MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JOEL PELOPSKY, Bankruptcy Judge.In this case debtor has moved to disqualify and remove the trustee by reason of the language of Rule 5002, Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. That Rule provides that:
“No person may be appointed as a trustee or examiner or be employed as an attorney, accountant, appraiser, auctioneer, or other professional person pursuant to § 327 or § 1103 of the Code if (1) the person is a relative of any judge of the court making the appointment or approving the employment or (2) the person is or has been so connected with any judge of the court making the appointment or approving the employment as to render such appointment or employment improper. Whenever under this rule a person is ineligible for appointment or employment, the person’s firm, partnership, corporation, or any other form of business association or relationship, and all members, associates and professional employees thereof are also ineligible for appointment or employment.”
The Court finds that there are no disputes of material fact, that no hearing is necessary and that the issue may be resolved on the pleadings and briefs of the parties and of the United States which has intervened.
The Court takes judicial notice of the following facts:
(1) The trustee is a member of the panel of trustees of this court, having been so *483selected by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts pursuant to powers granted the Director by § 604(f) of Title 28, U.S.C.
(2) The trustee was selected by an employee of the office of the Clerk of this bankruptcy court by determining which member of the panel was eligible for appointment in this asset case. The trustees are appointed in asset cases on a rotating basis and a trustee is eligible generally when his last appointment in such a case is prior to the time any other trustee was appointed.
(3) No judge of the bankruptcy court is consulted when such an appointment is made.
(4) The order of appointment is executed by the Clerk of the court or her designee using a signature stamp of the judge who draws the case, again by rotation selection.
(5) The trustee in this case is a member of a firm in which another member is a son of a sitting bankruptcy judge of this district.
I
Prior to the effective date of Rule 5002 which was August 1, 1983, the rule on prohibited appointments was Rule 505 which provided that:
“(a) Appointment or Employment of Relative of or Person Connected with Judge or Referee. No person may be appointed as trustee, receiver, marshal, or appraiser or employed as accountant or auctioneer in a bankruptcy case (1) if he is a relative of any judge or referee of the court making the appointment or authorizing the employment, or (2) if he is so connected with any judge or referee of the court making the appointment or authorizing the employment as to render such appointment or employment improper.
(b) Disqualification of Judge or Referee from Acting in Case: Relationship to Party or Attorney; Interest in Case; Appearance of Influence. Any judge or referee shall disqualify himself in any bankruptcy case (1) in which he is a relative of any party or his attorney, has a substantial, direct or indirect interest, has been of counsel, or is or has been a material witness, or (2) if his acting therein would justify the impression that any person can improperly influence him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, position, or influence of any party or other person, (c) Disqualification of Judge or Referee from Authorizing Employment of Attorney. Any judge or referee shall disqualify himself from authorizing the employment and from determining the compensation of (1) a relative as an attorney in a bankruptcy case, or (2) an attorney in a bankruptcy case if the judge or referee is so connected with the attorney as to render it improper for him to authorize such employment”.
Rule 505(a) prohibited appointment as trustee, receiver, marshal or appraiser- as well as employment as accountant or auctioneer of a person who’ was “a relative of any judge or referee of the court making the appointment”. The fair reading of the provision was to the effect that no judge or referee could appoint to any of the named positions a relative of any judge if all the appointing officers sat on the same court as, for example, judges of a multi-judge district.
But a relative could serve as attorney in bankruptcy matters, even as attorney for the trustee. See the advisory committee note to Rule 505. The language of Rule 505(a) did not prohibit the appointment or employment as attorney of a relative of any judge of the court, but only barred the related judge from authorizing employment or approving compensation. Rule 505(c).
The revision of the Rule broadened its reach. The prohibitions contained in Rule 505(a) were carried over but redefined and enlarged. Under Rule 5002 no relative of any judge of the court could be appointed as trustee or examiner or employed as attorney, accountant, appraiser, auctioneer or other professional person. In addition the last sentence of the Rule extends the ineli*484gibility to the relative’s “firm, partnership ... or any other form of business association
Attorneys were added to the group of categories from which relatives were barred. The class prohibited from serving is enlarged beyond blood lines to include persons involved in certain types of business relationships with the relative. In the instance before the Court the trustee sought to be removed is a law partner of a relative of a judge of the court. The plain language of Rule 5002 prohibits such an appointment.
II
Various sections of the Bankruptcy Code apply to trustees. Section 321 provides that “[a] person may serve as trustee in a case under this title only if such person is — (1) an individual that is competent to perform the duties of trustee and, in a case under chapter 7 ... resides or has an office in the judicial district within which the case is pending ... ”. The trustee here has served for many years in that capacity. He has an office in this judicial district.
There is no suggestion that the word “competent” is used as a term of art as, for example, it is used in mental health statutes. Rule 209, Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, In re Leader Mercantile Co., 36 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.1929); Matter of Chapter 13 Cases, 19 B.R. 713 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1982); In re Parr, 3 B.R. 692 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y.1980). A person may be competent to perform the duties of the trustee even though he might not be eligible. The trustee here is competent.
Section 322 provides for qualification of a trustee once selected. The prerequisite is that the person selected post a bond in the amount required by the court with sufficient surety. Section 701 provides for the appointment of an interim trustee who is a disinterested person. Section 702 sets forth procedures for the election of a trustee by creditors. Section 1104 permits appointment of a trustee in a reorganization case. Section 1302(d) authorizes appointment of a standing trustee in the district to manage Chapter 13 cases. None of these statutory provisions prohibits appointment of a person who has a business relationship with a person who is himself ineligible to be appointed by reason of consanguinity.
The thrust of Rule 5002 as it applies to the facts here is the suggestion that being related to a judge taints both the court on which the judge sits and the firm in which the relative works so that judicial colleagues and law partners cannot be relied upon to obey the canons of ethics and laws which prescribe their conduct. See the advisory committee note to Rule 5002.
Prior to the promulgation of this Rule the conduct of a judge in situations where there was potential conflict was left to the sound discretion of the individual judge with certain narrow exceptions. Section 455, Title 28, U.S.C., Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.1963); McNellis v. Dubnoff, 285 F.Supp. 563 (D.C.N.D.N.Y.1968). In Matter of Horton, 621 F.2d 968 (9th Cir.1980), the court ruled that the presence at debtor’s trial of a judge who had disqualified himself from hearing the case was not coercive upon the judge presiding. Apparently the revisers of the Rule thought consanguinity more invidious than actual presence. See also Centre, etc., v. Mabey, 19 B.R. 635 (D.C. Utah 1982).
Section 458 of Title 28, U.S.C., prohibits appointments or employment of a relative of any judge of a court to any office or duty in such court. This statute existed side by side with Rule 505 which, as noted above, clearly permits a relative of a judge to serve as attorney (an officer of the court) in cases pending in that court. There are no decisions interpreting the statute as it applies to bankruptcy practice, but a fair conclusion seems to be that Section 458 does not prohibit relatives of judges from practicing in certain roles in the bankruptcy court. In addition, prior to the adoption of Rule 5002, there was a presumption that practitioners would not be tainted by association with a relative of a judge.
Ill
There is nothing in the advisory committee notes to suggest that the bank*485ruptcy system has less integrity after August 1, 1983, than it contained before that date. The extension then of the prohibition against appointments must be based upon conjecture that such extension is necessary to avoid abuse. The practice before this Court provides no evidence to support such a conclusion.
The newly adopted Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure contain safeguards against abuse. Rule 2013(a) requires a proportioning of appointments of trustees to avoid disparity of compensation. Rule 2013(b) requires the clerk to maintain a public record of fees paid trustees. In a non-asset case the fee paid the trustee is set. Section 330(b) of the Code. In an asset case the trustee’s fee is calculated by formula, Section 326(a) of the Code, and must be approved by the court after notice to creditors and an opportunity for hearing.
At the same time appointments to the panel of trustees are limited to enable the panel trustees to earn certain minimum levels of income. The Director of the Administrative Office recognizes and abets this policy decision. Thus, limited access to certain aspects of the bankruptcy practice, deplored by the Commission and the Congress, are perpetuated by statute.
In its intervenor’s brief the United States makes essentially two arguments. One is that there is no constitutionally protected right to be a trustee. The second is that the rule is a rational safeguard against prior vices. The United States concedes, however, that among rights constitutionally protected are freedom of association, the right to engage in a particular profession or activity and where “participation in an occupation or activity has been foreclosed entirely or where future opportunities have been frustrated through injury to profession or reputation”. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
The Rule does infringe upon the right of association. It does infringe on the right to engage in a particular activity. Future opportunities are frustrated through injury to profession and reputation. The impact of the Rule is that one may be a partner in a law firm where a relative of a bankruptcy judge is also a member, but one cannot then be a trustee. The suggestion made by the United States that the party can withdraw from such association is facile. Such associations, as law partnerships, are not arranged or destroyed based upon eligibility to be a bankruptcy trustee.
In such an association, the affected party could not be a trustee. Thus his right to engage in a particular activity is infringed. But it would appear that such an affected person could be elected trustee as there is no requirement in the statute, Section 702 of the Code, that the Court make an order of appointment. Official Form 23 contemplates an order approving the election but there is no such statutory requirement. Clearly, though, the Court could not approve the final settlement because that would allow the trustee compensation. Nor could such an elected trustee make application to appoint himself as attorney even though such a procedure is clearly contemplated by the Code, Section 327(d), because the appointing order is clearly prohibited by the Rule.
Future activities are frustrated. The trustee must be a resident of the state served by the court or an adjacent state. Section 604(f), Title 28, U.S.C. As a practical matter the trustee is only appointed for a judicial district which may encompass less than a state. For equally practical purposes a panel trustee rarely serves outside the division of the Court in which he resides or has his office. At remuneration of $20 per case, travel is not economical. Thus, a person disqualified from serving in the judicial district in which he has an office has little or no opportunity to be appointed in another jurisdiction.
In its brief the United States contends that “a trustee in bankruptcy is appointed merely on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the trustee in this case has no judicially protect-able expectation whatsoever that he will be appointed to serve in any given ease in the future”. This is not an accurate recitation of the facts. After the trustee is appointed *486to the panel he is regularly appointed to cases on a rotation basis. The number of appointments is limited to maximize income. A panel trustee may only be removed for cause. Section 604(f), Title 28, U.S.C. Thus, once appointed, and absent cause, the trustee has a very real expectation of further appointments. The Court can only remove a trustee in a particular case, Section 324 of the Code, but may not remove a trustee from the panel. The Court may only recommend such removal to the Director of the Administrative Office.
A provision that a person may be removed from a position only “for cause” carries with it connotations of a removal procedure cloaked with protections of due process. There must be “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).
“What the Constitution does require is an opportunity ... granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner ... for a hearing ... That the hearing required by due process is subject to waiver, and is not fixed inform does not affect its root requirement that an individual be given an opportunity for hearing before he is deprived of any significant property in-interest . .. ”. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971).
See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).
In the particular case here the Rule creates an irrebuttable presumption that the trustee is not qualified to perform his duties in this jurisdiction. Compare Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63, (1973). Such presumptions are not favored. No matter what the character of the trustee, he cannot overcome the presumption. In Vlandis, supra, the Court struck down a state statute branding certain students as non-residents throughout their academic career without regard to the true state of their residency. There was no procedure for challenging the classification. The United States, in its brief here, concedes that the statute in Vlandis would not pass substantive due process review.
The United States attempts to distinguish the line of cases typified by Vlandis, supra, including Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) and Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 93 S.Ct. 2832, 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973), by contending that they rest upon equal protection grounds. But it is also clear that the initial objection must be to the absence of any procedure for testing the classification. A statute which prohibits proof to the contrary is a denial of due process. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). What follows, after a due process hearing, is the conclusion that the classification is invidious and a denial of equal protection.
Equal protection constraints do not apply against the United States. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971). But “a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification” may well be a denial of due process. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960).
Promulgation of the Rule, in the context of this case, constitutes a denial of due process. The trustee here has certain vested rights by virtue of his membership on the panel of trustees. He may not be deprived of those rights without notice and hearing. Shaw v. Hospital Authority of Cobb County, 507 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.1975). Remedies for misconduct cannot be imposed by ignoring fundamental constitutional rights. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963).
IV
The restriction in Rule 5002 against associates is both arbitrary and irrational. *487It purports to eliminate the appearance of impropriety by banning not only the appointment of relatives of judges but also persons associating with such relatives. As the Court has pointed out above, this bar would not prevent the person tainted by association from being elected a trustee. The Rule goes far beyond statutory qualifications and is not consistent with those qualifications. Sections 321 and 322 of the Code.
In describing and circumscribing the rational basis test, the Supreme Court has established balancing considerations. “What legitimate [governmental] interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?” Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1405, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972). In Stanley v. Illinois, supra, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the convenience of a presumption was constitutionally sound in view of the fact that more precise tests were available. The “Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency”. 405 U.S. at 656, 92 S.Ct. at 1215.
More precise tests are available here. Attorneys may move to disqualify a judge or remove a trustee if fairness becomes an issue. The Director of the Administrative Office may remove a trustee for cause and appears to be the sole determiner of whether an applicant is appointed to the panel in the first instance. The prohibition contained in the Rule is not effective as is pointed out herein. It invades and diminishes fundamental rights and is not constitutionally defensible. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976).
Despite its supposedly broad prophylactic purpose the Rule has already been held not to apply to relatives of judges of the District Court. In re Hilltop Sand & Gravel, 33 B.R. 839, 11 B.C.D. 3 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1983), reversed on appeal, In re Hilltop Sand & Gravel, 35 B.R. 412, 11 B.C.D. 377 (D.C.N.D.Ohio 1983).
In reversing, the District Court held that the District Court was not the court identified in Rule 5002. Leaving aside interesting questions arising out of the referral jurisdiction by which bankruptcy courts receive cases, consider only the appearing of impropriety. At the present time the District Court recommends the appointment of bankruptcy judges for the respective districts. The District Court exercises appellate jurisdiction generally, including the review of fee allowances. The District Court may sign orders in related proceedings arising out of case administration. The District Court can withdraw, on its own motion, a case from the Bankruptcy Judge. The appearance of impropriety survives the separation of courts.
There are safeguards in both the Code and the Rules, beyond the restrictions contained in Rule 5002, that insure a fair distribution of cases among trustees and adequate disclosure of fees earned. The judges of the bankruptcy court no longer select trustees and do not appoint them on a case by case basis. In a rare instance, as when a case is converted from reorganization to liquidation, the Court could appoint. But more often the selection is made from the panel with the next eligible person being chosen. In approximately four years on the bench, this writer has knowingly made four or five appointments. In the same period of time this Court has processed about 24,-000 estates in which trustees were appointed. Annual Reports of the Administrative Office. Clearly the appearance of impropriety, given such numbers, is less than a needle in a haystack.
Admittedly the bankruptcy trustees and the bankruptcy bar, in any particular judicial district, comprise a small group. This is neither the fault of the courts nor the bar. Likewise, other specialized bars are small in numbers. But it is only in the bankruptcy area, where the court must make many ministerial appointments, that the prohibition of association prevails. Relatives of judges of other courts may practice in those courts.
*488The extension of the Rule 5002 prohibition to persons associating with a judge’s relative is tantamount to disbarment of those associates in the bankruptcy court. There is no such restriction in the United States District Court. In addition it is disbarment without due process, a procedure much condemned. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968); Theard v. U.S., 354 U.S. 278, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957).
The committee note suggests the extension is necessary if the policy is to be “meaningfully implemented”. The Court is aware of the fact that the committee was divided on this issue. The Court is also aware that the creation of trustee panels was intended to eliminate abuse. But the reference to “bankruptcy rings” refers to the attorneys who practice before the bankruptcy courts. Other than condemning the small numbers, the evidence of misconduct is only semantic. The complaints come from non-bankruptcy lawyers. Commission Report, H.R.Doc. No. 93-137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Par. I at 93 and 109 (1973) reprinted in App. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy (15th Ed.) and the House Report Accompanying H.R.8200, H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, p. 5787, at 88 ff, reprinted in App. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy (15th Ed.). Cannot the same complaints be made against members of the anti-trust or tax bars by attorneys not specializing in those areas? There is no evidence in either report that suggests that the sins lie with associates of relatives of bankruptcy judges. There is no rational relationship between the prohibition and the vice.
The Rule reaches incongruous results. A debtor may select his own attorney but if that attorney is tainted by an association, he may not represent that debtor in a Chapter 11 reorganization because the Court must approve the selection of the attorney. Section 327 of the Code. Similarly a creditor’s committee could not select such a person as its attorney. Section 1103 of the Code. In a Chapter 7 asset case, the tainted attorney could not collect a fee if it had to be approved by the Court. A creditor, entitled to attorney fees because of its ov-ersecured status, might not be allowed to collect them if represented by an attorney of its own choosing who was tainted by association. Strangely enough Rule 5004 contemplates fee awards for persons who are barred from appointment under Rule 5002. There is no reference in either rule to the inconsistency. While the question of attorney eligibility is not before the Court, this analysis buttresses the determination that extension of the Rule to bar the appointment of persons associating with a judicial relative is irrational.
V'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 2075 of Title 28, U.S.C., the Supreme Court has the power to make rules for “practice and procedure in cases under Title 11. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right”. There is a presumption that the Supreme Court acts constitutionally in promulgating rules but the rule cannot exceed a grant of federal authority. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965); Section 2075, Title 28, U.S.C. There is no authority to promulgate a rule which operates as here, to deprive a person of a right without due process or which exceeds the narrow mandate set out in Section 2075. In re Itel Corp., 17 B.R. 942 (Bkrtcy.App. 9th Cir. 1982).
The Rule establishes an irrebuttable presumption that persons associated with a relative of a bankruptcy judge create an environment in the bankruptcy system which causes judges and lawyers involved in such an environment to lose their integrity. But that integrity is instantly restored if the tainted person moves to the adjoining judicial district to practice or takes only those bankruptcy cases where a judge makes no appointing or approving orders. How does this remove the air of impropriety, as for example in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, sitting in Manhattan and Brooklyn where undoubtedly the same bankruptcy bar practices in *489both districts? At the same time the Court notes that there is a single judicial district in 27 states and firms tainted by the association are effectively disbarred in those entire states because the appointing court is statewide.
Irrebuttable presumptions are not favored. Vlandis v. Kline, supra. The presumption here, as has already been shown, is arbitrary and violative of due process. It is based upon an assumption that bankruptcy judges favor one another’s relatives or those relative’s associates who practice before them. Supposing the bankruptcy judges do not like each other? Why is not the same reasoning true at the District Court level where there are numerous opportunities for judges to award fees in situations which, if they occurred in the Rule 5002 context, would involve tainted associations? See, for example, Sections 2412 of Title 28, U.S.C. and 1988 of Title 42, U.S.C.
As the Court has stated before, it is no one’s fault that the bánkruptcy bar is small. Nor is it anyone’s fault that creditors generally are not interested in being active in the administration of cases. Creditor interest is a function of economics. All of the legislation in the world is not going to change either the size of the bankruptcy bar or the amount of creditor interest. In the vast majority of cases creditors recover nothing. They will, therefore, not invest much time, effort or funds in finding out that truth.
Nor does the extension of the Rule eliminate the so-called “bankruptcy rings”. Most lawyers do not practice bankruptcy law extensively because they have few clients involved in bankruptcy matters. This rule will not change that fact. The notion that bankruptcy lawyers are in cahoots with the judge and each other is patent nonsense. There is as much integrity in this area of practice as there is in any other. Did the committee drafting the Rule want clients to hire attorneys who know nothing about the subject and knowingly pay for their education? Do judges want only uneducated lawyers in their courts? And once educated, do these lawyers then become part of the “bankruptcy rings” and thus lose their integrity? To state these questions is to point out the impossibility and implausibility of what the Rule extension attempts to achieve.
The Court is aware of only two instances of alleged favoritism in the bankruptcy system. In one (Detroit) there was no family relationship. In the other (Cleveland), the family relationship was with a member of the District Court, a situation supposedly not reached by the Rule. The Commission Report records complaints of the non-bankruptcy bar. Cannot the same complaints be made about the anti-trust bar or the tax bar by non-members? There is simply no evidence that the Rule 5002 prohibition cures any failing in the system when balanced against the harm done to the bar and to the integrity of practitioners.
The attorney associated with a relative is deemed unfit, by the language of the Rule, to practice in a particular court. He is damaged in both profession and reputation. There is no procedure short of dissolving this association by which the tainted party can overcome the presumption. In the particular case at bar, the trustee is removed without a showing of cause. Such a procedure is not authorized by statute. Nor is this an instance where the Court should yield to legislative discretion. These rules were not promulgated as an exercise of legislative discretion. The mere fact that the Rules are transmitted to the Congress before the effective date is of little significance where, as here, the Congress held no hearings and took no action to stamp its imprimatur upon the document.
The Court holds that the extension of Rule 5002 to bar the appointment of those persons associating with a relative of a judge of the court making the appointment is void as a denial of due process. Such an extension deprives persons of their right of association, their right to engage in a particular profession or activity and frustrates future opportunities through injury to profession or reputation. The Rule causes removal of trustees without cause in violation of the restrictions imposed by the statute. There is simply no evidence of the *490validity of the extension. The comments of the committee are not entitled to deference. Finally, the Rule violates the mandate set out in Section 2075 of Title 28 in that it abridges and modifies substantive rights.
The Motion to Remove is DENIED.