dissenting.
The majority’s opinion affirms the trial court’s order, which dismissed the charge of felony assault on a government officer or employee against defendant. I vote to reverse and respectfully dissent.
I. Standard of Review
[T]he scope of appellate review ... is strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law. Indeed, an *312appellate court accords great deference to the trial court in this respect because it is entrusted with the duty to hear testimony, weigh and resolve any conflicts in the evidence, find the facts, and, then based upon those findings, render a legal decision, in the first instance, as to whether or not a constitutional violation of some kind has occurred.
State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
II. Finding of Fact Numbered 9
The parties concede and the majority’s opinion agrees that finding of fact numbered 4 is not supported by any competent evidence, but holds the trial court’s finding of fact numbered 9 is supported by competent evidence. I disagree.
Finding of fact numbered 9 states:
That during proceedings regarding this case and upon the request of the Defendant for discovery and disclosure that Assistant District Attorney Higdon stated in open court that the poster had been destroyed and was not available, and that the subject photographs originally taken at the Stanly County Jail were not available as well.
The records and transcripts before us do not support “that the subject photographs originally taken at the Stanly County Jail were not available as well.” At defendant’s 11 July 2005 hearing, defendant’s counsel stated:
Your Honor, I have in my hand a copy of [sic] Stanly County Sheriff’s Office booking report. It is — it has on it [sic] copy of the photograph, the actual photograph that I saw with my eyes in the clerk’s office. This is the photograph that was on the bottom of the paper that said, “After he sued the D.A.’s office.”
At defendant’s 18 January 2007 hearing, defendant stated:
[Defendant]: . . . I’m handing you what is marked as Exhibit 3. Do you recognize that photograph right there . . .?
[Witness]: Yes. It’s one that looks like it was taken at the Stanly County Jail.
[Defendant]: Was that by chance be [sic] the picture where up there it said, before he sued the Stanly County *313District Attorney’s office? Is that the one that was up there ... in that poster?
[Witness]: That was — this is a side shot. It was a face, a complete face.
The transcripts from defendant’s 11 July 2005 and 18 January 2007 hearings clearly reveal defendant and his counsel possessed both photographs. Competent evidence does not support the trial court’s finding of fact numbered 9, these judicial admissions are binding upon defendant, and no evidence supports the trial court’s contrary conclusions of law. See City of Brevard v. Ritter, 285 N.C. 576, 580, 206 S.E.2d 151, 154 (1974) (citation omitted) (“Stipulations duly made during the course of a trial constitute judicial admissions binding on the parties and dispensing with the necessity of proof for the duration of the controversy.”); see also State v. Simon, 185 N.C. App. 247, 255-56, 648 S.E.2d 853, 858 (2007).
III. Conclusions of Law Numbered 1. 2, 3, and 4
The majority’s opinion also holds that conclusions of law numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4 are supported by the trial court’s findings of fact. I disagree.
Conclusions of law numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4 state:
1) That the photographs of the Defendant made during his processing into the Stanly County Jail on November 17th of 2003 and again between April the 19th and 20th of 2004 are relevant and material to the defense of the subject prosecution.
2) That the poster of the photographs described herein was willfully destroyed and not made available to the Defendant although the Defendant made a valid and timely request for same.
3) That the original photographs described herein have not been made available and as represented by the State of North Carolina are unavailable to the Defendant, even though implicitly requested by the Defendant.
4) That due to the destruction or failure of the State to provide this evidence, which is material and may be exculpatory in nature, the Defendant’s rights pursuant to the Constitution of the United States and the North Carolina Constitution have been flagrantly violated and there is such irreparable prejudice to the *314Defendant’s preparation of his case that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.
No evidence in the record shows and no findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusions that: (1) the photographs “are relevant and material to the defense of the [Union County] prosecution];]” (2) the poster was “willfully destroyed[;]” (3) “the original photographs described herein have not been made available [;]” or (4) “there is such irreparable prejudice to the Defendant’s preparation of his [Union County] case that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.” Uncontested evidence shows defendant was in possession of both Stanly County photographs at two separate hearings. No relevance of these photographs is shown to defendant’s Union County charges that are presently before us. The trial court’s order, which dismissed the Union County indictment against defendant, is unsupported by evidence or findings of fact and should be reversed.
IV. Conclusion
The trial court’s finding of fact numbered 9 is not supported by competent evidence and cannot be used to support the trial court’s conclusions of law. Cooke, 306 N.C. at 134, 291 S.E.2d at 619. The trial court’s remaining findings of fact do not support its conclusions of law numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4. Id. Defendant has failed to show any prejudice from the destruction of the poster and particularly any relevance of the Stanly County allegations and actions to the present charges in Union County. The trial court’s order, which dismissed the charge of felony assault on a government officer or employee against defendant, should be reversed. I respectfully dissent.