(concurring). Whether in a particular factual complex, the Motor Carrier Act and subsequent regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission impose vicarious liability upon a trucking company-lessee of a motor vehicle for the negligence of the lessor-driver, an independent contractor, is actually a question of federal law, though very frequently, as here, one for determination by a state court. Since the United States Supreme Court has not spoken definitively in this area, the proper approach for a state tribunal is to seek conformity with the broad spirit and purpose of the federal enactments, which are fully spelled out in the majority opinion.
Here the dispositive facts are, in my view, uncontradicted, or at the least, are in such an evidential posture that reasonable men could not differ as to them and the conclusions to be *219drawn therefrom. Hence, the trial judge, as a matter of law, should have granted plaintiff’s motion for a binding instruction to the jury that Bond Transportation was vicariously liable if it found the driver negligent. Since the jury’s finding that the driver was negligent is not challenged and no other prejudicial error appears, I would reverse the Appellate Division and affirm the trial court judgment on this basis. The question raised by Bond as to the correctness of the special interrogatory put to the jury on the issue of vicarious liability and the judge’s instructions with respect to its resolution would thereby become academic. To decide, as the majority does, that the issue was one for jury determination in this state of the proofs can only lead to confusion in future cases.
The operative facts are admittedly different from those in most prior state and federal court cases dealing with the question. In those decisions the accident happened while both the vehicle and the lessor-driver were or had been away from the home state preceding, following, or during a gap in, interstate transportation. Here, on the other hand, the accident was in no way connected with an interstate transportation. On the day in question, and, in fact, on all but one previous occasion during the lease period, the hauling was entirely within the State and the mishap occurred while the lessor was driving his tractor home from Bond’s terminal (both locations being in New Jersey, a few miles apart) after the day’s work, with the expectation of a similar assignment the next working day. But I do not believe that such a factual distinction precludes a legal conclusion of vicarious liability under the current federal regulations. The same conclusion must also be reached with regard to Bond’s even broader contention that liability cannot be imposed unless, at the moment of the accident, the vehicle was actually engaged in interstate commerce.
Furthermore, I do not deem it significant that a 30-day minimum written lease, which is required by the Com*220mission’s regulations, had not been executed; there can be no dispute that, in legal effect, an oral lease existed covering Bond’s use of the tractor during the winter heating season. Vicarious liability cannot be avoided simply by absence of a written instrument for at least the minimum period in evasion of the law. Trip leases being now forbidden, the case must be viewed as though the requisite written engagement had been entered into.
The dispositive facts in this case, as I see it, are Bond’s furnishing a decal (in one form or another) to the lessor-driver bearing its Interstate Commerce Commission franchise -number, and the continuous attachment of a decal to the leased tractor at Bond’s direction. Although the testimony is confusing in some respects, viewing it most favorably to Bond indisputably demonstrates that this is so. Photographic evidence establishes beyond doubt that the cardboard decal, at least, was on the tractor at the time of the accident; and there is no evidence that the lessee at any time had ordered its removal. It is to be observed in this connection, that, clearly, a decal is not required by any federal regulation to be affixed where the leased vehicle is to be and is in fact employed only for intrastate transportation. Moreover, Bond’s contention that its name was required on the tractor by the New Jersey motor vehicle law is erroneous. N. J. S. A. 39:4-46 demands only that the name and municipality of residence of the owner, lessee, or lessor appear on a vehicle. Here the photograph shows that the owner-lessor’s identification was already painted on the cab.
I would hold that the decal conclusively evidenced Bond’s intention to have the vehicle available and under its exclusive control for the entire lease period for interstate as well as intrastate transportation, and that Bond should not now be able to claim otherwise. This being so, the federal enactments must apply throughout, and Bond is required thereby to assume full responsibility to the public for the operation *221of the vehicle. Vicarious liability for this accident consequently attaches as a matter of law. This conclusion best comports, I believe, with the spirit and purpose of these enactments and is supported by the rationale of the better considered opinions in this field. See particularly Mellon National Bank & Trust Co. v. Sophie Lines, Inc., 289 F. 2d 473 (3rd Cir. 1961), where, although the accident occurred on an unauthorized return trip digression following an interstate hauling, the court decided that the only way the lessee could have avoided responsibility was by conforming to the specific requirements of the regulations, which mandated the removal of its decal before relinquishing possession of the equipment and the obtaining of a receipt for the vehicle from the owner. Not having done so, the lessee was held vicariously liable as a matter of law. See also Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N. Y. 2d 449, 209 N. Y. S. 2d 304, 171 N. E. 2d 454, 460 (1960) (concurring opinion of Desmond, C. J.); Turnbow v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 15 Ill. App. 2d 57, 145 N. E. 2d 377, 380, 66 A. L. R. 2d 1075 (App. Ct. 1957); Felbrant v. Able, 80 N. J. Super. 587, 590 (App. Div. 1963).
If more on the question of Bond’s intention is required, it is found in the one interstate trip undertaken by the lessor-driver during the period. Whether that hauling was Bond’s job conducted under cover of another’s franchise, or was the job of the other and Bond subleased the equipment, Bond’s intention to have the leased vehicle available for interstate transportation is clearly evident.
Additionally, it is to be noted that the ill-fated trip from the terminal to the lessor’s home, in accord with a frequent practice and with Bond’s full knowledge and acquiescence, was in the latter’s business interest by assuring the lessor-driver’s availability at the terminal for the next early morning assignment. Cf. Wright v. Globe Porcelain Co., 72 N. J. Super. 414 (App. Div. 1962); Prosser, Torts (3rd Ed. 1964), § 69; 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts (1956). § 26.7, p. 1378.
*222It may be added that at the trial, and in the appellate briefs as well, all counsel were of the view that the question of vicarious liability was a matter of law, one way or the other, and not a fact question for jury determination. The trial judge was of the same mind, but felt that Felbrant v. Able, supra, dictated otherwise. I cannot so read that opinion.
I concur in the result reached by the majority.
For reversal — Chief Justice Weinteaub and Justices Jacobs, Eeanois, Pboctoe, Hall, Schettino and Haneman. — 7.
For affirmance — None.