The issue presented in these cases is whether the General Assembly’s 2001 amendments1 to the capital punishment statutes abrogated this Court’s decision in State v. Rorie, 348 N.C. 266, 500 S.E.2d 77 (1998), so that the superior courts now have authority to declare a case noncapital as a sanction for the State’s noncompliance with Rule 24 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts. We hold that the 2001 amendments eliminated the rationale on which Rorie was decided, and thus, legislatively abrogated our holding. However, there is an insufficient showing of prejudice to justify declaring the cases noncapital. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s ruling permitting the cases to proceed capitally.
I. Background
On or about 25 March 2006, defendant was arrested for the murders of Laxavier Jamiel Henry and Billy Glenn Medford, the first murder allegedly occurring on 10 March 2006 and the second on 23 March 2006. The grand jury returned true bills of indictment charging defendant with first-degree murder in both cases on 8 May 2006.2
On 21 June 2006, an assistant district attorney filed an “Application for Rule 24 Pre-Trial Conference [and] Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty” that listed the docket numbers of both murder cases against defendant. Rule 24 requires
*31a pretrial conference in every case in which the defendant stands charged with a crime punishable by death. No later than ten days after the superior court obtains jurisdiction in such a case, the district attorney shall apply to the presiding superior court judge or other superior court judge holding court in the district, who shall enter an order requiring the prosecution and defense counsel to appear before the court within forty-five days thereafter for the pretrial conference.
Gen. R. Pract. Super. & Dist. Cts. 24, 2009 Ann. R. N.C. 21.
In accord with Rule 24, the assistant district attorney’s 21 June 2006 application requested the trial court “to schedule a Pretrial Conference in the above captioned matter within the next forty-five (45) days.” The application also gave notice “to the above named Defendant and the Court, of the State’s intent to seek the death penalty.” However, the application was filed more than ten days after the grand jury returned the indictments, and the pretrial conference did not occur within forty-five days thereafter.
At some point, the Richmond County District Attorney’s Office determined it had a conflict of interest and could not prosecute defendant for the murders. In a letter dated 28 November 2007, well over a year after the initial request for a Rule 24 conference, the Richmond County District Attorney’s Office requested the Attorney General’s Office to prosecute the murder charges against defendant. The Attorney General’s Office agreed to prosecute both cases and requested the relevant files in a letter dated 3 December 2007. The Richmond County District Attorney’s Office completed transfer of its relevant files by April or May 2008.
On 19 June 2008, defendant, through his counsel, filed a “Motion to Compel Compliance” complaining of the State’s failure to provide discovery and to conduct a Rule 24 hearing. Specifically, the Motion to Compel asserted that a written discovery request filed on 12 June 2006 had gone unanswered despite numerous oral follow-up requests. The Motion to Compel also noted that the State had not yet conducted a Rule 24 hearing, notwithstanding its request two years earlier. Defendant requested various forms of relief, including dismissal, sanctions, and an order to compel discovery. Notably, however, the motion also stated that defense counsel “does not know but will be able to better determine whether or not the Defendant has been prejudiced by the delay of the State.” No order ruling on the Motion to Compel is contained in the record, but defendant’s later fil*32ings indicate that the State provided “a banker’s box full of Discovery” in July 2008.
On 7 November 2008, the State filed a “Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty” and an “Application for Pre-Trial Conference on Charge of First Degree Murder” pursuant to Rule 24.3 Both were signed by two special deputy attorneys general. On 11 November 2008, defendant responded by filing a “Motion to Strike State’s Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty As Well As Preclude State from Seeking the Death Penalty” (“Motion to Strike”). The Motion to Strike alleged that the two and one-half year delay from the date of indictment violated defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights to a “correct Rule 24 Hearing,” a speedy trial, and timely discovery. The Motion to Strike stated further that “the delay has impaired Defendant’s ability to challenge not only his identification but the circumstances surrounding any involvement he may have had with regard to the crimes charged.” The Motion to Strike complained that witnesses’ recollections may have been compromised. Defendant made essentially the same assertions in two contemporaneous filings — a “Motion to Preclude State from Applying for a Pre-Trial Conference on Charge of First-Degree Murder” and a “Motion to Dismiss Case for the State’s Flagrant Violation of Defendant’s Rights.”
The parties appeared before the trial court on 1 December 2008 for an anticipated hearing on the State’s application for Rule 24 conference and defendant’s motions in opposition. The Rule 24 conference did not occur as expected, and the trial court entered an order resetting the hearing for 8 January 2009. The parties agreed that the period between 1 December 2008 and 8 January 2009 would not be a basis for either side to claim prejudice.
The State’s application for Rule 24 conference and defendant’s motions in opposition were heard on 8 January 2009, more than thirty months after the initial filing by the State on 21 June 2006 of the application for Rule 24 conference. Defendant argued that the State was in continuous violation of Rule 24 and that he had suffered serious prej-. udice from the State’s failure to hold a timely pretrial conference. *33Specifically, defendant asserted that he had been unable to obtain funding for second counsel, private investigators, or mitigation specialists. Defendant argued that the 2001 amendments abrogated the Rorie decision, thus permitting the trial court to declare the cases noncapital as a sanction for the State’s egregious noncompliance with Rule 24.
The trial court disagreed with defendant. Acknowledging that the 2001 amendments changed the law, the court nonetheless ruled that, based on Rorie, it lacked authority to declare the cases noncapital. Furthermore, the trial court was “not convinced that there is any prejudice.” The court noted that defendant could have applied for second counsel, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist at any time, and also observed that the “case[s are] not scheduled for trial in the near future.” Without authority to declare the cases noncapital for the State’s failure to comply with Rule 24, and a lack of prejudice to justify that sanction in any event, the trial court overruled defendant’s objections to the Rule 24 conference. Thereafter, the trial court heard the prosecutor’s forecast of aggravating circumstances and ruled that the cases could proceed capitally. This Court allowed defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s rulings on defendant’s objections to the violation of Rule 24.
II. Analysis
Defendant first argues that the 2001 amendments abrogated this Court’s holding in Rorie by granting district attorneys discretion in first-degree murder cases when evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances exists. With that discretion, defendant argues, superior courts have authority to declare the case noncapital when the State fails to comply with the mandates of Rule 24. The State contends that defendant “misapprehends the effect” of the 2001 amendments. We agree with defendant.
Prior to 2001, the capital punishment statutes, as interpreted in judicial decisions, mandated district attorneys to seek the death penalty in first-degree murder cases if there was evidence of an aggravating circumstance. See Rorie, 348 N.C. at 270-71, 500 S.E.2d at 80 (citing N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000 (1997)); State v. Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 709-10, 360 S.E.2d 660, 662-63 (1987); State v. Jones, 299 N.C. 298, 308-09, 261 S.E.2d 860, 867 (1980). District attorneys had no discretion to prosecute a first-degree murder case noncapitally when evidence of an aggravating circumstance existed. E.g., Rorie, 348 N.C. at 271, 500 S.E.2d at 80.
*34In Rorie, the Court was confronted with the question of whether the trial court exceeded its authority to enforce Rule 24 by precluding the State from prosecuting a first-degree murder case capitally. Id. at 267, 500 S.E.2d at 78. The trial court found and concluded as a matter of law
that the most important purpose of Rule 24 is to assure that the Defendant has effective assistance of counsel and that on these facts, there has been a substantial violation of the defendant’s rights to effective assistance of counsel by virtue of the state’s failure to timely file its Rule 24 Petition and the Court will preclude the state from seeking the death penalty. ■
Id. at 268, 500 S.E.2d at 78-79. The State conceded, and this Court recognized in Rorie, that trial courts of this State have inherent authority to enforce procedural and administrative rules, including Rule 24. Id. at 269, 500 S.E.2d at 79. The courts’ inherent authority to enforce Rule 24, however, stops short of actions that are “inconsistent with the Constitution or acts of the General Assembly.” Id. at 270, 500 S.E.2d at 79-80. Because the trial court’s order in Rorie precluded the district attorney from seeking the death penalty “notwithstanding what evidence of an aggravating circumstance or circumstances may exist,” this Court held that the trial court exceeded its inherent authority to enforce Rule 24. Id. at 271, 500 S.E.2d at 80. The trial court’s order was “potentially in conflict with the mandate of the General Assembly in the capital sentencing statute.” Id. We admonished district attorneys, however, that the requirements of Rule 24 are mandatory and that lesser sanctions such as contempt or disciplinary action could be appropriate enforcement measures. 348 N.C. at 271-72, 500 S.E.2d at 80-81.
In 2001, the General Assembly added the following provisions to the capital sentencing statutes:
(a) The State, in its discretion, may elect to try a defendant capitally or noncapitally for first degree murder, even if evidence of an aggravating circumstance exists. The State may agree to accept a sentence of life imprisonment for a defendant at any point in the prosecution of a capital felony, even if evidence of an aggravating circumstance exists.
(b) A sentence of death may not be imposed upon a defendant convicted of a capital felony unless the State has given notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. Notice of intent to seek the *35death penalty shall be given to the defendant and filed with the court on or before the date of the pretrial conference in capital cases required by Rule 24 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts, or the arraignment, whichever is later.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2004(a), (b) (2009). The General Assembly also amended section 15A-2000 to provide:
Except as provided in G.S. 15A-2004, upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony in which the State has given notice of its intent to seek the death penalty, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
Id. § 15A-2000(a)(l) (2009) (emphasis added). The 2001 amendments revoked the statutory mandate that required prosecutors to seek the death penalty in first-degree murder cases with evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances. Thus, the 2001 amendments significantly undercut the rationale on which Rorie was decided.
Although the 2001 amendments gave prosecutors discretion in first-degree murder cases, the changes did not alter the mandates or the gatekeeper function of Rule 24 in capital cases. While defendants “do not stand to lose or gain any rights” at the Rule 24 conference, it remains an important “administrative device intended to clarify the charges against the defendant and assist the prosecutor in determining whether any aggravating circumstances exist which justify seeking the death penalty.” State v. Chapman, 342 N.C. 330, 339, 464 S.E.2d 661, 666 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1023, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1996). Furthermore, the Rule 24 conference is the pivotal point in the pretrial proceedings when the court may declare the case capital, triggering appointment of second counsel and making public resources available to aid an indigent accused in preparing his defense. N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-450, -454 (2009); Indigent Def. Servs. R. 2A.2(d), 2D.1, 2009 Ann. R. N.C. 906, 915. With the Rule 24 hearing comes oversight of the capital litigation and acute supervision of further proceedings by the trial court. For these reasons, among others, “Rule 24’s ten-day time limitation clearly contemplates that cases which may be tried capitally are to be identified as early as possible in the process.” Rorie, 348 N.C. at 269, 500 S.E.2d at 79.
In addition to its gatekeeper function, the prompt Rule 24 conference preserves valuable public resources by avoiding allocation of *36funds for second counsel and mitigation experts to defendants accused of capital offenses but who are tried noncapitally. In light of its important role in capital cases, the State must heed the “ ‘simple, bright-line rule, requiring prosecutors to petition for a [Rule 24] conference in all capital cases.’ ” State v. Seward, 362 N.C. 210, 213, 657 S.E.2d 356, 358 (2008) (quoting State v. Matthews, 358 N.C. 102, 110, 591 S.E.2d 535, 541 (2004)). As this Court has repeatedly stated, Rule 24 places the duty upon the State to apply to the court for the pretrial conference. See id.; Matthews, 358 N.C. at 109-10, 591 S.E.2d at 541; Rorie, 348 N.C. at 271-72, 500 S.E.2d at 80-81.
When the State fails to comply, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged the trial courts’ inherent authority to enforce the mandates in Rule 24 through the contempt power or disciplinary action. See Matthews, 358 N.C. at 110, 591 S.E.2d at 541 (“If the prosecutor fails to petition the superior court for a pretrial conference, he risks disciplinary action.”); Rorie, 348 N.C. at 271-72, 500 S.E.2d at 80-81 (“Repeated violations of the rule manifesting willful disregard for the fair and expeditious prosecution of capital cases may result in citation for contempt pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 5A-11(7) or other appropriate disciplinary action against the district attorney.”). Before the 2001 amendments, a court’s authority to enforce Rule 24 could not extend to declaring a case noncapital, because such an order was in potential conflict with a statutory mandate. As noted above, the 2001 amendments revoked that statutory mandate, and we have recently held that “the trial court may properly declare [a] case non-capital” if the State’s “forecast of evidence at the Rule 24 conference does not show the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance.” Seward, 362 N.C. at 215, 657 S.E.2d at 359 (citing N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(c) (2007)). Because the 2001 amendments removed the statutory mandate on which Rorie was based, we now hold that the trial courts have inherent authority to declare a case noncapital as a sanction for the State’s violation of Rule 24.
However, our holding does not end the inquiry. Thus, we next address whether the facts presented justify declaring these cases noncapital. Because “[c]apital defendants do not stand to lose or gain any rights at the conference,” Chapman, 342 N.C. at 339, 464 S.E.2d at 666, the defendant must demonstrate that the State’s noncompliance caused sufficient prejudice to warrant declaring the case non-capital. If the defendant cannot make a sufficient showing of prejudice to warrant declaring the case noncapital, trial courts may still consider whether lesser sanctions are appropriate. See Rorie, 348 *37N.C. at 271-72, 500 S.E.2d at 80-81. Such lesser sanctions may be fashioned “both [to] get the district attorney’s attention and eliminate any possible prejudice to defendant resulting from the district attorney’s failure to petition for the required hearing within the time prescribed.” Id. at 271, 500 S.E.2d at 80-81.
Here, defendant contends that the State’s two and one-half year delay is so egregious and prejudicial that declaring the cases non-capital is appropriate. Defendant specifically claims that the delay prejudiced his ability to obtain effective assistance of second counsel and to acquire resources to prepare his capital defense. We conclude that defendant has not demonstrated that the State’s noncompliance, while egregious, caused sufficient prejudice to warrant declaring the cases noncapital.
Defendant acknowledges that the Office of Indigent Defense Services (“IDS”) rules allow second counsel to be appointed before the Rule 24 conference occurs in capital cases. See Indigent Def. Servs. R. 2A.2(d). Moreover, Rule 24 expressly states that it “does not affect the rights of the defense or the prosecution to request, or the court’s authority to grant, any relief authorized by law, including but not limited to appointment of assistant counsel, in advance of the pretrial conference.” Gen. R. Pract. Super. & Dist. Cts. 24. Nonetheless, defendant relies on IDS statistics to argue that appointment of second counsel before the Rule 24 conference is wasteful in the majority of cases that are charged capitally, but ultimately tried non-capitally. We agree that it was reasonable for defendant to wait until the cases were declared capital at the Rule 24 conference to request funding for second counsel, experts, and mitigation specialists to preserve resources. The lack of these resources, however, did not cause sufficient prejudice to declare the cases noncapital.
At the Rule 24 conference, the trial court expressly rejected defendant’s prejudice arguments. Regarding the second counsel prong of his argument, the trial court stated: “Granted, it would have been helpful to have a second [counsel] at an earlier stage. But, as pointed out by State’s counsel, the case[s are] not scheduled for trial in the near future. So I don’t see any prejudice by not having a second chair appointed.” Likewise, the trial court concluded that the lack of a mitigation specialist and investigator was not prejudicial because defendant also could have requested those resources before the Rule 24 conference. We agree with the trial court that there is insufficient prejudice to declare the cases noncapital because the date of trial is not imminent. Additionally, we note that trial courts may grant con*38tinuances when appropriate to give counsel time to become familiar with the case or to enable a defendant to acquire necessary witnesses. See, e.g., State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503, 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998); State v. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, 349-51, 402 S.E.2d 600, 607-08, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902, 116 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1991). Accordingly, defendant’s lack of second counsel, investigators, and mitigation specialists at an earlier juncture did not cause sufficient prejudice to warrant declaring the cases noncapital.
III. Conclusion
The 2001 amendments to the capital sentencing statutes revoked the statutory mandate that provided the rationale for the Rorie decision. As a result, it is within the inherent authority of the trial court to enforce Rule 24 by declaring a case noncapital in appropriate circumstances. However, precluding a capital prosecution is an appropriate sanction only when the defendant makes a sufficient showing of prejudice resulting from the State’s delay in holding the Rule 24 conference. Because defendant has not shown sufficient prejudice to warrant declaring the cases noncapital, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on that basis.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
. See Act of May 8, 2001, ch. 81, secs. 1, 3, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 163, 163-65 (amending N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a) & enacting N.C.G.S. § 15A-2004 (2009)) (collectively “2001 amendments”).
. The cases against defendant are 06CRS51011 and 06CRS51014. The grand jury also indicted codefendant Jason Matthew Patton for the same murders. The codefendant is not a party to this appeal.
. Only a “Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty,” referencing docket number 06CRS051011, and showing no “Filed” stamp, is appended to defendant’s brief to this Court. Appended to the State’s brief are an “Application for Pre-Trial Conference on Charge of First Degree Murder” and “Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty,” both referencing docket number 06CRS051014 and showing “Filed” stamps of 7 November 2008.