dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although well-written and, at first blush, persuasive, the majority opinion, wherein it approves the disregard of the claimant’s employability in the labor market where he lived at' the time of his injury, breaks judicial rank with the spirit of the Workmen’s Compensation Law and does *339disservice to long-established case law precedent which properly holds that the Commission, in determining the diminished ability of a claimant to compete in an open labor market pursuant to I.C. § 72-430(1), should include in its analysis that the labor market wherein the claimant lived at the time of injury.
My first disagreement with the majority opinion stems from its erroneous premise that Idaho Code § 72-430(1) fails to clearly express our legislature’s intent. Describing the factors to be considered by the Commission in determining permanent disability, I.C. § 72-430(1) states in relevant part:
72-430. Permanent disability — Determination of — Percentages—Schedule.
(1) Matters to be considered. In determining percentages of permanent disabilities, account shall be taken of the nature of the physical disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to handicap the employee in procuring or holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple injuries, the occupation of the employee, and his age at the time of accident causing the injury, or manifestation of the occupational disease, consideration being given to the diminished ability of the afflicted employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographic area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee, and other factors as the commission may deem relevant, ...
The statute clearly requires the Commission, in the course of its deliberations regarding a permanent disability claim, to consider the disablement, any disfigurement, the occupation, and the age of the claimant at the time of the injury or manifestation of occupational disease. Under the rule advanced by the majority today, the Commission is then to examine the labor market surrounding the claimant’s residence at a different time, the time of the hearing. I disagree with this interpretation because it is patently unsound and not within the legislative directive. Had the legislature intended a different rule for evaluation of the labor market, it surely would have included this admonition in the statute, and could have easily done so.
This Court interpreted the relevant statutory provisions in a vastly different manner in Lyons v. Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977). There, we read into the statutory language of I.C. § 72-4251 the ability of the Commission to consider evidence of actual jobs in both the labor market near the residence of the claimant at the time of his injury, and the market near the residence to which he later moved. Lyons, 98 Idaho at 407 n. 3, 565 P.2d at 1364 n. 3. The laudable purpose of this ruling was to discourage injured claimants from moving to non-lucrative labor markets and nonetheless collecting permanent disability benefits. In this case, though, the Court has decided to eliminate the analysis of the labor market near the claimant’s original residence, despite the fact that the only difference between this case and Lyons is that here, the claimant has, through diligence and sacrifice, moved to a more lucrative labor market than did the claimant in Lyons.
I find today’s result unacceptable in light of: (a) the humane purposes of the Worker’s Compensation Act; (b) the fact that it runs directly counter to the law in other jurisdictions; and (c) the fact that it provides a massive disincentive for injured employees to pull up stakes, seek out new work, and thereby assist themselves and their families.
The Arizona Court of Appeals faced precisely the facts that this Court faces today. In Edwards v. Industrial Comm’n of Ariz., the claimant Edwards was injured and subsequently unable to secure employment in the city of Phoenix, where he lived. He then relocated to an unidentified sister state. (The Court of Appeals refrained from identi*340fying the sister state out of fear that Edwards would once again lose his job). The Arizona Industrial Commission denied the claimant a loss of earning capacity because he was employed in the sister state. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where an injured employee, in desperation, seeks and secures work elsewhere, such employee has still suffered a loss of earning capacity because he is unable to compete in the labor market where he resided at the time of the injury. Edwards v. Industrial Comm’n of Ariz., 14 Ariz.App. 427, 484 P.2d 196, 199 (1971).2
Were this Court to hold the same today, such a ruling would be more consistent with the rule we announced in Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 769 P.2d 572 (1989). The facts in Combs were very similar to those in this case, except that Combs’ hearing before the Commission occurred before he was forced out of desperation to relocate to Missoula. Recognizing that “the test of reasonableness does not require the claimant to look for work beyond the general area in which he lives,” this Court ruled that including Missoula in the labor market, even were Combs to relocate there, would “vitiate the humane purposes which the Workmen’s Compensation Law was intended to further.” Combs, 115 Idaho at 697-98, 769 P.2d at 576-77 (quoting 2 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 57.61(d), at 245 (1985)). The majority recognizes the similarity of this case to Combs, but fails to acknowledge the irony. By actually relocating to Missoula, and incurring more expense and sacrifice on the part of his family, Davaz lost the disability compensation to which he would be entitled under Combs if he had only remained in Priest River until the hearing before the Commission took place. Surely this result also “vitiates the humane purposes which the Workmen’s Compensation Law was intended to further.”
Other courts have concluded, as we did in Combs, that injured employees should not have to relocate in order to find substitute employment. See, e.g., McMannis v. Mad-Ray Modulars, Inc., 289 So.2d 715, 718 (Fla. 1974) (“employer-carrier’s somewhat bizarre argument ... that claimant should have moved in an attempt to find work, appears to be supported neither by case nor statutory law. In fact, ... it would appear to be repugnant to both Federal and State Constitutions”); Fredenburg v. Control Data Corp., 311 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Minn.1981) (“An employee is not required to seek substitute employment outside his own community.”)
Therefore, it is patently erroneous to now hold that, contrary to the determination of the Edwards Court, an injured employee who does relocate to find work should thereby lose that which we and other courts have determined that he or she should not lose. Just as we ordered the Commission in Lyons to examine both the labor market at the time of injury and at the time of hearing in its deliberations for permanent disability, I would order the Commission to evaluate both labor markets in this case.
I dissent.
. I.C. § 72-425. Permanent disability evaluation. "Evaluation (rating) of permanent disability” is an appraisal of the injured employee’s present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors provided in section 72-430, Idaho Code.
. The majority correctly points out that the purpose of permanent disability compensation in Idaho is to compensate an injured employee for his or her decreased capacity to engage in gainful activity. Matthews v. Dept. of Corrections, 121 Idaho 680, 683, 827 P.2d 693, 696 (1992) (citing Graybill v. Swift & Co., 115 Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). Thus, the compensation that was at stake in Edwards served the same purpose as that which is at stake in this case.