dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which allows inheritance by an equitably adopted child from a natural child of the equitably adoptive parents. The doc-tine of equitable adoption, as interpreted by this Court in Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Singer, 162 W.Va. 502, 250 S.E.2d 369 (1978), is a legal recognition of the strong bonds of love and affection created on occasion between an unrelated “parent” and “child” without a formal adoption proceeding. Because the equitable adoption doctrine is based on the lineal relationship between parent and child I do not believe that its legal effect should be extended to allow inheritance “through” the parent as well as “from” the parent.
It is important to remember that the common law of this country did not recognize the concept of adoption. The right to adopt and the legal consequences of an adoption were controlled exclusively by statute. 2 Am.Jur.2d Adoption § 1, et seq. (1962); 14A Michie’s Jurisprudence Parent and Child § 27 (1978). Our decision in Singer, recognizing the concept of equitable adoption, made a limited change in the common law to permit a person to inherit from that person’s equitably adoptive parent. We stressed in Syllabus Point 2 of Singer that such an individual “must prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that he has stood from an age of tender years in a position exactly equivalent to that of a formally adopted or natural child.”
I can see no good policy reason for extending Singer beyond its facts and further changing the common law to permit an equitably adopted child to inherit from the siblings of the equitably adoptive parents.
The majority to justify its decision in this case places undue emphasis on certain facts in Singer in an attempt to broaden its holding. I do not find the majority’s efforts to distinguish cases from other jurisdictions persuasive. In fact, from my reading of the legal annotation cited by the majority, I question whether any other court in this country would come to the result reached in this case where, as here, no unfulfilled adoption contract is involved. See Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 347 (1980). The only cases that appear factually analogous hold that the doctrine of equitable adoption is not available against a blood relative of an adoptive parent. Robinson v. Robinson, 283 Ala. 257, 215 So.2d 585 (1967); Dye v. Ghann, 216 Ga. 743, 119 S.E.2d 700 (1961); In Re Olson’s Estate, 244 Minn. 449, 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955); Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697, 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 488, 94 L.Ed. 585 (1950); Pouncy v. Garner, 626 5.W.2d 337 (Tex.App.1981).
Furthermore, I do not believe it is wise to treat, as Syllabus Point 2 of the majority *400opinion suggests, an equitably adopted child as a “legally adopted child” for purposes of descent and distribution under W.Va.Code, 48-4-ll(b). Under this statutory provision, for example, if a legally adopted child dies intestate, all property, including real and personal, of such child shall pass “according to the statutes of descent and distribution of this State, to those persons who would have taken had the decedent been the natural child of the adopting parent or parents.” Placing an equitably adopted child in the same legal position as a statutorily adopted child under this provision would result in such child’s bloodline being disinherited. I do not believe the Court intended a complete wedding of judge-made and statutory law, and as a consequence I would suggest that trial courts in the future read Syllabus Point 2 of the majority opinion narrowly and confine the holding in this case to its precise facts.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Miller joins me in this dissent.