dissenting.
I dissent to the majority’s conclusion that there was no evidence presented at trial to raise the issue of voluntary manslaughter.
Officer Johnson testified as follows concerning statements that appellant made to him during an interview at appellant’s parents’ house:
Q Why did [appellant] say he killed Mr. Elledge?
A You want me to start at the first?
Q Yes.
A He stated that he was home, that he took his daughter to school, had car trouble, came home, fixed his car, and he was waiting until lunch time to go to work, and he stated that he was inside his home, and Mr. Elledge came over and knocked on the door, and he went to the door and saw who it was and asked him in, and he said Mr. Elledge accused him, or told him he knew he had been going with his wife.
*377THE COURT: Excuse me a moment. When you relate this story, could you be more specific as to who the hes and hims are, as best you could, just use the names because after awhile we kind of hear outself [sic] coming back.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Paul Luck said he heard a knock at the door, and he went to the door and he saw Robert Elledge at the door, and Paul Luck asked Mr. Elledge — invited him into his home, into the living room area. Paul Luck said Robert Elledge told him that he had something he wanted to talk to him about, and Paul Luck asked Robert Elledge what this was, and Robert Elledge told Luck that he knew he had been going with his wife, Margie Elledge, and he stated that he pulled out a knife, and said he was going to kill him.
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Luck said who pulled out a knife, and who was going to kill him.
THE WITNESS: I am sorry. Paul Luck said Robert Elledge pulled out the knife and Robert Elledge told Paul Luck that he, Robert Elledge, was going to kill him, and stated he stabbed him once in the chest, at this time.
Q (BY MR. CHITWOOD) All right, what did he tell you happened after that?
A He stated — Paul Luck stated that he and Robert Elledge scuffled around in the living room, and that he ran through the kitchen into the bathroom to get his gun, and he stated he picked up his gun and looked around. He looked up and Robert Elledge was coming for him, and he said Robert Elledge took the pistol away from him and hit him in the head— Paul Luck stated he took the knife away from Robert Elledge and stabbed him one more time. Paul Luck stated that Robert Elledge dropped the pistol and Paul himself, Paul Luck picked the pistol up and shot him one time in the head, and stated that Robert Elledge fell to the bathroom floor.
Q All right, now, Officer, isn’t it a fact that Paul Luck told you that he was stabbed by Mr. Elledge?
A That’s correct.
Q And that thereafter, he went into the kitchen, hurriedly, of course, and found the butcher knife?
A That’s correct.
******
Q Do you know — did he tell you whether or not, at the time he shot El-ledge, whether he was standing up, sitting down or what position he was in?
A He said Robert Elledge was standing up when he shot him in the head.
Q Was standing up when he shot him in the head?
A That’s what he said.
Q In the bathroom?
A Yes, sir.
******
Q And had he not, during these conversations, told you that he was having an affair with Mrs. Elledge?
A He did.
Q And that he had reason to fear Mr. Elledge because of this?
A He didn’t say that he feared him, he called Mr. Elledge by name though.
Q Well, did he — incidentally, how big a man — you saw Mr. Elledge, how big a man would you estimate him to be from what you saw?
A From the standpoint of height and weight, it would just be purely a guess. I would say 245 to 250.
Q 245 to 250 pounds?
A Yes, sir, that would be my rough estimate.
In Ray v. State, 515 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), we stated:
The testimony of the defendant alone is sufficient to raise the issue [of murder without malice] and, once it is raised, the court, without determining the weight or the truth or falsity of the testimony is bound to submit the issue for jury determination. Lee v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 504 S.W.2d 504; Monroe v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 501 S.W.2d 639; McGee v. State, *378Tex.Cr.App., 473 S.W.2d 11; Lewis v. State, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 345, 231 S.W. 113. Where the issue of murder without malice is raised by the evidence, the fact that the evidence also raises the issue of self-defense and the accused is granted a requested instruction on the same does not deprive the accused of his right to an instruction on murder without malice. Monroe v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 501 S.W.2d 639; Lewis v. State, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 345, 231 S.W. 113.
The evidence in Ray showed that as a result of a disagreement the complainant attacked the defendant which led the defendant to fear for his life. The Court held that the issue of assault with intent to murder without malice was raised. We have reached the same conclusion in other cases that involved similar facts. See, e. g., Armentrout v. State, 515 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Monroe v. State, 501 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Lewis v. State, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 345, 231 S.W. 113 (1921).
The testimony of Officer Johnson shows that appellant was in immediate danger of losing his life at the hands of a man much larger than he. The man was clearly enraged about his wife’s affair with appellant. Anyone in appellant’s position would have been terrified for his life in the face of such a ferocious and determined attack. Photographs taken of appellant after the attack show multiple stab wounds on his head, chest, and left arm. To say that the evidence does not raise the issue of whether appellant killed Elledge under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, namely terror, is to wholly ignore the circumstances surrounding Elledge’s death. It is also to ignore the express terms of the voluntary manslaughter statute. See Section 19.04 of the Penal Code.
Appellant’s failure to testify that he was in fear for his life does not preclude a charge on voluntary manslaughter. This Court long ago held that it is not necessary that the accused testify to the passion that is required to establish the offense, so long as the facts in evidence raise the issue. Thompson v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 87, 256 S.W. 279 (1923); Steen v. State, 88 Tex.Cr.R. 256, 225 S.W. 529 (1920).
This case cannot be distinguished on its facts from Ray, supra, or its predecessors that I cited. The majority seems to be overruling these cases sub silentio.
I dissent.
ROBERTS and CLINTON, JJ., join in this opinion.