concurring in the result.
I concur in the result reached by the Court’s opinion, but write to clarify that a suspension without pay under I.C. § 33-513 does not necessarily constitute the withholding of wages under I.C. § 45-609.
I.C. § 45-609 reads in pertinent part as follows:
*430No employer may withhold or divert any portion of an employee’s wages unless:
1.The employer is required or empowered to do so by state or federal law,....
The Court has determined that I.C. § 33-513 empowers the District to suspend Loftus ■without pay; thus, Loftus’ wage claim under I.C. § 45-609 fails. The Court assumes ar-guendo that a suspension without pay could fall under the prohibition against withholding of wages, but does not decide that issue. No prior decision of this Court has deemed that a suspension without pay would amount to a withholding of wages subject to the provisions of I.C. § 45-609, and this opinion should not be read as implying that it would be.
I do not believe that the Court needs to decide, under Part IV above, that Loftus was not required to exhaust the grievance remedy of the collective bargaining agreement before pursuing a remedy under the Wage Claim Statute in the magistrate division. The Court’s decision in Part III is completely dispositive of the wage claim issue, and therefore Part IV is dicta.
Moreover, the District raised the issue on cross-appeal as to whether the magistrate court erred in determining that the District is subject to liability, including treble damages, under the Wage Claim Statute. The Court’s decision here does not decide the issue due to its interpretation of I.C. § 33-513. However, I am concerned the Court’s statement that Loftus could pursue the judicial remedy of the wage claim statute without filing a grievance could be read as implying that the magistrate judge was correct in ruling that the District was subject to wage claim liability. That issue has never been squarely addressed by this Court, and in my view is not decided even by implication here.