers would ordinarily require. I believe the evidence would support a finding that the Woodards were lulled into a sense of security over the course of some 3‘A years and then, with the period of limitation comfortably behind it, the City changed rules and transformed from magnanimous sovereign into litigious adversary.
I do not intend to suggest that the Woodards have established conclusive entitlement to the benefits of equitable estoppel. I only say that they are entitled to have the issue decided by a fact finder rather than as a matter of law. I would, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City and Wells and allow that to occur.