The opinion of the court was delivered by
Schkeiber, J.In a complaint filed with the Division of Civil Rights, Charles S. Lige charged the Town of Montclair with violating the Law Against Discrimination, N. J. S. A. 10:5-1 et seq., by refusing to hire him as a fireman because he was black. He averred that he had applied for a fireman’s position and had failed a written test taken on [November 6, 1971. This complaint was amended to allege that the testing and selecting procedures "are fair in form but discriminatory in operation” and to seek compensatory damages.
A second amended complaint, which incorporated the first amended complaint, added a second count in which the Director of the Division of Civil Rights claimed that the written employment examination had an unlawful discriminatory effect on black applicants and was not properly designed to measure the traits necessary for successful per*7formance of the duties of firemen and policemen.1 He also charged that the selection procedures were “unvalidated” and had an unlawful potential to discriminate against black applicants.
Another complaint was filed by the Director against Montclair alleging that on December 29, 1971, nine black police officers were denied promotions as a result of tests which were not professionally validated and had a disparate effect on minority candidates. Therefore, it was asserted the Town violated the Law Against Discrimination.
Both matters were heard at the same time before a designated Hearing Examiner. At the hearing Mr. Lige testified-that he had applied for the position of a Montclair fireman after having read a newspaper advertisement that an examination was to be given for police and firemen positions, although there were no openings in the fire department. Although Mr. Lige had graduated from an integrated high school in West Virginia and had also successfully completed one year of college, he failed the written test. Subsequently he found another job. Since no fireman had been added to the force, at the hearing Mr. Lige abandoned any claim for compensatory relief. The Hearing Examiner refused to permit questioning with respect to whether Lige would now or in the future accept a job with the Montclair Eire Department and of what, other than his educational background, his experience and training had consisted.
The Division produced one other witness, Mr. Carmen C'appadona, who had been a field representative for about two and a half years. As a result of his interviews with three screening board members (their function is explained below), he ascertained that in Fovember 1971, applicants for the police and fire departments were given the same written *8standardized personnel examination, known as the A¥onderlic test.2 It consisted of 50 questions testing vocabulary comprehension, computation of mathematical problems, and deductive reasoning and ascertaining items of general knowledge.
To pass, the applicant had to attain a minimum score of 17 points and be in the top 75% of those taking the exam. Mr. Cappadona stated that he had been told the test had not been professionally validated. He was not qualified to judge whether the test was job related and did not know if the test could have been validated. The only test he examined was the one given on November 6, 1971.
If the applicant passed the written examination and the investigation by the detective bureau verified the record data, he would be then interviewed by a screening board which consisted of a psychologist, the town attorney, a college professor, a public school principal and an investment broker. The board had not been given any guidelines to be followed in its screening process or evaluation. The applicant was asked why he wanted to be a policeman or fireman; if a policeman, what he would do if he had to arrest a friend; whether if he were married, tire hours of duty would cause any problems; and what personal injuries he had sustained. The board considered the applicant’s attitude and demeanor. It graded each applicant and its recommendations were .submitted to the Commissioner of Public Safety. The Commissioner, guided by no written standards, exercised an unrestricted discretion in making his choice.
The November 1971 test was taken by 58 men. It was not known who were black and who were white, so Mr. Cappadona eliminated approximately 12 to 15 whom he *9assumed were Caucasian because of their names, telephoned about 19 and attempted to visit 25 or 26. On this basis he concluded that 19 applicants were black and 39 white. Of the 3 blacks and 26 whites who passed the written test, 2 blacks and 10 whites did not survive the investigation made by the detective bureau and 2 whites were rejected by the screening board. The remaining 1 black and 6 of the 14 whites were appointed to the police department. Of the remaining white applicants 7 were placed on the police department waiting list. None was appointed to the fire department, but one was placed on the fire department waiting list.
As of June 1, 1972, there were 104 policemen, of whom 15 were black. The members of the police force had been hired at many different dates between December 1, 1936 and January 1, 1972. The blacks had been selected between May 15, 1940 and January 1, 1972. Since 1966, 9 of the 45 policemen employed had been black.
As of April 21, 1972, 3 of the 89 firemen were black. The employment of the 89 had commenced at various times between June 1, 1939 and October 19, 1971. Since 1970, only 3 had been hired, one of whom was black.
In 1970, Montclair had a population of 44,000, of which 12,000 were black. Of Essex County’s 930,000 inhabitants, about 280,000 were black.
Mr. Cappadona testified that the police promotion procedures in 1971 (he did not examine the procedures in other years) were generally comparable to the hiring practices. The employment ladder ascended from patrolman and detective to sergeant, lieutenant and captain. Detectives were selected without written examination. Of the 14 detectives, 4 were black. However, to become a police sergeant, lieutenant or captain, a written exam had to be taken. The same screening board interviewed the applicants and made recommendations to the Commissioner who again exercising his unbridled discretion chose the successful promotees.
*10The 1971 written examinations for promotion were prepared by the Commissioner. The questions were derived from tests used by the National and State Association of Police Chiefs, the Essex County Police Academy and from his own experience. Cappadona was told the questions had not been professionally validated. He had not studied the questions, but understood they were geared to circumstances in Montclair. Examination papers were not signed, but only carried a number so that the applicant’s identification remained unknown to the grader. A grade score of 70 was passing. The 1971 written exam for sergeant was failed by the 7 blacks who took it. Thirteen of the 29 whites passed. One black took the telst for lieutenant and one for captain. They received the lowest exam grades in their respective groups and were not promoted. In 1969, when 5 promotions were made, 3 were black. No promotions had been made since then until 1971.
Each applicant for a promotion had received job evaluation scores from his supervisors. These ratings, which were also considered in the promotion process, ranged from 58 to 87.5 for the patrolmen and detectives. The black policemen’s scores were between 58 and 81.3; 5 exceeded 70.
The five-man screening board’s interrogation was directed to indicia of leadership, ability, initiative and good judgment. No blacks were interviewed for a sergeant’s position since all had failed the written examination. Each black applicant had been screened for the lieutenant and captain vacancies.
In May 1972 a new Commislsioner of Public Safety was chosen. He testified that because of the complaints that had been filed with the Division, Dr. John Seymour, Chairman of the Psychology Department at Montclair State Teachers College, was requested to prepare and submit an examination to be used for hiring purposes. Dr. Seymour proposed the Revised Beta Examination, which then replaced the Wonder-lie telst. The new examination consisted of 6 tests, all of which were visual, that is, based on pictures and drawings. *11Each applicant was required to pass a physical examination. A new three-person screening committee had been designated to interview the applicants. The committee members had been furnished with specific criteria as guidelines. In 1973, there were 5 police vacancies and the new exam was given under the auspices of the college. The top 15 whose scores ranged down to 70 were selected. Only 2 blacks were in the group and one was hired. The Commissioner expressed his thoughts about selecting new employees:
* * * I think the best qualified men should be the ones appointed and hopefully a good percent of them would be black.
At the hearing the Town moved to dismiss Lige’s complaint because he had suffered no damages, had not shown any discrimination was practiced against him, and was not seeking any redress. The Town denied any discrimination in its hiring or promotions and moved for dismissal of the Division’s claims because it had failed to make out a prima facie ease.
The Hearing Examiner found that 67% of the whites and 16% of the blacks passed the employment exam in November 1971, and that 36% of the white and 6% of the black applicants were approved for hiring. As for promotions, no blacks in 1971 passed the written test for feergeant and 45% of the whites did. No blacks were promoted in 1972 and 32% of the whites were. The black population of Montclair was 27.2%, and of Essex County 30%, but only 14% of the police department and 3.4% of the fire department were black. The Hearing Examiner held that these percentages when “taken together with the administration of invalidated telsts,” which demonstrated a “disproportionately negative effect on blacks,” constitute a prima facie showing of discrimination and shifted the burden of going forward to the Town, although admittedly there had been no intentional discrimination by the Town.3 *12Since the Town did not affirmatively offer significant evidence to establish the job relatedness of the written hiring or promotional tests, he concluded that administration of the tests violated the Law Againist Discrimination.
*13The Hearing Examiner also found that neither the screening board nor the Commissioner had received any standards or guidelines by which to operate. He found the entire selection process discriminatory. He recommended that the Town be found guilty of violating N. J. S. A. 10:5-4 and 5:13(a), and that the Director find that Lige was denied an equal opportunity because of his race and that he be placed on the fire department waiting list. The Hearing Examiner suggested issuance of an order to cease and desist use of any examination which had not been professionally validated, of oral screening board interviews, and of the exercise of an absolute discretion in the Commissioner without effective standards and protections against racial discrimination. He also indicated that the Director’s order could require appropriate affirmative action to minimize "future effects of practices which have in the past resulted in racial discrimination.”
The Director adopted the Hearing Examiner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. He ordered discontinuance of all tests until professionally validated and approved by the Division. Oral interviews by the Examining Board in the hiring process were prohibited. He ordered that Charles Lige and all others who took the exam on November 6, 1971 were to be reconsidered for the position|s for which they applied, and that all black applicants who were denied promotion in 1971 were to be reevaluated. Nondiscriminatory selection and promotion methods were to be devised, subject to the Director’s approval.4 To remedy the past discrimination he provided:
Future appointments to the Montclair Fire Department shall be conducted on the following basis: One (1) qualified minority appli*14cant shall be selected for every one (1) qualified white applicant until the total number of minority officers on the Fire Department equals at least fifteen (15) persons.5
The order provided that all black applicants who had been denied promotions in the Police Department in 1971 were to be reevaluated in accordance with non-diseriminatory standards. The order stated that:
* r * Future promotions in the Montclair Police Department shall be made on the following basis:
One qualified Black applicant shall be promoted for every one qualified white applicant until 50% of those minority applicants deemed qualified by the re-evaluation have been promoted.
Montclair appealed from the entire order, but limited its appellate contentions to an appeal from the above quoted remedial portions of the order for the stated reason that Montclair had chosen to revise its selection and testing procedures. The Appellate Division reversed and we granted the Division’s petition for certification. 68 N. J. 490 (1975).
The Appellate Division distinguished between relief to a specific person or persons and a remedy on a "class quota basis.” It pointed out that "to rectify the wTongs of the past by a method of racial quotas which in itself invidiously discriminates against others * * * would defeat the very purpose of N. J. S. Á. 10:5-1 et seq., for which the Division was created, namely, to safeguard all individuals from invidious discrimination because of sex, race, color or creed.” Lige v. Town of Montclair, 134 N. J. Super. 277, 281-282 (1975). It held the Division had exceeded its statutory power, had violated the federal and state constitutions and therefore struck down the ratio remedies. Id. at 282.
*15Anti-discrimination principles are espoused in the New Jersey Constitution and the Law Against Discrimination, N. J. S. A. 10:5-1 et seq. Article I, par. 5 of the 1947 Constitution, which did not exist in the 1844 Constitution, states:
No person shall be * * * discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, * * * because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin.
'This provision should be evaluated in the light of its historical meaning. Under the 1844 Constitution an individual’s civil rights were not to be denied on account of his religious principles. Article I, par. 4. At the Constitutional Convention of 1947 the Joint Committee on Constitutional Bill of Rights reported to the Convention that “impairment of the basic truth of equality [had] manifested itself in the undemocratic practice of many employers to refuse employment to persons of certain racial or religious groups.” Ill Proceedings of 1947 Constitutional Convention at 344^345. The Committee, recognizing that the Legislature had enacted the Law Against Discrimination and desirous of eliminating any possible doubts of its constitutionality, stated that “[t]oday, the principal threats to the truth of equality are found in practices of discriminations because of race, color, religion or national origin in the fields of employment, education, enjoyment of property and pursuit of a livelihood in a business, trade or profession.” Id. at 345. It recommended that a new paragraph 5 be inserted in Article I which would include freedom from discrimination because of race, color, religion or national origin in obtaining employment.
The 'Committee acknowledged that distinctions based on race, color, religion or national origin were abhorrent to our democratic ideals and social conscience. It agreed wholeheartedly with Chief Justice Stone’s comment in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100, 63 S. Ct. 1375, 1385, 87 L. Ed. 1774, 1786 (1943) :
*16* * * Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.
The Law Against Discrimination, enacted in 1945, predated the Constitution by two years. The Legislature deemed that Law an exercise of the State’s police power to promote the general welfare and to fulfill the provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing civil rights. N. J. S. A. 10: 5-2. Those rights referred to in the Statute may he considered to be those spelled out in greater detail in the 1947 Constitution. It has been held that effectuation of the mandate in Article I, paragraph 5 has been implemented by the Law. Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Div. Against Discrimination, 31 N. J. 514, 524, appeal dismissed, 363 U. S. 418, 80 S. Ct. 1257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1515 (1960).
The Law pronounces that discrimination because of race, creed, national origin or color threatens not only individual rights and privileges but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic State. N. J. S. A. 10:5-3. All persons are to have the opportunity to obtain employment without such discrimination. N. J. S. A. 10:5-4. Any employer who refuses to hire or discriminates against an employee with respect to employment terms, conditions or privileges is guilty of an unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination. N. J. S. A. 10:5-12.
The act also provides that an aggrieved person may file with the Attorney General a verified complaint charging unlawful discrimination. N. J. S. A. 10:5-13. After investigation the Attorney General may conclude probable cause exists to support the allegations of the complaint and seek to resolve the matter by conciliation. If not amicably adjusted, he is to issue and serve a complaint in the name of the Division and a hearing is then to be held before the Division. The Commissioner of Labor and Industry is likewise empowered to make and file complaints. N. J. S. A. 10:5-13.
*17We have had occasion to acknowledge the strength of the public policy and the broad interpretation accorded the provisions of the statute. See Jackson v. Concord Company, 54 N. J. 113 (1969); Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N. J. 474, 484 (1973). In David v. Vesta Co., 45 N. J. 301, 327 (1965), we adverted to the fact that unlawful discrimination “is regarded as a public wrong and not merely the basis of a private grievance.”
The remedial powers, reflecting that strong public policy,’ authorize the Director to “issue and cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination and to take such affirmative action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, * * * or extending full and equal * * * privileges to all persons, as, in the judgment of the director, will effectuate the purpose of this act * * *.” N. J. S. A. 10 :5-17.
This broad remedial affirmative power includes the right to take positive action which will operate prospectively to eliminate and prevent unlawful discrimination. We have hitherto, for example, upheld orders that required the posting in housing projects of notices of the Director’s order prohibiting discrimination. These orders also required that pertinent data be constantly updated and submitted to the Division so that the Director could be assured that no unlawful discrimination in the housing project was being practiced. Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N. J. 399, 409-410 (1973). So, too, we have affirmed the validity of a rule requiring owners of multiple dwellings to file annual reports disclosing rentals and the identification of tenants. N. J. Builders, Owners and Managers Association v. Blair, 60 N. J. 330 (1972). In every case where the remedial authority of N. J. S. A. 10:5-17 has been used, the sanction has been applied to correct an injustice to an individual which has occurred and to be assured that no future discriminator acts will take place.
*18The act has never been construed to authorize melioration of the effects of past discrimination in favor of individuals against whom no discrimination has been practiced. The Division in its pamphlet, Employer Guide to the New Jersey Anti-Discrimination Law (1965) in a section entitled “Quotas and Qualifications” has also construed the Law Against Discrimination to prohibit racial quotas to remedy past discrimination. The following questions and answers are set forth in the brochure:
Q. Is it legal for an employer to make cm agreement with any group to hire a specific number of non-whites?
A. No. Such agreements are discriminatory in nature.
Q. Should an employer discriminate against white applicants in the belief that he is complying with either State or Federal Law?
A. There should be no discrimination either for or against groups of employees, but rather provision for equality of opportunity and fair treatment for all individual applicants. [Emphasis in original; at 5].
We find nothing in the legislative history which bespeaks an interpretation authorizing the dissolution of discriminatory consequences by a racial quota. The statutory language refers to future action to cure a wrong to an individual. It addresses itself with respect to persons generally, as distinguished from individuals against whom discrimination has been practiced, only in the sense of making certain that they will receive in the future full and equal privileges. This is not to say that some actions to eliminate or reduce the results of prior discrimination may not be appropriate to assist the extension of full and equal privileges to persons against whose class there has been discrimination. But the act does not empower the Division to accomplish that result by imposition of a racial quota.
The Director of the Division on Civil Rights and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, amicus curiae, argue that federal courts have construed Title YII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 to authorize racial quotas to remedy past injustices to a class in favor of individuals who had not been directly and ad*19versely affected. 42 U. S. Q. §§ 1981, 1983, 2000e-5(g). See Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F. 2d 9, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. den. 416 U. S. 957, 94 S. Ct. 1971, 40 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1974); Rios v. Enterprise Ass’n Steamfitters Loc. 638 of U. A., 501 F. 2d 622, 629-630 (2d Cir. 1974); Erie Human Relations Commission v. Tullio, 493 F. 2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F. 2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir.) (Fourteenth Amendment), cert. den. 419 U. S. 895, 95 S. Ct. 173, 42 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1974); United States v. Masonry Cont. Ass’n of Memphis, Inc., 497 F. 2d 871, 877 (6th Cir. 1974).
The federal courts, however, have not sweepingly accepted the racial quota remedy. The Second Circuit has limited use of quotas to situations where there has been a “clear-cut pattern of long-continued and egregious racial discrimination” and the effect of the reverse discrimination must not be “identifiable”, namely, that it may not be concentrated on a relatively small group of non-minority persons. Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 520 F. 2d 420, 427 (2d Cir.), reh. en banc den., 531 F. 2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975). The Kirlcland test has not been satisfied in this case. Montclair’s discrimination was unintentional and only the tests given in November 1971 were shown not to have been validated. A clear-cut pattern of long continued and egregious racial discrimination has not been established. Furthermore, the effect of the reverse discrimination at least with respect to promotions in the police department is directed against a small identifiable non-minority group.
Some federal courts have refused to sanction racial quotas to remedy past discriminatory promotion practices. See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 482 F. 2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. den. 421 U. S. 991, 95 S. Ct. 1997, 44 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1975), where the Court wrote with respect to promotions that “the imposition of quotas will obviously discriminate against those Whites who have embarked upon a police career with the *20expectation of advancement only to be now thwarted because of their color alone. The impact of the quota upon these men would be harsh and can only exacerbate rather than diminish racial attitudes.” [Id. at 1341]. See also Equal Employment Opportunity Com’n v. Local 638, 532 F. 2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976).
We note in passing that some Congressional history indicates that racial quotas were not to be permissible under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964) (memorandum of Senators Case and Clark); 110 Cong. Rec. 7218 (1964) (memorandum of Senator Clark); 110 Cong. Bee. 12723 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); 110 Cong. Rec. 14331 (1964) (remarks of Senator John J. Williams); N. Clazer, Affirmative Discrimination 44-45 (1975); see also 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(j). See dissenting opinion of Judge Hays in Rios v. Enterprise Ass’n Steamfitters Loc. 638 of U. A., 501 F. 2d at 634, and concurring opinion of Judge Feinberg in Equal Employment Opportunity Com’n v. Local 638, 532 F. 2d at 833.
Two recent cases have rejected the use of quotas as appropriate affirmative action under the Federal Civil Rights Act. In Flanagan v. President and Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D. D. C. 1976), use of a quota to distribute scholarship funds as part of an affirmative action program under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act-of 1964 was rejected. The District Court held that:
While an affirmative action program may be appropriate to ensure that all persons are afforded the same opportunities or are considered for benefits on the same basis, it is not permissible when it allocates a scarce resource (be it jobs, housing or financial aid) in favor of one race to the detriment of others. [-Td. at 384].
In Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth University, 415 F. Supp. 673 (E. D. Va. 1976), the court refused to permit the federally subsidized defendant university to discriminate against the plaintiff applicant- for a teaching position on *21the ground of sex where defendant was attempting to compensate for past deficiencies. To correct the imbalance in this manner would violate Title YII. The court concluded that “[r]elianee upon such discriminatory practices to achieve ‘quotas’ or ‘goals’ is the use of an unconstitutional means to achieve an unconstitutional end.” [Id. at 680],
We are satisfied that the federal statute and the federal judicial interpretations which sanction racial quotas and discriminations against persons because of race are not apposite.6
The Director, to rectify a racial imbalance in the' Montclair Police and Eire Departments, adopted two racial quotas. One-half of future appointments to the fire department had to consist of qualified blacks until there were 15 blacks in the department. Promotions in the police department required that one qualified black be promoted for every qualified white until 50% of the qualified blacks, whose promotions had been rejected in 1971, had been advanced.
The Director’s orders granted priorities to black applicants and employees vis-a-vis others (assuming the minimum standard is met) without regard to the particular training, experience, and education of each applicant. Tt may be significant that only two blacks were in the top 15 of those who took the Revised Beta Test which, we were advised on oral argument, has been approved by the Division, The lack of some basic educational prerequisites such as the ability to read 'and understand may have resulted in failure. Equality of opportunity in employment will become more realistic when co-equality of opportunity in education exists. Lowering the standards for the Montclair Police *22and Eire Departments is not the solution. See N. Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination 51-66 (1975).
Although the new examination procedures for hiring and promotions are to be non-discriminatory, the order permits a less qualified black to be employed or promoted over a more qualified white.7 The inconsistency of applying nondiscriminatory methods of employee selection and then disregarding those methods on racial grounds is apparent. Inherent in the Division’s orders is a rejection of the concept that the more or most qualified should be hired and promoted. This rejection violates the fundamental precept in a democratic society that merit, not skin color, should determine an individual’s place- in society. Judge Smith in Equal Employment Opportunity Com’n v. Local 638, 532 F. 2d at 827, put it succinctly: “. . . ‘reverse discrimination’ contradicts our basic assumption that individuals are to be judged as individuals, not as members of particular racial groups.”8 Racial criteria squarely contradict the express and unambiguous language in Article 1, par. 5 of our Constitution.
In Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N. J. Super. 116 (Ch. Div. 1954), Justice Sullivan, then sitting as a Chancery Judge, struck down as violative of that constitutional provision a policy of the City of Elizabeth which applied a quota sys*23tem to determine the number of black occupants who were permitted to live in a public housing project. The quota limited black occupants to the percentage of black population in the City. Justice Sullivan pointedly wrote:
The evil of a quota system is that it assumes that Negroes are different from other citizens and should be treated differently. Stated another way, the alleged purpose of a quota system is to prevent Negroes from getting more than their share of the available housing units. However, this takes for granted that Negroes are only entitled to the enjoyment of civil rights on a quota basis. [Id. at 119].
The eventual survival of any form of government necessarily depends on the equal apportionment of the rights and privileges of citizenship as well as its obligations and duties among all its citizens irrespective of race, color or creed. Such a principle has long since been the keystone of our national and state form of government. [Id. at 121].
Curing an illegally imposed racial discrimination against an individual is understandable and justifiable — but race is not an appropriate standard to apply on a class basis. The contention that the racial quotas imposed by the Director have a benign design to correct the wrongs of the past misses the point. As a matter of wisdom no one can quarrel with the overall purpose. It is the method which is pernicious. It is the racial classification irrespective of qualification that mandates its invalidation. Surely the proposed quota system is not benign to a more qualified white applicant who may be denied a job or promotion.
For is the discrimination any less invidious whether the non-minority person has been subjected to racial discrimination because the policy was in effect for a day, a month or years or whether he is one of a small' identifiable class or an indefinite large group. The white, who has not been hired on the Montclair Eire Department or promoted in the Montclair Police Department because he was white and not black, could unquestionably charge in a complaint with the Division "unlawful discrimination” and an "unlawful employment practice” because of racial discrimination under *24N. J. S. A. 10:5-12 a. The paradoxical' position of the Director is manifest. He cannot and should not use the very criteria which the Legislature and the Constitution have condemned as a remedial device. It is important to recognize the difference between rectifying a racially improperly constituted school, Jenkins v. Tp. of Morris School District and Bd. of Ed., 58 N. J. 483 (1971), for no one has a right to attend a segregated school; whereas an applicant for a job or a promotion has a right to be considered and judged irrespective of race.
Conceptually, use of the quota to right past wrongs raises the spectre of the interest of each minority. The protections of the New Jersey Constitution and the Law Against Discrimination are not restricted to blacks. We are a state of minorities. Is the composition of the Montclair Police Department to be measured against the population ratio of each minority group and, if imbalance be found, which assuredly will be the case for many groups, should a quota be used to “correct” the balance? Judge Halpern commented in the Appellate Division opinion below:
* * * We pride ourselves as a nation on the “mix” of our people wherein history has proven our strength lies. But that “mix” is comprised not only of blacks, but of Poles, Jews, Scandinavians, Italians, Puerto Ricans, Hungarians, Cubans, Germans and others too numerous to list. It is one thing for the Division to find that a given person has been discriminated against and give him relief. See Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N. J. 399 (1973). But when it fashions a remedy on a class quota basis, it leads to insoluble problems and piles discrimination on top of discrimination. [134 N. J. Super. 277, 281 (1975)].
It has been said that a racial quota is particularly invidious when applied to matters involving intellectual competency and capacity.9 A racial quota is derogatory of and *25patronizing to the intended beneficiary minority. Professor Thomas Sowell' in his book, Black Education, Myths and Tragedies 292 (1972), writes:
[T]he actual harm done by quotas is far greater than having a few incompetent people here and there — and the harm that will actually be done will be harm primarily to the black population. What all the arguments and campaigns for quotas are really saying, loud and clear, is that black people just don’t have it, and that they will have to be given something in order to have something. The devastating impact of this message on black people — particularly black young people • — • will outweigh any few extra jobs that may result from this strategy. Those black people who are already competent, and who could be instrumental in producing more competence among this rising generation, will be completely undermined, as black becomes synonymous — in the minds of black and white alike ■ — ■ with incompetence, and black achievement becomes synonymous with charity or payoffs.
In carrying out the Division’s overall functions, it may be appropriate for the Director to- consider methods to extend full and equal privileges to blacks who desire to join the Montclair Eire and Police Departments. Some means are available, though more time-consuming and more difficult than application of reverse discrimination. Eor example, in addition to the use of objective criteria and fair testing, the Town might attempt to obtain more qualified black candidates by alerting black students in colleges and recent high school graduates of the job opportunities before the next examination. A short course to familiarize the applicants with the nature and type of examination could be sponsored. See, e. g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 319 (8th Cir. 1971), modified on rehearing, 452 F. 2d 327 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. den. 406 U. S. 950, 92 S. Ct. 2045, 32 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1972). Some other modus operandi may be fashioned by the Town and the Division. Vacancies in the departments will occur and. the imbalance due to the unintentional discrimination will ultimately be rectified.
In view of our holding herein we have not addressed ourselves to the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment *26to the Federal Constitution, and whether a “compelling state interest,” if applicable, has been demonstrated. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 333, 341-344, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 1714, 1718-1719, 40 L. Ed. 2d 164, 178, 182-185 (1974), wherein he comments that racial classification necessitates the strictest scrutiny under the equal protection clause; Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N. Y. 2d 326, 384 N. Y. S. 2d 82, 348 N. E. 2d 537 (1976); Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973) (strict scrutiny test not satisfied); Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School District, 357 F. Supp. 248 (N. D. Cal. 1972). In Bakke v. Regents of University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 553 P. 2d 1152 (1976), stay granted, — U. S. -, 97 S. Ct. 373, 50 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U. S. L. W. 3437 (U. S. Dec. 14, 1976) (No. 76-811), the California Supreme Court found that a school admissions program which set aside 16 class openings for disadvantaged minorities was invalid because the procedure could result in acceptance of minority students whose qualifications were inferior to white applicants, that the discrimination was invidious, and that the compelling state interest criteria were not satisfied.
A quota creates castes and divides society. It is particularly abhorrent where we are striving for an equality in society in which race is totally irrelevant. A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 (1973).
We find that the remedial provisions in the Director’s order are violative of Article I, par. 5 of the State Constitution and beyond the power entrusted to the Director in N. J. S. A. 10:5-17. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. .
N. J. S. A. 10:5-16 empowers the director to “reasonably and fairly” amend any complaint. In addition to aggrieved persons, the Commissioner of Labor and Industry, the Attorney General, or the Commissioner of Education may file complaints. N. J. S. A. 10:5-13.
The Town noted the hearsay nature of this evidence, but did not contest its admissibility. All relevant evidence is admissible in hearings before the Division. See N. J. A. C. 13:4-12.8(b) and N. J. S. A. 10:5-16.
The Hearing Examiner referred to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849, 28 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1971), which held that *12under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15, the Wonderlie test in the absence of evidence relating it to job performance was inadequate. For a criticism of the burden placed on employers to prove test validations see Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Howv. L. Rev. 1109, 1127, 1128, 1130 (1971). All applicants took the same examination and its lack of job relatedness does not necessarily support a finding that the test was racially discriminatory. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976), where the Court held that the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not violated even though the number of black police officers was not proportionate to population mix and the qualifying written examination, which four times as many blacks failed as whites, was not validated. See also Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973), where the court commented :
* ** * A population comparison ignores the fact that all segments of the population may not be equally qualified for the positions in question, Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203 (S. D. N. Y. 1971), and different groups within the population may have different levels of desire for the particular job, Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971). And most importantly, acceptance of the idea that discrepancies between racial composition of the community and the plant or department alone make out a prima facie case of discrimination leads inevitably toward a narrowing of the Court’s options in fashioning a remedy. If the problem is to be demonstrated by the mere fact of a discrepancy, then the solution logically must amount to an order to bring the employment statistics into line with the population statistics, lest the Court mandate a continuing prima facie violation. Hiring in that manner in the first instance is not required by law. No citizen has a constitutional right to have public employees perfectly reflect the racial composition of the hiring unit. Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971), modified 459 F. 2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 5 FEP cases 142 (4th Cir. 1972). And courts must be careful not to give credence to such misconceptions through their evidentiary requirements. To hold that a discrepancy between the employment population and the community population is prima facie a violation of law would not be wise, and it is not required. [Id. at 1193-1194n. 5],
Whether Lige’s complaint should have been sustained is questionable since he did not seek any monetary award, no fireman’s position had been filled, and the record is not clear on Lige’s willingness to accept the position since the Hearing Examiner refused to permit examination along these lines.
The order does not provide for the contingency which might arise if there were an insufficient number of qualified minority applicants to fill the vacancies.
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273, 96 S. Ct. 2574, 49 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1976) the Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was applicable to whites who had been discriminated against in favor of a black, but it did not consider the impact of an affirmative action program. The Court wrote that the act is “not limited to discrimination against members of any particular race.”
The Montclair policemen and firemen are not subject to the Civil Service Act. A racial quota device for public employees under civil service may well conflict with constitutional and statutory provisions. Reference is made to Art. 7, § 1, par. 2 of the Constitution which requires appointments and promotions in the civil service of the State, and of such political subdivisions as may be provided by law, to be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination, which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive. N. J. S. A. 11:10-6.1 of the Civil Service Act requires the appointing authority to certify that a promotion or hiring was “not done by reason of race, color, political faith, creed, national origin, ancestry . . . .”
In that case the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals struck down use of a racial ratio for acceptance into a union apprenticeship program.
Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, a noted psychologist and sociologist, is quoted in an interview as having said: “For blacks to be held to lower standards, different standards or in some eases no standards is a most contemptible form of racism.” Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1971.