On Petition to Rehear
McAMIS, ’ P. J.Counsel for the Administratrices have filed an earnest petition to rehear seeking a reversal of our previous holding that the Bullington note for $4,318.50 is not barred by the statute of limitations of six years, and that the Administratrices failed to carry the burden of showing payment of the Easterly claim.
. In our original opinion we cited Bright v. Moore, 87 Tenn. 186, 10 S.W. 356, holding that under T.C.A. sec. 28-111 limitation statutes do not run during the six months period during which personal representatives are immune from suit. Petitioner argues that as T.C.A. sec. 30-1001 now contains the language “other than by filing of claims” no suit shall be brought until this period of immunity has run and since T.C.A. sec. 30-512 provides that the filing of claim arrests the running of limitations statutes, there is no reason to tack six-months to the applicable limitation period.
The argument is ingenious and has been ably presented. We are of opinion, however, it should be addressed to the Legislature, rather than to the courts. T.C.A. sec. 28-111; in express and unequivocal terms, provides that the period of six months that personal representatives are immune from suit “is not to be taken as a part of the time limited for commencing actions which lie against the personal representative.” The Legislature was here dealing specifically with the time within which suit may he brought. This statutory provision goes back to the Code of 1858.
In 1939, by what is now T.C.A. sec. 30-512, legislation was enacted providing that the filing of a claim *210against a decedent estate stops the running of the applicable statute of limitations. The Legislature could have, but did not, at that time repeal T.C.A. sec. 28-111. Both T.C.A. sec. 30-512 and T.C.A. sec. 28-111 are for the benefit of creditors and clearly, there is no conflict or repeal by implication which would warrant the Courts in disregarding the provisions of T.C.A. see. 28-111, as we are asked to do.
As to the Easterly claim, wé have concluded upon further consideration that it is completely out of harmony with the footing upon which experienced business men conduct their affairs to suppose that Mr. Myers would have endorsed notes to Mr. Easterly in payment of the notes he held without requiring surrender of the notes. The case might be different if he had issued his own check in payment for in that case he would have had his can-celled checks as evidence of payment. The quotations from 11 A.L.R.(2d) Bills and Notes, Section 971, contained in the brief is- not to the contrary. The text statement is merely to the effect that failure to require surrender of the instrument does not deprive the maker of the right to show payment. The evidentiary force of failure to do so is not covered in the citation.
For the. reason indicated, the petition to rehear must be denied.
Cooper and Parrott, JJ., concur.