The plaintiff, Paul Rollins, instituted this action in trespass on the case in the Circuit Court of Wyoming *180County against Lonie Lonis Daraban, Jr., to recover damages for personal injuries, including tlie loss of an arm, sustained by the plaintiff as a result of a collision upon a public highway involving an automobile operated by him and a truck operated by the defendant. To the action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict of a jury rendered on May 16, 1958, in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $7,500, the plaintiff prosecutes this writ of error.
From the testimony it appears that the collision involving the two motor vehicles occurred at or near a bridge or culvert. W. C. Hersman, a member of the Department of Public Safety, who was called to the scene shortly following the accident, testified: “* * * there was a bridge, a small culvert there where the accident happened.”
After the defense rested its case in chief, the plaintiff recalled Gr. H. Rollins, father of the plaintiff, to the witness stand for further testimony. Gr. H. Rollins testified that, after the adjournment of court on the preceding day, he visited the scene of the collision and inspected the culvert. The portion of such testimony which has significance in connection with the action of the court in setting aside the verdict is the answer: “Well, it has head walls on both ends of the culvert. ’ ’
After the trial the defendant obtained affidavits and photographs which were exhibited to the trial court in support of the motion to set aside the verdict. The photographs apparently were of the culvert and of the plaintiff’s automobile which had been involved in the collision. It was on the basis of such affidavits and photographs that the verdict was set aside. In the petition and brief filed in this Court on behalf of the plaintiff, it is insisted, first, that the affidavits and photographs were improperly considered by the trial court, because they were never made a part of the record, and, second, that they were in- any event insufficient to warrant the trial court’s action in setting- aside the verdict.
*181When the verdict of the jury was returned, the defendant by counsel promptly moved the court in arrest of judgment and to set aside the verdict and grant the defendant a new trial. The court order setting forth these proceedings states that the “motions were received by the court and the defendant is granted a period of ninety days from the date of said verdict within which to file his grounds and reasons in support of said motions.”
The printed record contains that which appears to be a written statement of grounds assigned by counsel for the defendant in support of the motion to set aside the verdict and grant the defendant a new trial. It bears in the printed record the following caption or designation: “MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT FILED July 28, 1958.”
Appearing in the printed record also are two affidavits made by Bud Daniels and James Gribs on, respectively, which, along with the photographs, were obviously designed to be and actually were considered by the trial court in support of the motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. The record fails to disclose that either of the affidavits was filed or marked filed, either by the trial court or the clerk thereof.
An order entered by the trial court on September 23, 1958, contains the following language: “And the court having prepared a written memorandum of the reasons of his ruling in setting aside the verdict, on motion of the defendant said written memorandum is ordered made a part of the record in this action.” The written opinion of the trial court which was made a part of the record contains the following language:
“Error is assigned from the evidence taken without objection of G. H. Rollins who was recalled to give certain evidence about the existence of concrete head walls on a culvert at the scene of the collision. It is urged that photographs which have been filed and two affidavits which have been filed to the effect that there are no abutments sticking up above the *182level of the road are contrary to the evidence given by the said Rollins. There is some ambiguity in this testimony and since the argument of counsel for the plaintiff was not reported, just how this matter was put to tire jury in the argument is not subject to strict ascertainment. The pictures and affidavits indicate that there are no head walls extending above the level of the road to any extent, but I am afraid that die evidence and the concluding argument were urged to the jury to the extent that they were of the opinion that said head walls did exist above the level of the road, which in effect would have discredited all of the defendant’s evidence in the case.”
The affidavits and the photographs, upon which the court relied as a basis for setting aside the verdict, were not formally made a part of the record by a court order, nor have they been made a part of the record before this Court by bill of exception or certificate in lieu thereof. The eminent trial judge in his written opinion makes reference to argument of counsel for the plaintiff dealing with head walls on the bridge or culvert. Such remarks of counsel were not made a part of the record before this Court by bill of exceptions or certificate in lieu thereof. As has been stated, the affidavits were copied in the printed record, but the photographs are not before this Court physically or in any other sense.
Bills of exceptions and certificates in lieu thereof were unknown to the common law and are wholly creatures of statute. Burks Pleading and Practice (4th Ed.) page 539, Section 301. Code, 56-6-35, dealing with bills of exceptions, provides that a party “may avail himself of any error appearing on the record, by which he is prejudiced, without obtaining a formal bill of exceptions, provided he objects or excepts on the record to the action of the court complained of, and provided it is such a matter as can be considered without a formal bill of exceptions.” (Italics supplied.) “The purpose of a bill of exceptions is to exhibit on the record the supposed mistakes of the trial court which do not appear on the record and could not otherwise be brought before an appellate *183court for review and correction if erroneous.” Hinton Milling Co. v. New River Milling Co., 78 W. Va. 314, syl. 4, 88 S. E. 1079; Penix v. Grafton, 86 W. Va. 278, syl. 1, 103 S. E. 106. Code, 56-6-36, provides for certificate in the form therein prescribed “in lieu of” a bill of exceptions.
It is not necessary to detail what is embraced in the “record” under the law of this State, except to state that the record itself does not include photographs, the written opinion of the trial court, oral arguments of counsel, written grounds assigned in support of a motion to set aside a verdict, nor even the testimony itself, unless made a part of the record by one of the methods prescribed by law. Burks Pleading & Practice (4th Ed.), Section 301, page 539. Instructions given and refused may be made a part of the record by proper notations appearing over the signature of the trial judge. Code, 56-6-20. The writ or process commencing an action at law or suit in equity is a part of the record. Code, 56-3-32. Affidavits, including affidavits urged in support of a motion to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial, are not a part of the record. State v. Jones, 128 W. Va. 496, syl. 2, 37 S. E. 2d 103; Snodgrass v. Charleston NuGrape Co., Inc., 113 W. Va. 748, syl. 3, 169 S. E. 406; Townley Bros. v. Crickenberger, 64 W. Va. 379, syl. 4, 63 S. E. 320; 4A C.J.S., Appeal & Error, Section 773, page 636. “The mere filing of papers does not make them a part of the record. The rule book and the order book are the proper sources of information as to what constitutes the record.” Burks Pleading & Practice, (4th Ed.), Section 425, page 824. “Nothing else that transpired during the trial in the court below will be considered a part of the record in the appellate court, unless made so by a bill of exceptions or order of the court; * * (Italics supplied.) 1 M. J., Appeal and Error, Section 170, page 609.
While the trial court’s written opinion may be made a part of the record by court order, when such is *184done it operates merely “to point out the specific ground on which the trial court acted.” Woodruff v. Gilliam, 116 W. Va. 101, 109, 179 S. E. 873; Robertson v. Vandergrift, 119 W. Va. 219, 193 S. E. 62; Wilson v. Hix, 136 W. Va. 59, 73, 65 S. E. 2d 717, 726; Cottle v. Cottle, 129 W. Va. 344, syl. 5, 40 S. E. 2d 863.
The appellant takes the position that since the affidavits and photographs were not made a part of the record, this Court must hold that the trial court’s action in setting aside the verdict was not justified. We regard this as a misconception of the law. Robertson v. Harmon, 47 W. Va. 500, syl. 2, 35 S. E. 832. There is always a presumption of regularity in all judicial proceedings. McClure-Mabie Lumber Co. v. Brooks, 46 W. Va. 732, syl. 5, 34 S. E. 921; Richardson v. Donehoo, 16 W. Va. 685, syl. 14; Shrewsbury v. Miller, 10 W. Va. 115, syl. 2. “Error must he shown by him who asserts irregularity.” State v. Cooper, 74 W. Va. 472, 475, 82 S. E. 358, 359. See also, Forest Glen Land Co. v. George, 96 W. Va. 209, syl. 2, 122 S. E. 543; Furbee v. Shay, 46 W. Va. 736, syl. 2, 34 S. E. 746; Griffith v. Corrothers, 42 W. Va. 59, syl. 2, 24 S. E. 569. The presumption of regularity obtains when the record is silent. Alleged error “must be affirmatively shown by the record.” State v. Beatty, 51 W. Va. 232, syl. 4 and 5, 41 S. E. 434; State v. Joe, 105 W. Va. 281, 283, 142 S. E. 250, 251; Cave v. Blair Limestone Co., 74 W. Va. 752, syl. 1, 82 S. E. 1095; Teter v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 74 W. Va. 344, syl. 12, 82 S. E. 40; Scott v. Newell, 69 W. Va. 118, syl. 4, 70 S. E. 1092; Cox v. National Coal & Oil Investment Co., 61 W. Va. 291, syl. 13, 56 S. E. 494; State v. Henry, 51 W. Va. 283, syl. 7, 41 S. E. 439; McGraw v. Roller, 47 W. Va. 650, syl., 35 S. E. 822; Griffith v. Corrothers, 42 W. Va. 59, syl. 3, 24 S. E. 569; Webb v. Bailey, 41 W. Va. 463, syl. 4, 23 S. E. 644; Miller v. Rose, 21 W. Va. 291, syl. 1. “The presumption of law is in favor of the correctness of the judgment of the lower court, and this Court will not reverse unless error affirmatively appears by the record.” Scott *185v. Newell, 69 W. Va. 118, syl. 4, 70 S. E. 1092. See also State v. Ice, 34 W. Va. 244, syl. 4, 12 S. E. 695; State v. Lavin, 64 W. Va. 26, syl. 2, 60 S. E. 888; 1 M. J., Appeal and Error, Section 258, page 675. “Where the record is so imperfect as not to disclose error in a judgment, it is presumed to be right, and on writ of error will be affirmed.” National Cash Register Co. v. Union Bargain House, 55 W. Va. 489, syl., 47 S. E. 287; Davis v. Staggers, 127 W. Va. 699, 34 S. E. 2d 264. ‘ ‘ The burden which is cast upon the appellant in the appellate court is not merely to lodge a doubt, but to satisfy the court of the error assigned.” 1 M. J., Appeal and Error, Section 259, page 677.
From the foregoing it is obvious that the burden is on the appellant to produce before this Court a record sufficient to disclose to the Court affirmatively that error was committed by the trial court in its action in setting aside the verdict. The affidavits, the photographs and the written assignments of error in support of the motion to set aside the verdict were properly before the trial court, but they have not been made a part of the record before this Court. The burden is not on the appellee, the defendant below, to make the appellant’s record for him. If the record is not sufficient to afford an appraisal of the trial court’s action in setting aside the verdict, this Court must presume that the action of the trial court in this respect was correct and legally justified. In the case of Ward v. County Court of Raleigh County, 141 W. Va. 730, 734, 93 S. E. 2d 44, 46, the Court stated: "Certain questions are attempted to be raised as to the actions of the trial court relating to the setting aside of the verdict of the jury. Since a consideration of such questions depends on the evidence taken at the trial before the jury, which evidence has not been made part of the record before this Court by any bill of exceptions, such questions cannot now be considered. As to such questions, we must assume that the action of the trial court was correct. ’ ’ In the *186case of Sanders v. Wise, 74 W. Va. 797, 83 S. E. 77, a verdict for the defendant was rendered in 1909, a motion to set aside such verdict was made promptly hut not acted upon until 1913, at which time the trial judge set aside the verdict, assigning as his sole reason for so doing his failure "to find anything in the record as to what the evidence was before the jury. ’ ’ Upon writ of error, this Court, in reversing the trial court, stated: “As the defendant could rest contented upon the finding in his favor, the duty devolved on plaintiff, whose motion, though promptly made, the court four years later sustained, to preserve the testimony, or to show in what respects the effort, if made, would have been unavailing; and he can not now complain that plaintiffs in error have failed to produce the testimony.” “A bill of exceptions or certificate in lieu thereof, in accordance with Code, 56-6-36 (e) is necessary to give this Court jurisdiction to consider the matters which must he made a part of the record by proper bill of exceptions or certificate in lieu thereof.” (Italics supplied.) Davis v. Phillips, 140 W. Va. 280, 283, 83 S. E. 2d 699, 700. In the case of Smith v. Withrow, 129 Va. 668, 106 S. E. 694, the Court held: “In the absence of the affidavits upon which the trial court relied when it set aside the verdict of the jury, this court must presume that such action was correct, and the verdict properly set aside.” See also 4A C.J.S., Appeal & Error, Section 1199, pages 1321-1322.
It is clear that the factual situation upon the basis of which the trial court set aside the verdict of the jury has not been made a part of the record. Included in this category are the affidavits, the photographs, and the written assignments of error urged in support of the motion to set aside the verdict. It is true that the trial judge’s written opinion, which was made a part of the record, makes reference to at . least some of the photographs, to at least some of the assignments of error, and to at least some of the affidavits which were before the trial court.
*187It is true also that this Court may look to the trial court’s opinion under such circumstances for the limited purpose of determining the reasons for the trial court’s action. But it can not he contended seriously that such documents were thereby made a part of the record before this Court. Nor are we warranted in assuming either that the trial court’s opinion sets forth the full contents of the affidavits, or all of them, that it refers to all the photographs, or that the trial court, upon the showing thereby made, adopted the most plausible basis urged for setting aside the verdict. In the third point of the syllabus of the case of Shrewsbury v. Miller, 10 W. Va. 115, the Court stated: “It makes no difference upon what ground the court below decided the case, or the particular matter complained of, it is not the reasons assigned upon which the court decided a question that is to be reviewed, but the action of the court itself; and the question always in the appellate court is, whether the judgment to be reviewed is correct.” In Dunn’s Ex’rs v. Renick, 40 W. Va. 349, 361, 22 S. E. 66, 70, it is stated that “the action of a court may be stated to be on an insufficient reason, and yet be right for a different reason.” See also Henry v. Ohio River Railroad Co., 40 W. Va. 234, 246, 21 S. E. 863, 868; Riggs v. Huffman, 33 W. Va. 426, 430, 10 S. E. 795, 796-7.
The case of Westover Volunteer Fire Department v. Barker, 142 W. Va. 404, 95 S. E. 2d 807, involved a proceeding under Code, 55-4, to determine a disputed boundary. The case was heard by the court in lieu of a jury. From the written opinion of the trial court, which was made a part of the record, it appeared that the trial judge on his own initiative had taken a view of the premises, and based the trial court’s findings on facts disclosed to him by such view. This Court discerned this situation from the trial court’s opinion and held that such view was not legally warranted. But that is a quite different situation from the one here presented. In the case cited, this Court was justified, under its prior decision's, *188in looking to the trial judge’s written opinion to determine the reasons for the trial court’s findings and thereby it was determined by this Court that, as a legal proposition, the trial court was not warranted in taking a view of the premises under the circumstances of that case. But in the instant case, on the other hand, this Court can not determine whether the trial court was warranted in setting aside the jury verdict without a resort to the factual situation which formed the basis of the trial court’s action, and such factual situation is not presented by the record before the Court. One thing which appears affirmatively and unmistakably from the trial court’s opinion is that it was based on matters which are not a part of the record before this Court.
It is fundamental that the judgment of the trial court in setting aside a verdict and awarding a new trial is entitled to peculiar weight and that its action in this respect will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly unwarranted. McClaugherty v. Traction Co., 123 W. Va. 112, syl. 1, 14 S. E. 2d 432; Rucker v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, 120 W. Va. 63, 196 S. E. 494, 498; Ware v. Hays, 119 W. Va. 585, 589, 195 S. E. 265, 267; Venturino v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 113 W. Va. 341, 167 S. E. 868. “In addition to erroneous rulings in a trial, or weakness of evidence, relied upon in a motion for a new trial, there is discretion in the trial judge, founded upon impressions derived from his observations in the course of the trial which he may exercise in resolving any doubt he may have, as to the proper disposition of the motion, wherefore his award of a new trial, based upon his opinion as to the sufficiency of the ground of the motion therefor, is entitled to peculiar respect in the appellate court.” Ross v. Lake & Export Coal Corporation, 92 W. Va. 229, syl. 4, 116 S. E. 155. See also Vaughan v. Memorial Hospital, 103 W. Va. 156, 136 S. E. 837.
The burden was upon the appellant to present a record disclosing the factual situation urged in the *189trial court in support of the motion to set aside the verdict. In the absence thereof, this Court must presume that the showing made in this respect was sufficient to justify the action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict of the jury and in awarding a new trial, either upon the ground assigned by the trial court for so doing, or upon another basis disclosed from such factual situation.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Wyoming County is affirmed.
Affirmed.