dissenting.
In passing the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A 30:4-27.24 to -27.38, the Legislature provided the Attorney General with a powerful tool for the protection of the public. The Legislature, however, inserted procedural safeguards in the Act to minimize the potential for its misuse. Under the SVPA, J.M.B. may be involuntarily committed as a “sexually violent predator” if there is a showing that he committed a “sexually violent offense” and there is a showing by clear and convincing evidence that he “suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes [him] likely to engage in acts of *602sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a).
I generally concur in the majority’s measured approach in construing the reach of the SVPA. I cannot agree, however, that the Legislature intended a standard other than proof beyond a reasonable doubt to establish a sexually violent offense, which triggers the potential for life-time involuntary commitment. For that reason, I must part from the majority.
The key issue in this case is whether J.M.B. was convicted of a sexually violent offense. For purposes of this ease, the SVPA provides two avenues for establishing a sexually violent offense. One avenue is for the Attorney General to show that J.M.B. was convicted of committing or attempting to commit such crimes as aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, certain kinds of kidnapping, and felony murder involving sexual assault. See N.J.S.A 30:4-27.26(a). No one disputes that a conviction of any of those enumerated sexually violent offenses must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The other avenue is for the Attorney General to establish that J.M.B. committed “any offense for which the court makes a specific finding on the record that, based on the circumstances of the ease, the person’s offense should be considered a sexually violent offense.” N.J.S.A 30:4r-27.26(b). In this category, the majority essentially contends that so long as there is a conviction of an offense, beyond a reasonable doubt, then the court may make a finding by clear and convincing evidence that “the person’s offense should be considered a sexually violent offense,” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(b).
I cannot conclude, particularly given the liberty interests at stake, that the Legislature has endorsed an illogical dichotomy in the burden of proof between the two statutory categories. According to the majority, in the first category, the crimes, which are clearly distinguishable as sexual offenses, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to trigger the SVPA. In the second category, if a person commits a crime that is not an enumerated sexual *603offense, then the court is allowed to designate the offense as sexual, for purposes of the SVPA, by a showing of clear and convincing evidence. Nothing in the wording of the statute suggests that the Legislature had that asymmetrical result in mind.
The only place in the statute where the Legislature indicates that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies is where the Attorney General must show that the person, who has committed a sexually violent offense, “needs continued involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator,” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a). To determine that a person “needs continued involuntary commitment” necessarily requires a finding — by clear and convincing evidence — that he “suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder” that makes him likely to be a repeat sexually violent offender unless “confined in a secure [rehabilitative] facility.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26.
Accordingly, I believe that the Legislature must have intended that the court’s “specific finding” that a non-enumerated offense is in fact a sexually violent offense be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. That is an interpretation that makes the most sense when viewing, in harmony, all the parts of the SVPA. It is also an interpretation that, I believe, would be consonant with the approach taken by the majority. Therefore, I would reverse the Appellate Division and remand this matter to the trial court to make a “specific finding” whether the Attorney General has satisfied the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt” that J.M.B.’s underlying offense is a sexually violent offense under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(b).
I therefore respectfully dissent.
Justice WALLACE joins in this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS-5.
For reversal — Justices ALBIN and WALLACE-2.