dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that Johnson was not required to show irreparable injury as a prerequisite to his obtaining the injunction he seeks. This conclusion runs contrary to the well-settled law of this state. To be entitled to permanent injunctive relief, the movant must plead and prove a valid cause of action against the defendant. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex.1993); Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and S.E. Texas, Inc., 937 S.W.2d 60, 71 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), aff'd, 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.1998). In addition, he must also show that harm is imminent. Operation Rescue, 937 S.W.2d at 72. Finally, he must establish that the imminent harm •will result in an irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued. Id. Such injury may be found where a later award of damages will not provide adequate compensation for the harm suffered. Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.1987).
Johnson did not allege irreparable injury resulting from the barricade on Lemon Drive. In addition, the court did not set out an express finding or conclusion that such injury would result without the injunction. This court may nevertheless deem findings where the trial court has issued an order and the existing findings are silent on an indispensable issue. Sun Coast Resources, Inc. v. Cooper, 967 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). However, such a presumed finding must be raised by the pleadings and supported by the evidence. Id.
At trial, Johnson testified that he desired to have Lemon Drive opened so that those who purchased homes in Palm Valley South subdivision would be able to have easy access to the Palm Valley Country Club. However, he also testified that he had already developed the property and that ingress and egress to and from the development was possible via Stuart Place Drive, a public roadway abutting both his property and the Town of Palm Valley on the west. He presented no other evidence of imminent harm or irreparable injury without the injunction. Accordingly, I would conclude that there is no evidence in the record to support the deemed finding of irreparable injury necessary to support an injunction.
Johnson contends, and the majority conclude, that a showing of irreparable injury is not necessary to support the injunction here because it was issued pursuant to section 65.015 of the civil practice and remedies code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 65.015 (Vernon 1998). That section provides:
An injunction may not be granted to stay or prevent the governing body of an incorporated city from vacating, abandoning, or closing a street or alley except on the suit of a person:
(a) who is the owner or lessee of real property abutting the part of the *290street or alley vacated, abandoned, or closed; and
(b) whose damages have neither been ascertained and paid in a condemnation suit by the city nor released.
Id. Johnson suggests that the more specific language of section 65.015 controls the more general authority to grant injunctions found in section 65.011, which states, in pertinent part:
A writ of injunction may be granted if:
(3) the applicant is entitled to a writ of injunction under the principles of equity and the statutes of this state relating to injunctions; [or]....
(5) irreparable injury to real or personal property is threatened irrespective of any remedy at law.
Tex. Crv. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 65.011 (Vernon 1998). In short, Johnson asserts that section 65.015 comprehensively sets out the elements that entitle a person to injunctive relief from road closures. I disagree. The clear language of that section indicates that section 65.015 serves to impose two additional requirements upon an applicant. In other words, an applicant seeking an injunction preventing street closure must not only state a valid cause of action, show imminent harm and irreparable injury, he must also own abutting land and retain some ability to enjoin the closure (either because he has not been compensated or has not yet released his claim).
Johnson points to Dykes v. City of Houston, 406 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.1966), to further his argument that no showing of injury is required. In Dykes, a landowner sought a mandatory injunction to prohibit the City of Houston from placing a barricade across a public street. The barricade was erected to prevent vehicle traffic from entering an undeveloped area of the dedicated street. The supreme court upheld the injunction, noting that the case presented a “conflict between a private interest and the public welfare.” In short, the court’s opinion was rooted in the fact that the abutting landowners had acquired their property in a subdivision in which the plat dedicated private easements over the public road thereby entitling them to enjoin the City’s attempted closure. See Acts of 1930, 41st Leg., 5th C.S., ch. 84, 1930 Tex. Gen. Laws 257 (amended 1985) (current version at Tex. Crv. PRAC. & Rem. Code Ann. § 65.015 (Vernon 1997)). The focal point of the court’s analysis was its conclusion that the petitioners had purchased property in a subdivision and acquired private easement rights over the dedicated public road by virtue of having bought lots “with reference to a front or rear on that street.” Dykes, 406 S.W.2d at 181 (citing Oswald v. Grenet, 22 Tex. 94, 100 (1858)). This easement gave the purchasers “the right to have such street ... kept open.” Id. (quoting Wolf v. Brass, 72 Tex. 133,12 S.W. 159,160 (1888)).
I find nothing in this record to indicate that Johnson has acquired such an easement. The plat records introduced into evidence indicate that Johnson’s property is immediately south of the Town and the maps show that the northern border of Johnson’s property is contiguous with a portion of the southern border of the Town. Unlike in Dykes, where the petitioners bought their property within the subdivision containing the closed street, here, Johnson’s property is located entirely out-* side of the Palm Valley subdivision (which is now the Town of Palm Valley). Thus, I would conclude that Johnson has not acquired a private easement over Lemon Drive within the Town of Palm Valley. This distinction makes Dykes inapposite to the present case.
Johnson similarly argues that where a statute is being violated, the equitable requirements for obtaining an injunction do not apply. See Gulf Holding Corp. v. Brazoria County, 497 S.W.2d 614, 619 (Tex.Civ.App.- — Houston [14 th Dist.] 1973, writ ref d n.r.e.). In Gulf Holding, the court found that the “Open Beach Act” provided for a mandatory injunction to remove obstructions or barriers restricting access to *291beaches. Id. (citing VERNON Ann. Civ. Stat. art. 5415d (repealed, now Tex. Nat. Res.Code Ann. § 61.001, et seq.)). Section five of that act, as then codified, stated:
The Attorney General, any County Attorney, District Attorney, or Criminal District Attorney of the State of Texas is hereby authorized and empowered, and it shall be his, or their duty to file ... actions seeking either temporary or permanent court orders or injunctions to remove any obstruction or barrier, or prohibit any restraint or interference, restricting the right of the public ... to free and unrestricted ingress and egress to and from the state-owned beaches....
Id. (emphasis added). I find.no similar language in the statutes governing street closures. .Injunction is an appropriate remedy to stop street closure, but without a private easement, I believe that Johnson must also comply with the civil practice and remedies code, which places additional limitations on those who seek injunctive relief.
Because Johnson has not demonstrated an entitlement to injunctive relief because he has not shown irreparable injury, I would dissolve the injunction, reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Justices CHAVEZ and RODRIGUEZ join in the dissent.