concurring.
I fully concur with the majority and write separately only to address intervenors’ argument that its motion to intervene was timely because it was filed within seventy-seven days after the entry of the 19 August 1999 Consent Order (Phase II). Phase II was not the result of a new complaint; rather, it was a consequence of the single complaint filed by the State and, indeed, was contemplated in the 21 December 1998 Consent Decree and Final Judgment (Phase I). Thus, the timeliness of intervenors’ motion must be judged in the context of Phase I. In that context, there was more than a ten-month delay in the filing of the motion to intervene, and I agree with the majority that intervenors have offered no acceptable excuse for the delay. Clearly, there is nothing to support a finding of extraordinary and unusual circumstances or a strong showing of justification for failure to request intervention sooner, State Employees’ Credit Union, Inc. v. Gentry, 75 N.C. App. 260, 264, 330 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1985), the showing required when a party seeks to intervene after entry of judgment.