dissenting.
“[J]ust as ‘a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor[, so has a] parallel rule ... been applied in the context of a lesser[-]included[-]offense instruction.’ ” State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293, 303, 544 A.2d 826 (1988) (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 887, 99 L.Ed.2d 54, 61 (1988)). Under our law, a criminal defendant need only scale a “low threshold” to avail himself of a jury charge on a lesser-included offense. State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 278, 508 A.2d 167 (1986). Successfully surmounting that threshold depends exclusively on “whether the evidence presents a rational basis on which the jury could acquit the defendant of the greater charge and convict the defendant of the lesser.” State v. Brent, 137 N.J. 107, 117, 644 A.2d 583 (1994) (citing State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 531, 534, 601 A.2d 175 (1992)); see also Cannel, New Jersey *185Criminal Code Annotated, comment 12 on N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8 (2008) (“[W]here the defendant makes the request and the State objects, the facts proved at trial should be evaluated to ensure that there is a rational basis for a jury to reject the greater charge and convict of the lesser; wherever there is such a basis, the lesser charge should be given.”). It cannot be overstated that “[t]he question at that stage of the proceedings centers on the existence of evidence to support the lesser[-]included offense, and not on its worth.” State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236, 251, 914 A.2d 1250 (2007) (emphasis added). That there is also evidence upon which a jury could convict a defendant of the greater offense is essentially irrelevant to the rational-basis analysis. See State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 397, 799 A.2d 477 (2002) (citing State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 489, 662 A.2d 308 (1995)).
As the majority correctly observes, “ ‘theft, by definition, is a lesser-included offense of robbery.’ ” Ante at 177, 966 A.2d at 480 (quoting State v. Ingram, 196 N.J. 23, 39, 951 A.2d 1000 (2008)); see N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l(a). Upon request therefore, the trial judge was required to include a theft charge in the jury instruction if there existed a rational basis in the record to acquit Cassady of robbery, but to convict him of theft. That rational basis exists here because there is evidence in the record that casts doubt on the existence of the prerequisite mental state for elevating theft to robbery: whether Cassady “purposely put [the teller] in fear of immediate bodily injury” in the course of stealing the money from her drawer. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l(a)(2).
It is undisputed that Cassady never touched or threatened the bank teller, and the record contains no direct evidence that his purpose was to put her “in fear of immediate bodily injury.” N.J.S.A 2C:15-l(a)(2). To be sure, the teller may well have felt fear during the course of her encounter with Cassady. Indeed, such a response is understandable. But it is not her response, however reasonable, that elevates a theft to robbery. Only evidence that it was Cassady^ “conscious object” to place her in fear of immediate bodily injury will satisfy the standard. N.J.S.A. *1862C:2—2(b)(1); N.J.SA 2C:15-l(a)(2); see State v. Smalls, 310 N.J.Super. 285, 292, 708 A.2d 737 (App.Div.1998) (noting that focus of robbery determination is defendant’s conduct, not victim’s characteristics, because “[a] cautious person ... may exhibit fear in many settings that are not criminal.”).
A review of the entire trial record reveals that there is “ ‘room for dispute’ ” regarding Cassady’s purpose, thereby satisfying the rational-basis test of N.J.SA 2C:l-8(e). State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 415, 568 A.2d 879 (1990) (quoting Crisantos, supra, 102 N.J. at 285, 508 A.2d 167 (O’Hern, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). For example, during Cassady’s cross-examination of the bank teller, she testified that “I didn’t have to hand my money to him[;] ... he himself took the money from my window.” She further testified about her interaction with Cassady and her perspective of his actual goal:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] But you said that my client didn’t touch you in any way, did he?
[TELLER:] He didn’t touch me.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] And he didn’t physically threaten to do you any harm in any way, did he?
[TELLER:] Nothing.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] All his actions were directed towards the money?
[TELLER:] Towards the money, but when he jumped I got scared.
The other bank employees’ testimony corroborated the teller’s account, ante at 170 n.l, 966 A.2d at 475-76, and supported the notion that Cassady’s purpose was singular—to get the money:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] And you heard what the person was saying to [the teller] at the bank, and that person never threatened [her], did he?
[WITNESS:] No.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] No, and everything was directed towards, Give me the money or, Let me have the money, and that’s what he did, he jumped over[,] grabbed the money, jumped back over and left, correct?
[WITNESS:] (Nodding in the affirmative.)
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] In fact he never touched anybody or threatened anybody?
[WITNESS:] (Shaking head in the negative.) Sorry. No.
*187[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] But he never made any threatening statements, did he?
[WITNESS]: No.
LDEFENSE COUNSEL:] Never made any threatening actions, did he? [WITNESS:] No.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Just jumped over, grabbed the money, and jumped back over and left?
[WITNESS:] Yes.
According to another employee, once over the glass partition, Cassady never directed any action or attention to any teller staffing other available cash drawers:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Now, at this point he climbs up over?
[WITNESS:] Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] And he’s down there in the work area?
[WITNESS:] Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] What happens then?
[WITNESS:] He proceeds to go into the teller’s drawer and then he climbed back over.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] So everything was directed on ... the money, is that true, and not on [the teller], but the money that is in the teller’s box or something[?]
[WITNESS:] Yes, sir.
Thus, whether Cassady’s conduct constituted bank “robbery,” as it is defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l(a)(2), is not as “‘plain and simple’ ” as the majority suggests. Ante at 179, 966 A.2d at 479 (quoting State v. Cassady, 396 N.J.Super. 392, 405, 934 A.2d 644 (App.Div.2007) (Fuentes, J., dissenting)). To the contrary, and mindful that it is the mere “existence,” not the “worth,” of facts supporting a lesser-included-offense charge that matters, the foregoing excerpts signify Cassady’s satisfaction of the minimal evi-dentiary requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(e). Samuels, supra, 189 N.J. at 251, 914 A.2d 1250. The facts detailing Cassady’s actions may well be “clear and unequivocal,” ante at 178, 966 A.2d at 481, but they hardly preclude a debate among rational minds regarding his purpose.
Despite that evidence, the judge instructed the jury without any mention that, if it believed that Cassady did not act with the *188purpose to put the teller “in fear of immediate bodily injury,” it could still convict him of theft. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l(a)(2). In my view, that was error. Like the majority, the judge failed to look at the considerable evidence in Cassady’s favor regarding his “purpose” in vaulting the window, and thus improperly applied N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(e) to the facts established at trial. See Brent, supra, 137 N.J. at 117, 644 A.2d 583; see also State v. Jordan, 240 N.J.Super. 115, 118-19, 572 A.2d 676 (App.Div.) (“[W]here the evidence provides a rational basis upon which the defendant may be found guilty of an included offense and not guilty of the encompassing offense, it is reversible error for the court to refuse, upon request, to charge the jury with respect to the included offense.” (citing Mauricio, supra, 117 N.J. at 417-18, 568 A.2d 879)), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 328, 585 A.2d 345 (1990).
Failure to charge a legitimate lesser-included offense suffers from an additional infirmity. It presents the jury with a proverbial Hobson’s choice. “Unless a jury is told that it can convict the defendant of lesser[-]included offenses, it may be tempted to find [the] defendant guilty of a crime he or she did not commit simply because it prefers to convict on some crime rather than no crime at all.” State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 54, 618 A.2d. 316 (1993); see also Catherine L. Carpenter, The All-or-Nothing Doctrine in Criminal Cases: Independent Trial Strategy or Gamesmanship Gone Awry?, 26 Am. J.Crim. L. 257, 300 (1999) (“However well-intentioned the [defendant’s] trial strategy [ (not seeking the lesser charge) ], the failure to instruct on a provable lesser-included offense always subjects the defendant to the risk of an unwarranted conviction.”).
Here, given the compelling video evidence establishing that Cassady committed some crime, the jury was faced with an “ ‘all- or-nothing’ predicament[ ]”: without the choice of theft, it could only convict Cassady of robbery, or acquit him entirely. Short, supra, 131 N.J. at 54, 618 A.2d 316 (quoting State v. Muniz, 118 N.J. 319, 332, 571 A.2d 948 (1990)). He was thus improperly subjected to the risk of an unwarranted conviction.
*189For those reasons, and for the reasons expressed in Judge Grail’s thorough and thoughtful opinion, I would affirm the Appellate Division’s reversal of Cassady’s conviction.
Justices ALBIN and WALLACE join in this opinion.
For affirmance in paH/reversal in part/reinstatement—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS—4.
For affirmance—Justices LONG, ALBIN and WALLACE—3.