concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from part V of the majority opinion, but concur with the judg*912ment of the court in all other respects. The majority in part V holds that the prejudgment interest statute, § 13-21-101(1), 6A C.R.S. (1987), permits the recovery of prejudgment interest for future damages found by a trier of fact in a suit governed by the Health Care Availability Act (the HCAA), §§ 13-64-101 to 13-64-503, 6A C.R.S. (1992 Supp.). The HCAA is a later enacted and more specific statute than the prejudgment interest statute, and thus the express purpose and provisions of the HCAA should guide the application of the prejudgment interest statute in suits governed by the HCAA. See M.S. v. People, 812 P.2d 632, 637 (Colo.1991).
The HCAA attempts to curb the “significantly increasing costs of malpractice insurance,” § 13-64-102, by setting limits in medical malpractice cases on the award of damages, including compensatory damages, § 13-64-302, and by “[e]ffectuat[ing] more precise awards of damages for actual losses,” § 13-64-201(l)(b). The HCAA defines “future damages” as “damages of any kind arising from personal injuries which the trier of fact finds will accrue after the damages findings are made,” § 13-64-202(2), and the HCAA requires the trier of fact to determine the present value of future damages and to make separate findings for each claimant specifying the amount of such damages, § 13-64-204(l)(b), 13-64-205(l)(d). These findings provide the basis for the entry of judgment for future damages. See § 13-64-205(l)(d), (e), (f).
The overcompensation of a claimant by an award of prejudgment interest for future damages1 in a case governed by the HCAA is plainly inconsistent with the purpose of the HCAA. In addition, because the HCAA requires in every case governed by it a specific finding of the present value of future damages accruing after the damages findings are made, the HCAA places the trial court in a perfect position to effectuate the purpose of the HCAA by making a more precise award of damages for actual losses. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling not to award prejudgment interest for future damages in this case, and I would hold generally that the HCAA does not permit in cases governed by it the recovery of prejudgment interest for future damages.
. For example, suppose on Day 100 a finding is made that were it not for his injury a claimant would have received as income $10,000 on Day 465, and that there are no other damages at all besides this loss of $10,000 in future income. In such a case, the claimant would be made whole by an award on Day 100 of the present value of receiving $10,000 on Day 465, which, for the sake of simplicity, let us assume is $9,000. If, instead, the claimant on Day 100 receives $9,000 plus the interest that would have accrued on $9,000 if it had been invésted since the date the suit was filed, then the claimant will be overcompensated, which is to say, the claimant will receive on Day 100 an amount (let us assume $9,900) whose present value is greater than the present value of his damages. Cf. Patrick J. McDivitt, Comment, Pre-Judgment Interest as an Element of Damages: Proposed Solutions for a Colorado Problem, 49 U.Colo.L.Rev. 335, 338-341 (1978).